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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
DARR YL HARRIS and CHRISTINE 
HARRfS, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
DUANE L. YOST and LORI YOST, husband 
and wife, DUANE L. YOST as Trustee of the 
DUANE L. YOST TRUST, THE BANK OF 
COMMERCE, an Idaho Corporation and 
JOHN DOES I-X, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-09-3488 
MOTION TO AMEND ANSWER 
AND COUNTERCLAIM, CROSS 
CLAIM AND THIRD-PARTY 
CLAIM AND TO INCLUDE 
CLAIM FOR PUNITIVE 
DAMAGES 
MOTION TO AMEND ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM, CROSS CLAIM AND 
THIRD PARTY CLAIM AND TO INCLUDE CLAIM FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES - 1 
THE BANK OF COMMERCE, an Idaho 
corporation, 
v. 
Counterclaimant/Cross-
claimant/Third-Party 
Claimant, 
DARRYL HARRIS and CHRISTINE 
HARRIS, husband and wife, 
Counterdefendants, 
and 
DUANE L. YOST and LORI YOST, husband 
and wife, DUANE L. YOST as Trustee ofthe 
DUANE L. YOST TRUST, JOHN DOES I-X, 
Crossdefendants, 
and 
HAMPSHIRE HOLDINGS, LLC, 
Third-Party Defendant. 
COMES NOW the Counterclaimant/Crossclaimant/Third Party Claimant, The 
Bank of Commerce (the "Bank"), by and through its attorneys of record, Nelson Hall Parry 
Tucker, P.A., and moves the Court to grant leave to amend its Answer and Counterclaim, Cross 
Claim and Third-Party Claim. Pursuant to Idaho Code § 6-1604(2), the Bank also moves for 
leave to amend its Counterclaim to include a claim for punitive damages against 
PlaintiffiCounterdefenant Darryl Harris. A copy of the proposed Amended Answer and 
Counterclaim, Cross Claim and Third-Party Claim is attached hereto as Exhibit "A". This 
MOTION TO AMEND ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM, CROSS CLAIM AND 
THIRD PARTY CLAIM AND TO INCLUDE CLAIM FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES - 2 
,; t) 
..:... ~. ":£ 
motion is supported by the documents previously filed with the Comi, the memorandum in 
support and affidavits filed herewith. Oral argument is requested. 
WHEREFORE, the Bank asks the Court to grant leave to amend. 
Dated this .J?O;day of January, 2011. 
NELSON HALL PARRY TUCKER, P.A. 
By ~~ 
DougJaSRlS(;n 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I l~'eby certifY that I served a true copy of the foregoing document upon the following 
this -Z::r day of January, 2011, by hand delivery, mailing with the necessary postage 
affixed thereto, facsimile, or overnight mail. 
Kipp L. Manwaring 
MANWARING LA W OFFICE 
381 Shoup Avenue, Suite 210 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
[ ] Mailing 
[ ~nd Delivery 
[ ] Fax: 523-9109 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
Wiley R. Dennert 
L:\DRN\0260.491 \Answer & Counterclaim - Motion to Amend. wpd 
MOTION TO AMEND ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM, CROSS CLAIM AND 
THIRD PARTY CLAIM AND TO INCLUDE CLAIM FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES - 3 
Douglas R. Nelson - ISB# 1580 
Brian T. Tucker - ISB# 5236 
Wiley R. Dennert - ISB# 6216 
NELSON HALL PARRY TUCKER, P.A. 
490 Memorial Drive 
P.O. Box 51630 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-1630 
Telephone:(208) 522-3001 
Facsimile: (208) 523-7254 
Attomeys for The Bank of Commerce 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
DARRYL HARRIS and CHRISTINE 
HARRIS, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
DUANE L. YOST and LORI YOST, husband 
and wife, DUANE L. YOST as Trustee of the 
DUANE L. YOST TRUST, THE BANK OF 
COMMERCE, an Idaho Corporation and 
JOHN DOES I-X, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-09-3488 
AMENDED ANSWER AND 
COUNTERCLAIM, CROSS CLAIM 
AND THIRD-PARTY CLAIM 
AMENDED ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM, CROSS CLAIM AND THIRD-PARTY CLAIM - 1 
EXI-HBI 
"A" 
THE BANK OF COMMERCE, an Idaho 
corporation, 
v. 
CounterclaimantiCross-
claim an t/Third -Party 
Claimant, 
DARRYL HARRIS and CHRISTINE 
HARRIS, husband and wife, 
Counterdefendants, 
and 
DUANE L. YOST and LORI YOST, husband 
and wife, DUANE L. YOST as Trustee of the 
DUANE L. YOST TRUST, JOHN DOES I-X, 
Crossdefendants, 
and 
HAMPSHIRE HOLDINGS, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability company, ROBERT 
PARKINSON CRANDALL, an individual, 
and F AMIL Y ASSET PROTECTION 
LEGAL SERVICES, P.L.L.c., an Idaho 
professional limited liability company, 
Third-Party Defendants. 
AMENDED ANSWER 
COMES NOW Defendant Bank of Commerce (the "Bank") by and through its attorneys 
of record, Nelson Hall Parry Tucker, P.A., for its amended answer to Plaintiffs' Complaint 
admits, denies and alleges as follows: 
FIRST DEFENSE 
AMENDED ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM, CROSS CLAIM AND THIRD-PARTY CLAIM - 2 
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Plaintiffs' Complaint fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted. 
SECOND DEFENSE 
The Bank denies each and every allegation or averment of the Complaint not specifically 
admitted. 
THIRD DEFENSE 
The Bank answers the specific allegations of the Complaint as follows: 
l. Admits paragraphs 1, 2, 4, 16, 17, 18, 19, 47, and 48. 
2. Denies paragraphs 23, 24, 30, 39, 44, 49,50,51,52,56,62 and 63. 
3. With regards to paragraphs 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14,20,21,26,27,28, 
29, 31, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 41, 42, 43, 46, 54, 55, 57, 59, 60 and 61, said paragraphs are 
allegations between the Plaintiffs and Defendants Duane L. Yost and Lori Yost, husband and 
wife, and/or Duane L. Yost as Trustee of the Duane L. Yost Trust, and therefore do not require 
an answer by the Bank. To the extent said paragraphs apply to the Bank, the Bank is without 
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth ofthe matters asserted in said 
paragraphs and, therefore, denies the same. Even if any or all of the allegations in said 
paragraphs were true, the Bank still has a priority lien position superior to any lien that the 
Plaintiffs may have. 
4. With regards to paragraph 15, the Bank is without sufficient information whether 
it was "[ u ]pon the Y osts' direction and in reliance on Palmers's letter," and therefore denies the 
same. To the extent said portion of paragraph 15 were true, the Bank still has a priority lien 
position superior to any lien that the Plaintiffs may have. The Bank admits the remainder of 
paragraph 15. 
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5. Paragraphs 22, 25, 32, 40, 45, 53 and 58 are merely restatements of previous 
paragraphs and, therefore, do not require a response. 
6. Furthermore, the Bank denies the Plaintiffs are entitled to costs and attorneys fees 
against the Bank. 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
The Bank asserts the following affirmative defenses in response to the Complaint: 
First Affirmative Defense 
As and for a first affirmative defense, the Bank alleges Plaintiffs fail to state a claim 
upon which relief may be granted. 
Second Affirmative Defense 
As and for a second affirmative defense, the Bank alleges it is a bona fide lender and/or 
a bona fide purchaser. 
Third Affirmative Defense 
As and for a third affirmative defense, the Bank alleges estoppel in all its forms 
including, but not limited to, judicial estoppel, equitable estoppel, quasi-estoppel, promissory 
estoppel, etc. 
Fourth Affirmative Defense 
As and for a fourth affirmative defense, the Bank alleges waiver. 
Fifth Affirmative Defense 
As and for a fifth affirmative defense, the Bank alleges laches. 
Sixth Affirmative Defense 
As and for a sixth affirmative defense, the Bank alleges unclean hands. 
AMENDED ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM, CROSS CLAIM AND THIRD-PARTY CLAIM - 4 
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Seventh Affirmative Defense 
As and for a seventh affirmative defense, the Bank alleges assumption ofthe risk. 
Eighth Affirmative Defense 
As and for an eighth affirmative defense, the Bank alleges payment. 
Ninth Affirmative Defense 
As and for a ninth affirmative defense, the Bank alleges ratification. 
Tenth Affirmative Defense 
As and for a tenth affirmative defense, the Bank alleges unjust enrichment. 
Eleventh Affirmative Defense 
As and for an eleventh affirmative defense, the Bank alleges constructive trust. 
Twelfth Affirmative Defense 
As and for a twelfth affirmative defense, the Bank alleges part performance. 
Thirteenth Affirmative Defense 
As and for a thirteenth affirmative defense, the Bank alleges election of remedies. 
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS 
The Bank has been required to retain the services of attorneys to defend against the 
Complaint. The Bank therefore seeks its reasonable costs and attorneys fees incurred in the 
defense against the Complaint pursuant to Rule 54, I.R.c.P., and Idaho Code §§ 12-120, 12-121 
and 12-123. 
REQUEST FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, the Defendant respectfully requests relief as follows: 
1. Dismissal of Plaintiffs' Complaint with prejudice; 
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2. Enter a Judgment in favor of the Bank and against Plaintiffs; 
3. Award reasonable attorney fees and costs to the Bank; and 
4. Grant the Bank such other and further relief as the Comi deems just and proper. 
AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM, CROSS CLAIM AND THIRD-PARTY CLAIM 
COMES NOW the Counterclaimant/CrossclaimantiThird Party Claimant, The Bank of 
Commerce (the "Bank"), by and through its attorneys of record, Nelson Hall Parry Tucker, 
P.A., and for its complaint alleges as follows: 
1. Status of the Bank . At all times mentioned herein, the Bank is an Idaho 
corporation with its principal place of business in Bonneville County, Idaho. The Bank is the 
beneficiary of a Deed of Trust sought to be judicially foreclosed in this matter. 
2. Status of the Other Parties 
A. Counterdefendants Darryl Harris and Christine Harris ("Harris" herein), 
are husband and wife and at all times relevant hereto were residents of 
Bonneville County, Idaho. Said Counterdefendants have or claim some 
interest in the real property described herein as Tract II by reason of a deed 
of trust granted by Duane Yost and Lori Yost, husband and wife to Idaho 
Title and Trust Co. an Idaho Corporation, as trustee for the benefit of 
Darryl Harris and Christine Harris, dated June 13, 2005, and recorded 
June 20, 2005, as Instrument No. 1189682 in the records of Bonneville 
County, State ofIdaho. 
B. Crossdefendants Duane L. Yost and Lori Yost ("Yost" herein), are 
husband and wife and at all times relevant hereto were residents of 
AMENDED ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM, CROSS CLAIM AND THIRD-PARTY CLAIM - 6 
Bonneville County, Idaho. Yost is the vested owner of the real property 
sought to be foreclosed in this matter and the makers of the notes, deeds 
of trust and other security documents sought to be foreclosed. 
C. Cross defendant Duane L. Yost as Trustee of the Duane L. Yost Trust 
("Trust" herein) upon information and belief is a living trust created and 
registered in Bonneville County, Idaho. 
D. Crossdefendants John Does I-X, are persons or entities whose identities 
are not known that may have or claim an interest in the subject real 
property. 
E. Third-Party Defendant Hampshire Holdings, LLC, is an Idaho limited 
liability company with its principal place of business in Idaho Falls, 
Idaho. 
F. The above named Counterdefendants, Cross defendants, and Third-Party 
Defendant Hampshire Holdings, LLC, and each of them, may claim some 
right, title, lien, or interest in the real property described below, but their 
interest, if any, in and to said real property, is junior, subordinate, and 
subsequent to the right and lien of the Bank. 
G. Third-Party Defendant Robel1 Parkinson Crandall ("Crandall"), is an 
individual believed to reside in Bonneville County. Crandall is an attorney 
licensed to practice law in the state ofIdaho, a certified public accountant, 
an Idaho notary public and an employee of Third-Party Defendant Family 
Asset Protection Legal Services, P.L.L.C. ("Family Asset Protection"). 
AMENDED ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM, CROSS CLAIM AND THIRD-PARTY CLAIM - 7 
• C' (iO ... 
H. Family Asset Protection is an Idaho professional limited liability 
company, organized for the practice in the profession of law. 
3. Amounts Due and in Default. 
A. The Bank is the holder of a Promissory Note made by Duane Yost dated 
April 16, 2008, in the amount of$2,000,000.00 which is past due and fully matured. Said Note 
requires payments on demand and provides for an initial interest rate of5.75% per alliUm and 
then beginning on April 17,2008, a variable interest rate of 0.500% above the following index 
rate: the highest published Wall Street Journal prime. A true and correct copy of said 
Promissory Note is attached hereto as Exhibit "A". Yost is in default of said Note having not 
made timely and full payment. As of July 13, 2009 the principal and interest amount which is 
fully due and owing is approximately $1,250,155.18 plus a per diem interest accrual after July 
13,2009 at the per diem rate of approximately $188.37955. 
B. The Bank is the holder of a Promissory Note made by Duane Yost dated 
November 21,2008 in the amount of$l ,000,000.00 with a maturity date of November 21,2009. 
Said Note requires one balloon payment of$l ,055,000.00 and provides for an initial interest rate 
of5.5% per annum and then beginning on November 22,2008, a variable interest rate of 0.500% 
above the following index rate: the highest published Wall Street Journal prime. A true and 
correct copy of said Promissory Note is attached hereto as Exhibit "B". Yost is in default of 
said Note due to the default provisions. As of July 13, 2009 the principal and interest amount 
owing is approximately $1,035,260.27 plus a per diem interest accrual after July 13,2009 at the 
per diem rate of approximately $150.68493. 
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4. Description of the Collateral. 
A. As security for the repayment of said Promissory Notes, together with 
interest, costs, and attorney's fees, the Cross defendants, Yost, made, executed, and delivered 
to The Bank, that certain Deed of Trust executed on November 21,2008, which was recorded 
on November 21,2008, and re-recorded on December 17,2008, in the real estate records of 
Bonneville County, Idaho, under Instrument Nos. 1317355 and 1319093, respectively, and 
attached hereto as Exhibit "C" and that certain Deed of Trust executed on December 24,2008, 
which was recorded on December 30, 2008, in the real estate records of Bonneville County, 
Idaho, under Instrument No. 1319937, and attached hereto as Exhibit "D". Said Deeds of Trust 
are incorporated herein as though set forth in full covering the following described real property . 
situated in Bonneville County, Idaho: 
TRACT I 
Beginning at a point that is South 89°55'28" West along the 
Section line 1326.98 feet from the North 114 Corner of Section 1 0, 
Township 1 North, Range 38 East of the Boise Meridian; running 
thence South 89°55'28" West along said Section line 1236.12 feet 
to the South Right-of-Way line of 65th South; thence along said 
South Right-of-Way line of 65th South and the East Right-of-Way 
line of 25th East the following three (3) courses; South 00°12'54" 
East 28.10 feet to a point of curve with a radius of 69.34 feet and 
a chord bearing South 44 ° 18'28" West 98.29 feet; thence to the left 
along said curve 1 09.24 feet through a central angle of90016'00"; 
thence South 89°10'28" West 28.71 feet to the West line of said 
Section 1 0; thence South 00° 19'04" East 1216.86 feet to the South 
line of the North h of the Northwest 114 of said Section 10, thence 
North 89°54'09" East along said South line 1327.87 feet; thence 
North 00°03'13" West 1312.06 feet to the POINT OF 
BEGINNING. 
Excepting 
That portion thereof conveyed to the State of Idaho by that deed 
recorded on May 8, 1950 in Book 70 of Deeds at Page 287 of 
AMENDED ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM, CROSS CLAIM AND THIRD-PARTY CLAIM - 9 
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Official Records of Bonneville County, Idaho. 
("Real Property Collateral" herein) 
B. As security for the repayment of said Promissory Notes, together with 
interest, costs, and attorney's fees, the Third-Party Defendant Hampshire 
Holdings, LLC, made, executed, and delivered to The Bank, that certain Deed of 
Trust executed on November 21,2008, and attached hereto as Exhibit "E". Said 
Deed of Trust is incorporated herein as though set forth in full covering the 
following described real property situated in Bonneville County, Idaho: 
TRACT I 
Beginning at a point that is South 89°55'28" West along the 
Section line 1326.98 feet fl'om the North 114 Corner of Section 10, 
Township 1 North, Range 38 East of the Boise Meridian; running 
thence South 89°55'28" West along said Section line 1236.12 feet 
to the South Right-of-Way line of65 th South; thence along said 
South Right -of-Way line of 65th South and the East Right -of-Way 
line of 25th East the following three (3) courses; South 00°12'54" 
East 28.10 feet to a point of curve with a radius of 69.34 feet and 
a chord bearing South 44 ° 18'28" West 98.29 feet; thence to the left 
along said curt 1 09.24 feet through a central angle of 90° 16'00"; 
thence South 89°10'28" West 28.71 feet to the West line of said 
Section 1 0; thence South 00° 19'04" East 1216.86 feet to the South 
line of the North Yz of the Northwest 114 of said Section 10, thence 
North 89°54'09" East along said South line 1327.87 feet; thence 
North 00003'l3" West 1312.06 feet to the POINT OF 
BEGINNING. 
That portion thereof conveyed to the State of Idaho by that deed 
recorded on May 8, 1950 in Book 70 of Deeds at Page 287 of 
Offieial Records of Bonneville County, Idaho. 
TRACT II: 
Lot 11 in Block 3 of Canterbury Park, Division No.2, to the City 
of Idaho Falls, Idaho according to the official plat thereof, 
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recorded October 19,1992 as Instrument No. 837954 filed in 
Official Records of Bonneville County, Idaho 
("Real Property Collateral" herein) 
5. Default and Acceleration. The Bank is the owner and holder of said Notes and 
the beneficiary of said Deeds of Trust. The Crossdefendant Yost is in default due to his failure 
to make timely payment under said Promissory Notes and the other default provisions of said 
Promissory Notes, and The Bank declares all sums owing under said Notes, Deeds of Trust, and 
any related security documents, due and payable in full. In addition, the Bank has incurred 
expense for a title report preliminary to foreclosure, the full amount of which is presently 
unknown, but which The Bank is entitled to recover. 
COUNT I 
BREACH OF PROMISSORY NOTE 
6. The Bank realleges the allegations contained in paragraphs 1-5 as though fully 
set forth herein and incorporates the same by reference. 
7. As of July 13,2009, there was due and owing to the Bank the unpaid principal 
and interest amount of approximately $2,285,415.45 plus additional pre judgment interest at the 
rate of approximately 5.5% per annum resulting in a per diem of approximately $339.06448 
together with costs and attorney's fees accruing thereon. 
8. Yost is in default of his payment obligation to the Bank, and the Bank has 
declared and does hereby declare all sums owing and immediately due and payable in full. The 
Bank has made demand upon the Defendant at least ten (l0) days prior to filing suit in this 
matter but Yost has failed and/or refused to make any payments to the Bank. 
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9. The Bank is therefore entitled to judgment against Yost in the sum of 
approximately $2,285,415.45 together with accruing interest thereon from July 13, 2009 at the 
per diem rate of approximately $339.06448 until the date of judgment, plus accruing costs and 
attorney's fees. 
COUNT II 
BREACH OF GUARANTY AGREEMENT 
10. The Bank realleges the allegations contained in paragraphs 1-9 as though fully 
set forth herein and incorporates the same by reference. 
11. The Cross defendants Duane Yost and Lori Yost and the Third-Party Defendant 
Hampshire Holdings, LLC, personally guaranteed up to $1,000,000 ofthe obligations of Duane 
Yost described above. A copy of said guarantees are attached hereto as Exhibit "F". 
12. The Cross defendant Duane Yost has defaulted on the obligations as described 
above. 
13. The Bank has made demand on the Cross defendant Duane Yost for payment but 
Duane Yost has failed to pay as required by the Promissory Notes. 
14. The Bank has made demand on the Cross defendants Duane Yost and Lori Yost 
and the Third-Party Defendant Hampshire Holdings, LLC, for payment based upon the guaranty 
but each of them has refused and continues to refuse to pay the Bank. 
15. As the Guarantor, the Cross defendants Duane Yost and Lori Yost and the 
Third-Party Defendant Hampshire Holdings, LLC, are obligated to the Bank in the principal 
amount of $1 ,000,000 plus additional pre judgment interest at the rate of approximately 5.5% 
per annum resulting in a per diem of $150.68493 together with costs and attorney's fees 
accruing thereon. 
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COUNT III 
FORECLOSURE OF DEEDS OF TRUST 
16. The Bank realleges the allegations contained in paragraphs 1-15 as though fully 
set f011h herein and incorporates the same by reference. 
17. The Deeds of Trust described above grant to the Bank a valid lien and security 
interest in and to all of the real property, improvements, fixtures, irrigation equipment, or water 
rights, or other property described therein. Said Deeds of Trust have never been satisfied or 
discharged and no other suit or action has been commenced to foreclose upon said Deeds of 
Trust or to collect the amounts owed on the aforesaid Promissory Notes. 
18. By the terms of said Deeds of Trust, the real property, and any fixtures, 
improvements, irrigation equipment or water rights, should be declared as pat1 of the Deeds of 
Trust and should be included in this foreclosure and in any sale hereinafter to be ordered as part 
of the security for the repayment of this loan. 
19. Use of Premises. Said Real Property Collateral, as described in each separate 
tract, has at all times heretofore been used together as one lot or parcel for each tract and every 
part thereof is necessary for the best use and enjoyment of said Real Property Collateral and 
each tract cannot be sold in separate parcels without material injury to the parties thereto. 
20. Reasonable Value. The Bank intends to determine the reasonable value of the 
property prior to entry of decree herein and to introduce evidence supporting such value. In the 
event that said reasonable value should be less than the amount of the judgment requested, plus 
accruing interest, costs, and fees, the Bank intends to apply to the Court for the entry of a 
deficiency judgment against Crossdefendants Yost, for any deficiency remaining after 
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application of the foreclosure sale proceeds to payment of the judgment herein, plus accruing 
interest, costs, and fees herein. 
21. No Other Action. The Bank has no plain, speedy, or adequate remedy at law, and 
no other proceeding at law or equity has been commenced or is pending to collect said notes or 
any portion thereof or to foreclose these Deeds of Trust. That all conditions precedent to the 
initiation and prosecution of this suit on said Notes and the foreclosure of said Deeds of Trust 
have been satisfied. 
22. Attorney's Fees. Under each and every count, the Bank has been forced to 
employ counsel to represent it in this action and has become obligated to pay its reasonable 
attorney's fees and costs for such service. The Bank is entitled to recover reasonable attorney's 
fees from the Crossdefendants by virtue of the attorney's fees provision contained in the 
Promissory Notes, Deeds of Trust, and other security documents herein above described as well 
as pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120 and §12-121. The Bank alleges that $5,000.00 is a 
reasonable sum to be allowed as attorney's fees if this action is uncontested, plus such additional 
sums as the Court may adjudge as reasonable attorney's fees in the event of a contest, trial or 
appeal. 
COUNT IV 
BREACH OF CONTRACT/THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY 
23. The Bank realleges the allegations contained in paragraphs 1-22 as though fully 
set forth herein and incorporates the same by reference. 
24. The Harrises agreed to sell the subject 40 acres to the Y osts. 
25. The Bank was a known and intended third-party beneficiary of this agreement 
between the Harrises and the Y osts. 
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26. The Harrises are claiming that they did not transfer the said 40 acres to the Y osts. 
27. To the extent the Court finds that the Harrises did not transfer the 40 acres to the 
Y osts, then the Harrises breached their agreement to transfer the 40 acres to the Y osts. 
28. As a result, the Bank, as a third party to the agreement, has been damaged. 
29. The Bank seeks damages in an amount to be proven at trial and/or for specific 
performance of the Harrises' agreement to transfer the 40 acres to the Y osts. 
COUNT V 
FRAUD/MISREPRESENTATION 
30. The Bank realleges the allegations contained in paragraphs 1-29 as though fully 
set forth herein and incorporates the same by reference. 
31. In order for Duane Yost to use Tract I ofthe Real Property Collateral, ("Tract I") 
as collateral for his renewal loan with the Bank, Darryl Harris executed a QuitClaim Deed on 
November 25,2010 that purported to transfer Tract I to the Duane L. Yost Trust. 
32. However, in order for the title company to issue title insurance for Tract I, a 
Corrected QuitClaim Deed was prepared which included a signature line for Christine Harris 
in addition to the signature line for Darryl Harris. 
33. Without authority from his wife, Darryl Harris signed Christine Harris' name to 
the Corrected QuitClaim Deed on or about December 1, 2008. 
34. Darryl Harris remained silent about the fact that he had signed Christine Harris' 
name to the Corrected Quitclaim Deed without her consent and his silence was a representation. 
35. Therefore, Darryl Harris represented that Christine Harris signed the Corrected 
QuitClaim Deed. 
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36. Implied in this representation was the statement and/or representation that 
Christine Harris had consented to the transfer of Tract I to Duane Yost and Lori Yost pursuant 
to the Corrected QuitClaim Deed. 
37. Such representation was false as Christine Harris had not signed the QuitClaim 
Deed nor had she authorized Darryl Harris to sign her name on the Corrected QuitClaim Deed. 
38. This representation was material because Tract I was owned by Darryl Harris and 
Christine Harris as community property and the consent of both Darryl Harris and Christine 
Harris was necessary to transfer Tract I to Duane Yost and Lori Yost. 
39. Darry I Harris knew that Christine Harris had not signed the Corrected QuitClaim 
Deed. Moreover, Darryl Harris knew he had signed Christine Harris' name on the Corrected 
QuitClaim Deed without first getting her authorization and therefore, he knew that his 
representation was false. 
40. Darryl Harris intended that Crandall, the Yosts, the title company and the Bank 
would rely on his forgery of his wife's signature on the Corrected QuitClaim Deed. 
41. In addition, Darry I Harris intended that the Y osts, the title company and the Bank 
would rely on his silent representation that Christine Harris had consented to the transfer of 
Tract I to the Y osts. 
42. Furthermore, Darryl Harris knew that the Corrected QuitClaim Deed would be 
recorded with Bonneville County and that his forgery of his wife's signature would be relied on 
by the general public. 
43. Duane Yost, Lori Yost, the title company and the Bank are members of the 
general public. 
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44. At no time during 2008, did Crandall, the Yosts, the title company or the Bank 
know that Darryl Harris had forged his wife's name on the Corrected QuitClaim Deed. 
45. In fact, the Bank did not know about said forgery until it received Plaintiffs' 5th 
Supplmentary Response to the Defendants, the Bank of Commerce First Set ofInterrogatories 
and Requests for Production of Documents on or about November 1,2010. 
46. Crandall, the Yosts, the title company and the Bank all relied on Darryl Harris' 
forgery of his wife's signature on the Corrected QuitClaim Deed. 
A. Specifically, Crandall relied on said forgery when he notarized the 
Corrected QuitClaim Deed because he believed that Christine Harris had 
actually signed said deed. 
B. Specifically, Duane and Lori Yost relied on said forgery as they believed 
that Tract I had been deeded and transferred to them and they believed 
that they could therefore use Tract I as collateral for various loans 
obtained by Duane Yost from the Bank. 
C. Specifically, the title company relied on said forgery as it issued title 
insurance to the Bank. 
D. Specifically, the Bank relied on said forgery as it renewed various loans 
to Duane Yost on the belief that Darry I Harris and Christine Harris had 
actually transferred Tract I to Duane Yost and Lori Yost and on the belief 
that the Y osts could provide Tract I as security for the renewal loans. 
47. The Bank's reliance on the forgery was justifiable as neither Darryl Harris nor 
Christine Harris, despite their knowledge of the forgery, informed the Bank of the forgery until 
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on or about November 1,2010. 
48. In addition, the Bank's reliance on the forgery was justifiable because the Bank 
had a long business relationship with Darryl Harris and was not aware of any prior instance of 
Darryl Harris' dishonesty and therefore had no reason to suspect that Darryl Harris would ever 
forge his wife's signature. 
49. Ifthe Court declares the Corrected QuitClaim Deed to be invalid, then as a result 
of Darry I Harris' fraud and forgery the Bank has suffered injury because it gave value to Duane 
Yost by renewing his loans and extending the terms of his loans believing that its Deeds of Trust 
had secured Tract I as collateral for the renewal loans. 
50. Specifically, the Bank's injury is the value of Tract I, plus other amounts to be 
proven at trial of this matter. 
51. In addition, ifthe Court declares the Corrected QuitClaim Deed to be invalid, then 
as a result of Darryl Harris' fraud and forgery the Bank has suffered injury because rather than 
enter into the renewal loans with Duane Yost, the Bank could have used moneys on deposit with 
the Bank during the latter end of2008 that were in accounts owned or controlled by Duane Yost 
as a setoffbut because of the fraud and forgery, the Bank did not exercise its right to said setoff. 
COUNT VI 
CIVIL LIABILITY OF NOTARY PUBLIC AND EMPLOYER 
52. The Bank realleges the allegations contained in paragraphs 1-51 as though fully 
set forth herein and incorporates the same by reference. 
53. Crandall, individually and as an employee of Family Asset Protection, notarized 
the Corrected Quitclaim Deed which contains Darryl Harris' forgery of Christine Harris' 
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signature, despite the fact that Christine Harris did not appear before him and that she did not 
sign the Corrected Quitclaim Deed. 
54. As a notary public, Crandall failed to require Christine Harris and Darryl Harris 
to personally appear before him prior to or at the time he notarized the Corrected Quitclaim 
Deed. 
55. As a notary public, Crandall's failure to exercise the required degree of care in 
identifYing the person who actually signed Christine Harris' name on the Corrected Quitclaim 
Deed constitutes official misconduct pursuant to Idaho Code § 51-112. 
56. As a notary public, Crandall's failure to exercise the required degree of care in 
verifYing who signed Christine Harris' name to the Corrected Quitclaim Deed at or before the 
time he notarized the Corrected Quitclaim Deed constitutes official misconduct pursuant to 
Idaho Code § 51-112. 
57. As a notary public, Crandall should be held liable for all damages proximately 
caused by his official misconduct as set forth herein. 
58. Pursuant to Idaho Code §51-118, Family Asset Protection, as Crandall's 
employer, should be jointly and severally liable with Crandall for all damages proximately 
caused by the official misconduct of Crandall, because Crandall was acting as a notary public 
within the scope of his employment when he notarized the Corrected Quitclaim Deed and 
because Family Asset Protection had actual knowledge of, or reasonably should have known 
of, Crandall's official misconduct. 
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COUNT VII 
PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL 
59. The Bank realleges the allegations contained in paragraphs 1-58 as though fully 
set forth herein and incorporates the same by reference. 
60. By signing the Corrected Quitclaim Deed, Defendant Darryl Harris made the 
specific promise that he and his wife, Christine Harris, were transferring Tract I to Duane Yost 
in order for the Bank to obtain security in Tract I and to renew Duane Yost's loans with the 
Bank. 
61. The Bank was a known third-party beneficiary to Darryl Harris' promise to 
transfer Tract I to Duane Yost. 
62. The Bank relied on Darryl Harris' promise to transfer Tract I to Duane Yost. 
63. To the extent the Corrected Quitclaim Deed is deemed void because of Darryl 
Harris' forgery of his wife's name on said deed, Darryl Harris breached his promiseto transfer 
Tract r to Duane Yost. 
64. The Bank has suffered substantial economic loss as a result of its reliance on 
Darryl Harris' promise to transfer Tract r to Duane Yost. 
65. The Bank's loss was or should have been foreseeable by Darryl Harris when he 
forged his wife's name on the Corrected Quitclaim Deed. 
66. It was reasonable for the Bank to rely on Darryl Harris' promise to transfer Tract 
I to Duane Yost as well as on his forgery of Christine Harris' name on the Corrected Quitclaim 
Deed. 
67. As a result, the Bank has been damaged in an amount to be proven at triaL 
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COUNT VIII 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
68. The Bank realleges the allegations contained in paragraphs 1-67 as though fully 
set forth herein and incorporates the same by reference. 
69. Defendant Darryl Harris' decision to forge Christine Harris' name on the 
Corrected Quitclaim Deed, without her written consent and in reckless disregard of the 
consequences to the Bank and to other third parties, was oppressive, malicious, outrageous, 
reckless and fraudulent. The Bank is entitled to an award of punitive damages against 
Defendant Darryl Harris, pursuant to I.C. § 6-1604. 
REQUEST FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, the Bank prays for judgment as follows: 
A. That the Bank have judgment against Yost in the sum of approximately 
$2,285,415.45 together with interest at the rate of approximately 5.5% per annum after July 13, 
2009 at the per diem interest accrual of approximately $339.06448 for any sums advanced by 
the Bank or which the Bank becomes obligated or elects to advance for the payment of taxes, 
assessments, insurance premiums, mortgage insurance premiums, water charges, and other 
governmental charges, fines, assessed or charged against the property during the pendency of 
this action, including interest on such advance from the date of the advance; for the sum of 
$5,000.00 for attorney's fees if this action is uncontested, plus such additional sums as the Court 
may adjudge as reasonable in the event of contest, trial, or appeal; for the Bank's taxable costs 
and disbursements herein; and for interest on the entire amount of said judgment at the 
maximum rate allowed by law. 
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B. That the Bank's Deeds of Trust herein described be adjudged first and prior liens 
upon the Real Property Collateral superior to any right, title, claim, lien, or interest on the part 
of the named Counterdefendants, Crossclaimants, Third-Party Claimaint or any persons 
claiming by, through, or under said Counterdefendants, Crossclaimants or Third-Party 
Claimaint, except for Tract II upon which Counterdefendants Darryl Harris and Christine Harris, 
husband and wife, may have a first lien priority based upon the deed of trust described in 
paragraph 2.A. of this Counterclaim, Cross Claim and Third-Party Claim. 
C. That the Court, in the decree, establish the reasonable value ofthe Real Property 
Collateral herein described according to proof. 
D. That the Bank's Deeds of Trust described herein be foreclosed and said Real 
Property Collateral, together with improvements and water rights, however evidenced, be sold 
in one parcel in accordance with and in the maImer provided by law; that the Bank be permitted 
to be a purchaser at the sale; that the net proceeds of said sale be applied first toward the 
payment of the costs of said sale and then toward the payment of the Bank's judgment; that the 
Bank have and retain a deficiency judgment against the Cross Defendants and Third-Party 
Defendant, in the event that the bid at the sale is less than the sum of the Bank's entire 
judgment, plus costs of sale. 
E. That the decree provide that after the sale of said Real Property Collateral, all 
right, title, claim, lien, or interest in the above-named Counterdefendants, Crossdefendants, 
Third-Party Defendants, and every person claiming by, through, or under said 
Counterdefendants, Cross defendants and Third-Party Defendants in or to said property, 
including the right of possession thereof from and after said sale, be forever barred and 
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foreclosed and that the purchaser at said sale be entitled to immediate possession of the premises 
as allowed by law subject only to such statutory right of redemption as the Counterdefendants, 
Crossdefendants and Third-Party Defendants may have by law. 
F. In the event that the Bank is the purchaser at sale and possession of said premises 
is not surrendered to the Bank, that the Court issue a Writ of Assistance directed to the sheriff 
of Bonneville County, Idaho, to deliver possession of said premises to the Bank. 
G. That the Bank be granted a judgment against Defendants Darryl Harris and 
Christine Harris for damages in an amount to be proven at trial andJor for specific performance 
of their agreement to sell the subject 40 acres to the Y osts. 
H. That the Bank be granted a judgment against Defendant Robert Parkinson 
Crandall, an individual, and Family Asset Protection Legal Services, P.L.L.C., in an amount to 
be proven at trial. 
I. That punitive damages be entered against Defendant Darryl Harris and in favor 
of the Bank. 
J. That the Bank may have such other and further relief as the Court deems just and 
equitable. 
Dated this __ day of _______ , 201l. 
NELSON HALL PARRY TUCKER, P .A. 
By: 
Douglas R. Nelson 
* This is an attempt to collect a debt, any information obtained will be used for that purpose. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certifY that I served a true copy of the foregoing document upon the following 
this day of ,2011, by hand delivery, mailing with the necessary postage 
affixed thereto, facsimile, or overnight mail. 
Kipp L. Manwaring 
MANWARlNG LA W OFF1CE 
381 Shoup Avenue, Suite 210 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
[ ] Mailing 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Fax: 523-9109 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
Douglas R. Nelson 
L:\ORN\0260.491\Answcr & Counterclaim - Amended - Reviscd.wpd 
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Douglas R. Nelson - ISB# 1580 
Brian T. Tucker - ISB# 5236 
Wi ley R. Dennert - ISB# 6216 
NELSON HALL PARRY TUCKER, P.A. 
490 Memorial Drive 
P.O. Box 51630 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-1630 
Telephone:(208) 522-3001 
Facsimile: (208) 523-7254 
Attorneys for The Bank of Commerce 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
DARRYL HARRIS and CHRISTINE 
HARRIS, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
DUANE L. YOST and LORI YOST, husband 
and wife, DUANE L. YOST as Trustee of the 
DUANE L. YOST TRUST, THE BANK OF 
COMMERCE, an Idaho Corporation and 
JOHN DOES I-X, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-09-3488 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO AMEND ANSWER 
AND COUNTERCLAIM, CROSS 
CLAIM AND THIRD-PARTY 
CLAIM AND TO INCLUDE 
CLAIM FOR PUNITIVE 
DAMAGES 
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THE BANK OF COMMERCE, an Idaho 
corporation, 
v. 
Counterclaimant/Cross-
claimant/Third-Party 
Claimant, 
DARRYL HARRIS and CHRISTINE 
HARRIS, husband and wife, 
Counterdefendants, 
and 
DUANE L. YOST and LORI YOST, husband 
and wife, DUANE L. YOST as Trustee of the 
DUANE L. YOST TRUST, JOHN DOES I-X, 
Crossdefendants, 
and 
HAMPSHIRE HOLDINGS, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability company, 
Third-Party Defendant. 
COMES NOW the Counterclaimant/Cross-claimant/Third Party Claimant, The 
Bank of Commerce (the "Bank"), by and through its attorneys of record, Nelson Hall Parry 
Tucker. P.A" and hereby submits its memorandum in support of its motion to amend the 
counterclaim to include a claim for punitive damages. 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
The general factual background regarding this matter is set forth III the Bank's 
Memorandum in Support of Second Motion for Summary Judgment. More specific facts 
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relating to the motion to amend and to add punitive damages are set forth as follows: 
During his deposition, Darryl Harris ("Darryl") testified that he knew his wife, Christine 
Harris ("Christine") needed to sign the Corrected QuitClaim Deed: 
A. Based on what Duane said. Duane said the bank wants me to sign 
this new corrected deed. 
Q. Okay. And what was - what was the correction, then, to this 
second deed? 
A. My wife did not sign the first one. 
Q. Okay. And so you were aware that, at least according to Duane, 
there was some reason why your wife needed to sign this quitclaim deed? 
A. Yes, uh-huh. 
Q. So the main thing was just getting your wife's signature on there; 
is that right? 
A. Yes. 
Darryl Harris Depo. Tr., p. 63, l. 17 to p. 64, I. 10. 
In addition, Darryl knew the Bank would rely on the Corrected QuitClaim Deed: 
Q. And did you understand in this loan that -- Well, excuse me, in this 
transaction that the bank was obtaining title insurance on the west forty acres? 
A. Yes. That's what they were attempting to do. 
Q. Okay. So you knew that the corrected quitclaim deed would be 
relied on by both the bank and the title company to make sure that title really had 
been transferred to Duane and Lori Yost; is that right? 
A. Yes, yes. 
Q. And you also knew that the bank would rely on the corrected 
quitclaim deed in securing their loan with Duane Yost; is that right? 
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A. Yes. 
Darryl Harris Depo. Tr., p. 68, 11. 2-17. 
Finally, Darryl admitted to forgery: 
Q. And you signed your name and you forged your wife's name? 
A. Yes. 
Darryl Harris Depo. Tr., p. 132, 11. 22-24. 
The Bank was not aware that Darryl had forged Christine's name on the Corrected 
QuitClaim Deed until after receiving Plaintiffs' 5th Supplmentary Response to the Defendants, 
the Bank of Commerce First Set ofInterrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents 
dated November 1,2010, which was well after the discovery cutoff date (September 7, 2010Y 
and after the Bank had already filed its first Motion for Summary Judgment. 
ARGUMENT 
A. Amended Answer 
Rule 15(a), l.R.C.P., allows a paliy to amend its answer upon leave of court. Furthermore, 
"leave shall be freely given when justice so requires." Jd. 
At the time the Bank filed its original Answer on July 15, 2009, it did not know that Darryl 
had forged his wife's name on the Corrected QuitClaim Deed. The Bank only learned about the 
forgery after the Harrises served the Bank with their 5th supplemental discovery responses on 
November 1,2010. The proposed Amended Answer addresses the new revelation regarding forgery 
by including additional affinnative defenses. 
1 See Order Setting Trial and Pretrial Conference dated March 19,2010. 
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This Court should freely give the Bank leave to file the proposed Amended Answer. 
B. Amended Counterclaim, Cross Claim and Third-Party Claim 
Rule 15(a), LR.C.P., allows a party to amend its complaint, cross claim and/or third-party 
claim upon leave of court. Furthermore, "leave shall be freely given when justice so requires." !d. 
Rule 14(a), LR.C.P., allows "a defendant to serve a summons and complaint upon a person 
not a party to the action who is or may be liable to such third-party plaintiff for all or a part of 
plaintiffs claim against the third-party plaintiff." If the third-party plaintiff seeks to file the third-
party complaint more than 10 days after filing the original answer, it "must obtain leave on motion 
upon notice to all parties to the action." Id. 
Pursuant to Rules 14( a) and 15( a), this Court should allow the Bank to amend its 
Counterclaim, Cross Claim and Third-Party Claim. 
At the time the Bank filed its original Counterclaim, Cross Claim and Third Party Claim, it 
did not know anything about the forgery or the fact that Robert Crandall apparently notarized the 
Corrected QuitClaim Deed despite the fact that Christine never appeared before him nor 
acknowledged the signature on that deed as hers. In light of these new allegations, the Bank is 
requesting leave to include additional claims of breach of contract/third party beneficiary, 
fraud/misrepresentation, civil liability of notary public and employer, promissory estoppel and 
punitive damages. Besides the additional claims, the proposed Third-Party Claim seeks to add 
Robert Crandall and his employer, Family Asset Protection Legal Services, P .L.L.C., as an additional 
party to this matter. 
Idaho Code § 51-118 provides that a "notary public shall be liable for all damages 
proximately caused by his official misconduct." Because of the new allegations regarding the 
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forgery and failure to properly notarize the deed, Robert Crandall may be liable to the Bank for his 
allegedly improper notarization. 
Section 51-118 also provides that the "employer of a notary public shall be jointly and 
severally liable with such notary public for all damages proximately caused by the official 
misconduct of such notary public ... " For this reason, the Bank should be allowed to amend its Third-
Party Claim to also include a claim against Robert Crandall's employer, Family Asset Protection 
Legal Services, P.L.L.c. 
C. Punitive Damages 
The Bank is entitled to amend its complaint to include a claim for punitive damages because 
there is a reasonable likelihood that it will be able to prove sufficient facts at trial to establish an 
award of punitive damages. Under Idaho law a court must allow an amendment to the pleadings to 
state a prayer for punitive damages if "the moving party has established at such hearing a reasonable 
likelihood of proving facts at trial sufficient to support an award of punitive damages." Kuntz v. 
Lamar Corporation, 385 F.3d 1177, 1187 (9th Cir. 2004); citing Ie. § 6-1604(2). The moving party 
must show that "the defendant acted in a manner that was an extreme deviation from reasonable 
standards of conduct, that the act was performed ... with an understanding of or disregard for its 
likely consequences, and that the defendant acted with an extremely harmful state of mind." See, 
Gen. Auto Parts co. v. Genuine Parts Co., 132 Idaho 849, 979 P.2d 1207, 1210-11 (1999). 
Conduct justifying punitive damages requires "an intersection of two factors: a bad act and 
a bad state of mind." Linscott v. Rainier Nat. Life. Ins., 100 Idaho 854, 606 P.2d 958,962 (1980). 
"The defendant must (l) act in a manner that was an extreme deviation from reasonable standards 
of conduct with an understanding of or disregard for its likely consequences, and must (2) act with 
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an extremely hannful state of mind, described variously as with malice, oppression, fraud, gross 
negligence, wantonness, deliberately, or willfully." See, Adams v. Unites States of America, 622 
F.Supp.2d 996, 1006 (D. Idaho 2009). 
In this case, Daryl acted with malice, oppression, fraud, gross negligence, wantonness, 
deliberately, or willfully, and in extreme deviation from reasonable standards of conduct when he 
knew that it was important for his wife to sign the Corrected QuitClaim Deed but forged her name 
without her consent. 
There was no history or prior precedent that would make Darryl believe that it was okay 
to sign his wife's name. In fact, Darryl testified: 
Q. Has Christine Harris ever given you permission to SIgn that 
document on her behalf? 
A. No. 
Q. Has she ever given you permission to sign your name on anything 
A. Not-
Q. - not just a legal document? 
A. Not that I recall. 
Darryl Harris Depo. Tr., p. 17, 11. 9-17. 
Q. Have you ever asked her if you could sign her name on any 
document? 
A. Not that I recall. 
Q. Have you ever signed Christine's name to any type of document? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. Okay. And what document was that? 
A. That quitclaim deed of late 2008, and the date on it is what? 
Q. Well, are you talking the corrected quitclaim deed? Is that what 
you're talking about? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. And that would be approximately December 1 S\ 2008? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. Have you ever signed her name on any other document? 
A. I can't recall. 
Q. Is it possible you've signed her name on another document before? 
A. If there is, I do not recall it, so I'd have to answer no. 
Darryl Harris Depo. Tr., p. 18,1. 19 to p. 19, 1. 13. 
Not only was there no past "course of dealing" which could have made Darryl believe 
he could forge his wife's name, she had not given him authorization to do so on the Corrected 
QuitClaim Deed. 
A. Did she authorize you to sign her name on the corrected quitclaim deed? 
Q. No. 
Darryl Harris Depo. Tr., p. 70, 11. 9-11. 
Moreover, Darryl acted with malice, oppression, fraud, gross negligence, wantonness, 
deliberately, or willfully, and in extreme deviation from reasonable standards of conduct when 
he failed to notify the Bank of his forgery for nearly two (2) years. Darryl forged his wife's 
name on the Corrected QuitClaim Deed on or about December 1, 2008. More than six (6) 
months later, Darryl and Christine filed their Complaint which commenced this action on June 
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12,2009. The Complaint not only failed to mention the forgery, but actually alleged that both 
Darryl and Christine had signed the Corrected QuitClaim Deed. Following the filing of the 
Bank's Answer, Counterclaim, Cross Claim and Third Party Claim, the Harrises responded to 
the Counterclaim without mentioning the forgery or raising forgery as a defense. The Harrises 
responded numerous times to the Bank's discovery requests by serving their answers and 
responses, as well as supplemental answers and responses, on the Bank, again without 
mentioning the forgery. It was not until on or about November 1,2010, that the Harrises sent 
their fifth supplemental discovery response in which they disclosed to the Bank, for the first 
time2, that Darryl had signed Christine's name to the Corrected QuitClaim Deed without her 
consent. This disclosure of the forgery was not made until after the Bank had filed its first 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
It is unjustifiable for Darryl to have concealed his forgery for six (6) months prior to the 
commencement of this action as well as for nearly a year and a half after he had filed his 
Complaint. Darryl's lengthy delay in revealing the forgery is an indication of his extremely 
harmful state of mind. Only when faced with the very real possibility that the Bank would be 
granted its Motion for Summary Judgment,3 did Darryl finally disclose his forgery to the Bank. 
Daryl acted with malice, reckless disregard, gross negligence, wantonness and fraud when 
2 Darryl had previously made the argument to the Bank that the Corrected QuitClaim Deed was not valid. 
However, the basis for Darryl's argument prior to November 1, 20lO, had always been because he claimed there was a 
failure of consideration to support the Corrected QuitClaim Deed. He had never previously indicated to the Bank that 
said deed was invalid because he himself had forged his wife's signature. 
3 At the hearing on the Harrises' Motion to Extend Time and Alternative Motion to Continue, heard on 
September 30, 2010, precisely the date when their response to the Bank's Motion for Summary Judgment would have 
been due, Judge st. Clair made statements that he thought it would be difficult to prevail against a bona fide lender for 
value. Of course Judge St. Clair's comments were only dicta, but it was informative as to what a district judge's initial 
impressions of the issues raised in the Bank's Motion for Summary Judgment were. 
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he deliberately and willfully forged his wife's name on the deed and when he did not inform the 
Bank about the forgery for nearly two (2) years. Therefore, the Bank should be granted leave 
to amend its Counterclaim to include a claim of punitive damages against Darryl. 
CONCLUSION 
In light of the foregoing, the Bank respectfully requests that this Court grant leave for the 
Bank to amend its answer to include additional affim1ative defenses. In addition, the Third Party 
Claim should be allowed to be amended to include Robert Crandall and Family Asset Protection 
Legal Services, P.L.L.C., as third-party defendants. Finally, the Bank should be allowed to amend 
its Counterclaim to include the following claims against Darryl Harris: breach of contract/third party 
beneficiary, fraud/misrepresentation, promissory estoppel and punitive damages. 
Dated this ~?¢day of January, 2011. 
NELSON HALL PARRY TUCKER, P.A. 
By: ~;e~ 
Douglas . elson 
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Attorneys for The Bank of Commerce 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
DARRYL HARRIS and CHRISTINE 
HARRIS, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
DUANE L. YOST and LORI YOST, husband 
and wife, DUANE L. YOST as Trustee of the 
DUANE L. YOST TRUST, THE BANK OF 
COMMERCE, an Idaho Corporation and 
JOHN DOES I-X, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-09-3488 
OPPOSITION TO THE 
HARRISES' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
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THE BANK OF COMMERCE, an Idaho 
corporation, 
v. 
CounterclaimantlCross-
claimant/Third-Party Claimant, 
DARRYL HARRIS and CHRISTINE 
HARRIS, husband and wife, 
Counterdefendants, 
and 
DUANE L. YOST and LORI YOST, husband 
and wife, DUANE L. YOST as Trustee of the 
DUANE L. YOST TRUST, JOHN DOES I-X, 
Crossdefendants, 
and 
HAMPSHIRE HOLDINGS, LLC, 
Third-Party Defendant. 
The Bank of Commerce ("Bank" herein) by and through its attorneys of record, hereby 
objects to and opposes the Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment. This Opposition is supported 
by all ofthe affidavits and documents supporting the Bank's Second Motion for Summary Judgment 
which have previously been filed. In addition, the Bank relies on the Second Affidavit of Duane L. 
Yost filed concurrently herewith. 
T. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
The factual and procedural background is set forth in the Bank's Memorandum in Support 
of Second Motion for Summary Judgment. 
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II. LEGAL STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Generally, when considering a motion for summary judgment, a comi 
"liberally construes the record in a light most favorable to the party opposing the 
motion and draws all reasonable inferences and conclusions in that party's favor." 
Brooks v. Logan, 130 Idaho 574, 576, 944 P.2d 709, 711 (1997). However, where 
the evidentiary facts are undisputed and the trial comi rather than a jury will be the 
trier of fact, "summary judgement is appropriate, despite the possibility of 
conflicting inferences because the court alone will be responsible for resolving the 
conflict between those inferences." Riverside Development Co. v. Ritchie, 103 
Idaho 515, 519, 650 P.2d 657, 661 (1982). As long as the parties have filed 
cross-motions for summary judgment and no jury has been requested, the trial 
court may draw the inferences it would be allowed to draw from the evidence at 
trial. See Williams v. Computer Resources, Inc., 123 Idaho 671, 673, 851 P.2d 
967, 969 (1993). 
Drov v. Sorensen, 133 Idaho 534, 537, 989 P.2d 276, 279 (1999). 
III. ARGUMENT 
The Hanises set forth the following theories in their Memorandum in Support of 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment: lack of consideration, failure of delivery and violation 
ofI.C. ~ 32-912. Through these three theories, Darryl and Christine Harris (collectively, the 
"Harriscs") are claiming that the Corrected Quitclaim Deed is void. However, the Corrected 
Quitclaim Deed is not void. Moreover, the Harrises should be estopped from claiming the 
Corrected Quitclaim Deed is void. Therefore, the Bank should be allowed to foreclose its Deeds 
of Trust and apply the proceeds of the sale of the real property to Duane Yost's indebtedness to 
the Bank. 
A. Consideration 
The Harrises claim that the Corrected Quitclaim Deed is void for lack of consideration 
because they argue the Y osts never paid them the $800,000 purchase price. However, the 
Harrises argument fails for several reasons. 
OPPOSITION TO THE HARRISES' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 3 
1. Lack of Admissible Evidence. 
The Harrises have not presented any admissible evidence to support their lack-of-
consideration argument. The Harrises' statements regarding a lack of consideration are simply 
their opinions but are inadmissible to contradict the Corrected QuitClaim Deed's clear language. 
See Bliss v. Bliss, 127 Idaho 170, 898 P .2d 1081 (1995), (extrinsic evidence is not admissible to 
contradict the clear language of a quitclaim deed). 
In Hall v. Hall, 116 Idaho 483, 888 P.2d 255 (1989), the Idaho Supreme Court reviewed 
the issue of whether parol evidence may be used to establish that a portion of real property 
transferred to a man-ied couple was transferred as a gift when the deed stated that it was "For 
Value Received". The magistrate looked at parol evidence to determine that a portion of the 
property was in fact transferred as a gift and the district court affirmed. The Court of Appeals 
reversed and remanded, ruling that parol evidence could not be used to vary or amend the deed. 
The Supreme Court concurred with the Court of Appeals. 
The only pertinent language of the deed is as stated hereinabove. Where possible, 
the court should give effect to the intention of the parties to a deed. Gardner v. 
Fliegel, 92 Idaho 767, 450 P.2d 990 (1969). Where the language ofa deed is 
plain and unambiguous the intention of the parties must be determined from the 
deed itself~ and parol evidence is not admissible to show intent. Id. Oral and 
written statements are generally inadmissible to contradict or vary unambiguous 
terms contained in a deed .... Where, as here, the consideration clause clearly 
recites that the transfer was made "For Value Received," parol evidence is not 
admissible to contradict the deed by attempting to show the transfer was in part a 
"gift" rather than "for value." 
Hall v. Hall, 116 Idaho 483, 484, 777 P.2d 255,256 (1989) (footnote omitted). 
The Corrected Quitclaim Deed is unambiguous. It simply states: 
Darryl Harris and Christine Harris, Husband and Wife, Grantors, of 
Idaho Falls, Idaho hereby RELEASES, and Forever QUITCLAIMS to Duane 
Yost and Lori Yost, Grantees, for good and valuable consideration the following 
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described tract of land ... 
Complaint, Exhibit "C" (bold in original). 
The consideration clause clearly recites that the transfer was made "for good and valuable 
consideration". Therefore, parol evidence is not admissible to contradict the Corrected Quitclaim 
Deed by attempting to show that there was no agreed upon consideration and that said deed is 
void for lack of consideration. 1 To the extent any parol evidence is presented for this purpose, 
then the Bank objects thereto and moves to strike it on the basis that such evidence is not 
admissible to contradict the clear and unambiguous language of the Corrected Quitclaim Deed. 
Therefore, any statements by the HaITises in which they claim there was no good and 
valuable consideration to support the validity of the Corrected Quitclaim Deed is not admissible. 
2. Lack of Consideration v. Failure of Consideration 
Although the Harrises claim that the Corrected Quitclaim Deed fails due to a lack of 
consideration, the uncontroverted evidence does not support either a lack of consideration or a 
failure of consideration. 
The difference between a lack (or want) of consideration and a failure of consideration is 
important. At best, the Harrises can only show a failure of consideration. Therefore, the 
Corrected Quitclaim Deed may be voidable, but not void. A voidable deed does not affect the 
Bank's protected status as a bona fide lender. 
i. Lack of Consideration 
A lack of consideration is only applicable when there is no legally enforceable contract. 
1 This is not to say that parol evidence mayor may not be admissible on the issue of whether ther.e was a 
subsequent failure of consideration. 
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Put another way, an illusory promise is not sufficient to create a valid contract. However, the 
contract between Darryl and Duane to sell the Subject Property was a legally enforceable 
contract, supported by valid consideration. 
'Want of consideration' is defined as follows: "In the general law of contracts, this term 
means a total lack of any valid consideration for a contract, while 'failure of consideration' is the 
neglect, refusal or failure of one of the parties to perform or furnish the consideration agreed on." 
Black's Law Dictionary 712 (abridged 6th ed. 1997). 
Referring to an insurance policy, the Idaho Supreme Court has stated, "If the policy is 
truly illusory, the contract is void for lack of consideration ... " Vincent v. Safeeo Ins. Co. of 
America, 136 Idaho 107, 112,29 P.3d 943, 948 (2001). 
The Missouri Court of Appeals has explained: 
The phrase "illusory promise" means "words in promissory form that 
promise nothing. CORBIN ON CONTRACTS Section 5.28. An illusory promise 
is not a promise at all and cannot act as consideration; therefore no contract is 
[01111ed. lei. 
The tendency of the law, however, is to uphold the contract by finding the 
promise was not illusory when it appears that the parties intended a contract. Id. 
Magruder Quarry & Co., L.L.C v. Briscoe, 83 S.W.3d 647, 650 (2002). 
The purchase and sell agreement entered into between Darryl and Duane was supported 
by valuable consideration. Darryl agreed to sell the forty (40) acres of the Subject Property to 
Duane at $20,000.00 an acre for a total purchase price of$800,000.00. See 2nd Yost Aff."r 4. 
The source of the $800,000.00 purchase price was not essential to the transaction. Id. at'l 5. 
What was essential was that Duane agreed to pay Darryl $800,000.00 for the Subject Property. 
Id. 
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Therefore, the purchase and sell agreement regarding the Subject Property was an 
enforceable contract supported by Duane's promise to pay a valuable consideration, specifically 
$800,000.00. The fact that Duane chose to pay the $800,000.00 by transferring that amount from 
his Trigon account into Darryl's Trigon account does not make the contract invalid from the 
beginning due to a lack of consideration as the Harrises now argue. At most, the Harrises' 
argument raises a question of whether there was a failure of consideration. 
ii. Failure of Consideration 
The dictionary defines 'failure of consideration' as follows: 
As applied to notes, contracts, conveyances, etc., this term does not 
necessarily mean a want of consideration, but implies that a consideration, 
originally existing and good, has since become worthless or has ceased to exist or 
been extinguished, partially or entirely. It means that sufficient consideration was 
contemplated by the parties at [the] time [the] contract was entered into, but either 
on account of some innate defect in the thing to be given or nonperfonnance in 
whole or in part of that which the promisee agreed to do or forbear nothing of 
value can be or is received by the promisee. Such consists of neglect, refusal, or 
failure of one of the parties to perfom1 or fumish agreed-upon consideration. 
Black's Law Dictionary 411 (abridged 6th ed. 1997). 
The Idaho Court of Appeals has explained the difference between lack or want of 
consideration and failure of consideration as follows: 
The term "failure of consideration" includes instances where a proper 
contract was entered into when the agreement was made, but because of 
supervening events, the promised perfolmance fails, rendering the contract 
unenforceable. General Insurance Co. of America v. Carnicero Dynasty Corp., 
545 P.2d 502 (Utah 1976); Taliaferro v. Davis, 216 Cal.App.2d 398,31 Cal. Rptr. 
164 (1963); 1 S. WILLISTON, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 119A (W. 
Jaeger, 3d ed. 1957); 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 129 (1963). Failure of consideration 
generally refers to failure of performance of a contract. Converse v. Zinke, 635 
P.2d 882 (Colo.1981); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 237 
comment a (1981) (hereinafter referred to as RESTATEMENT). "Failure" of 
consideration is to be distinguished from "want" or "lack" of consideration, which 
refers to instances where no consideration ever existed to support the contract, 
OPPOSlT10N TO THE HARRISES' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT-7 
rendering the contract invalid from the beginning. General Insurance Co. of 
America v. Carnicero Dynasty Corp., supra. 
An examination of the lease and the "compromise agreement" is necessary 
to determine the merits of the parties' arguments. Under the lease, mutual 
promises to perform served as the consideration .... 
World Wide Lease, Inc. v. Woodworth, 111 Idaho 880, 884-85, 728 P.2d 769, 773-74 (Idaho Ct. 
App. 1986). See also General Ins. Co. of America v. Carnicero Dynasty Corp., 545 P.2d 502 
(Utah 1976) ("There is a distinction between lack of consideration and failure of consideration. 
Where consideration is lacking, there can be no contract. Where consideration fails, there was a 
contract when the agreement was made, but because of some supervening cause, the promised 
perfonnance fails. "). 
In Barrett v. Simmons, 221 S.E.2d 25 (1975), the Georgia Supreme Court dealt with an 
argument very similar to one now being made by the Harrises. The Barrett Court stated: 
Barrett contends that the warranty deed from himself to Wills was without 
consideration and therefore was not a valid conveyance. He testified that he 
executed the deed in exchange for Simmons' promise to pay him $300,000 and to 
remove the Federal Land Bank liability within 30 days. He contends that neither 
promise was carried out. 
Code s 29-101 provides that a deed must be made on a valuable or good 
consideration. A promise to pay constitutes consideration. Failure to pay the 
consideration promised, although it constitutes a breach, does not render the 
conveyance invalid for lack of consideration. Morris v. Johnson, 219 Ga. 81 (1), 
132 S.E.2d 45 (1963); Harry v. Griffin, 210 Ga. 133(1), 78 S.E.2d 37 (1953); 
Nathans v. Arkvvright, 66 Ga. 179(la) (1880). 
Barrett, 221 S.E.2d at 27. See also Goodwin v. City of Dallas, 496 S.W.2d 722, 723 (1973) ("A 
deed procured without consideration ... is, as between the parties thereto, voidable only and not 
void.") 
The Harrises alleged in their Complaint the following: "During the months of September 
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and October 2007 the Harrises and the Y osts discussed a transaction where the Harrises agreed to 
sale and the Y osts agreed to purchase the subject property for the purchase price of $800,000.00." 
Complaint, '1 7. The Harrises have also alleged that the "Y osts breached their obligation by 
failing to pay the Harrises the purchase price of$800,000.00." Id. at 'l59. 
Under the purchase and sale agreement, Darryl and Duane made mutual promises to 
perforn1 which served as consideration. Duane promised to give Darryl $800,000.00 and Darryl 
promised to give Duane the forty (40) acres of Subject Property. 
Moreover, the fact that the Harrises have obtained a money judgment against the Yosts 
for $800,000.00 of principal, plus interest, costs and attorney fees, is additional evidence to 
support the existence of a valid contract. See Judgment by Default executed by Judge Anderson 
on October 15,2009. How else could the Harrises be entitled to an $800,000.00 judgment 
against the Y osts unless it was for breach of a valid contract? 
If Duane failed to perform his promise, then at most a failure of consideration would 
exise and the Corrected Quitclaim Deed would at most be voidable, not void.3 
2 There is substantial evidence, much of it from DalTyl himself, that the HalTises did in fact receive at least some 
of the $800,000.00 of consideration for the Subject Property. After the $800,000.00 was transfelTed from Duane's 
Trigon account into DalTyl's Trigon account, Danyl made the following withdrawals from his Trigon account: 
$20,000.00011 October 8, 2007, $18,000.00 011 October 16, 2007, $85,000.00 on December 13,2007, $200,000.00 on 
July 14, 2008, and $40,000.00 on September 19,2008. See DalTyl HalTis Depo. Tr. p. 38, 1. 13 to p. 461. 6, Exhibit Nos. 
34,35 & 36. At least some of the $800,000.00 may have been withdrawn by Danyl after it was deposited on October 
1,2007. In addition, it was not hard for Darryl to withdraw money from his Trigon account until late 2008. Jd. at p. 42, 
II. 4-6. Therefore, from October 1, 2007, until late 2008, Darryl had access to the $800,000.00. That access had at least 
some value. Until late December 2008, Darryl had not heard of any Trigon checks bouncing. ]d. at p. 88,11.5-13. 
Finally, the real reason the $800,000.00 was not included in the HalTises' claim that was filed with the federally-
appointed receiver, Wayne Kline, is because Darryl objected to including the $800,000.00 and requested that the receiver 
remove it from their claim Jd. at p. 118, 11. 4-13. 
3 In their Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, the Harrises cite cases that stand for the 
proposition that a deed is void as a result of lack of consideration. However, none of those cases are on point because 
the purchase and sale agreement between Darryl and Duane was based on valid consideration, namely Duane's promise 
to pay Danyl $800,000.00. 
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3. Effect of Failure of Consideration on the Corrected Quitclaim Deed 
Even ifnone of the $800,000.00 was paid to the Harrises, it does not change the outcome 
of the cross motions for summary judgment because the failure of consideration would not affect 
the Bank's protected status as a bona fide lender. 
Corpus Juris Secundum provides insightful authority regarding the effect of consideration 
on a deed. "As a general rule, as between the parties, their heirs, or privies, a deed is good 
without consideration." 26A C.J.S. Deeds § 27 (2001). Moreover, "[a]s a general rule, a deed 
which is otherwise valid will not be invalidated by reason of a total or partial failure of 
consideration, and will nevertheless operate to convey title." Id. at § 32. Finally, "[ w ]hile a void 
deed passes no title, a voidable deed passes a defeasible title which may be set aside except when 
it is acquired by an innocent purchaser for value." Id. at § 148. 
Courts have held that a bona fide purchaser is protected when the original grantor alleges 
a failure of consideration. The United States District Court for the District of Kansas has 
explained the effect of a failure of consideration on a bona fide purchaser for value, as follows: 
The problem with plaintiffs' argument is that it fails to take account ofthe 
protection offered by the law to a holder in due course of a negotiable instrument 
or, similarly, to a bona fide purchaser of real property. With regard to persons 
claiming such interests, the following rules are set forth in American 
Jurisprudence 2d, a treatise widely cited by Kansas courts: 
In determining priority between the interest of a vendor 
[ seller] of real estate and the interest of a person claiming through 
the purchaser, the general rules relating to bona fide purchasers 
prevail, so that an equitable interest of the vendor in the property 
may be cut offby a transfer by the purchaser of his or her legal 
interest to one who has all the requisites for protection as a bona 
fide purchaser. * * * However, the vendor's equitable interest will 
be given preference where the person claiming through the 
purchaser does not have the status of a bona fide purchaser for 
value without notice. Moreover, if the purchaser has no interest in 
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the property, because of the invalidity of the deed, a subsequent 
purchaser from him or her is not entitled to protection as a bona 
fide purchaser. Legal interests of the vendor are protected as 
against the person claiming through the purchaser, under the 
general rule that a vendor can, as against persons having a superior 
legal interest, convey only such interest as he or she has. 
77 AmJur.2d, Vendor and Purchaser § 417. While plaintiffs attempt to rely on 
the latter portion of this paragraph by arguing that the deed to the Freemans was 
invalid due to failure of consideration, the rules governing conveyances appear to 
hold otherwise: 
Failure of consideration does not render a deed void, nor 
does it render a subsequent conveyance by the grantor to another 
operative to pass any title. Indeed, even total failure of 
consideration does not necessarily entitle the grantor to 
cancellation of the deed, because a deed is valid and operative as 
between the parties and their plivies, whether or not founded on a 
consideration. Thus, nonpayment of the promised price gives the 
grantor an implied equitable lien on the land, or creates a liability 
upon the purchaser which may be enforced in an action at law, but, 
in the absence of additional circumstances, such as fraud, justifying 
equitable relief, it does not entitle him to cancellation of the deed. 
23 A. Jur.2d, Deeds § 95. Thus, the rule appears to be that failure of consideration 
at most makes a deed voidable, as opposed to void, and that "title may pass by the 
deed, and an innocent purchaser may be held entitled to retain it as against the 
original grantor." Id. See also 66 Am.Jur.2d, Reformation of Instruments § 65 
(ref0l111ation of an instrument will be decreed by a court of equity as between the 
original parties, but relief will not be granted ifit appears that the rights of bona 
fide purchasers or of subsequent encumbrancers or lienholders for present 
consideration wiIJ be prejudiced thereby); Restatement (First) of Restitution § 172, 
comment ("The question in such cases is which of two innocent persons should 
suffer a loss which must be borne by one of them. The principle which is applied 
by courts of equity is that they will not throw the loss upon a person who has 
innocently acquired title to property for value."). Similar rules generally protect 
holders in due course of negotiable instruments. See K.S.A. §§ 84-3-305, 
84-3-306. 
Messenger v. Sundell-Guy, 99-1216-WEB, 1999 WL 1253057 (D. Kan. Dec. 1, 1999). See also 
First Interstate Bank of Sheridan v. First Wyoming Bank, N.A. Sheridan, 762 P.2d 379 (Wyo. 
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1988) (failure4 of consideration on the part of the original grantor would fail to annul the 
protections afforded the mortgagee bank under the bona fide purchaser doctrine); Brown v. 
Johnson, 11 So.2d 713,717 (La. Ct. App. 1942), ("[T]he conveyance act executed by Jamerson 
to Johns was valid on its face, and neither lack of consideration for it nor equities that existed 
between those parties can be urged against Johnson, who was a bona fide purchaser for value.") 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that a voidable purchase will pass clear title to a bona 
fide purchaser. See Swinehart v. Turner, 44 Idaho 461, 259 P. 3 (1927) ("While a purchase by a 
representative at his own sale is voidable, a deed from him conveying the property to a bona fide 
purchaser for a valuable consideration will pass title, and after such a conveyance the original 
purchase wi 11 not be set aside.") 
Numerous other courts have also held that a voidable deed does not preclude the 
protections provided to a bona fide purchaser. Fallon v. Triangle Management Services, Inc., 
169 Cal.App.3e 1103 (1985) (trustees who held a deed of trust secured by a voidable deed held a 
valid lien even though the deed was subsequently declared void where the trustees were bona fide 
encumbrancers for value without notice); Martinez v. Affordable Hous. Network, Inc., 123 P.3d 
1201,1205 (Colo. 2005) (a deed voidable for fraud protects a subsequent purchaser if the 
subsequent purchaser took the property for value and without notice of any defect in title); Lee v . 
..\ The trial court used the term "failure of consideration." On the other hand, the Wyoming Supreme Court used 
the term "lack of consideration" throughout the decision. However, it is clear that what was at issue was really failure 
of" consideration, specifically a breach of a promise to pay. Pursuant to the Agreement for Warranty Deed with Duncan, 
the Wagensens had the right to request a warranty deed on the property by payment of the sum of $500 per acre to 
Duncan. After a warranty deed on the 20-acre parcel was conveyed to the Wag ens ens and Mr. Wag ens en conveyed his 
interest in the parcel to Mrs. Wagensen by recorded deed, Mrs. Wagensen obtained a $225,000 loan secured by a 
mortgage on the parcel. Thereafter, Mrs. Wag ens en defaulted on both the Duncan Agreement for Warranty Deed and 
the $225,000 loan. The Wagensen's promise to pay the sum of $500 per acre to Duncan constituted consideration. 
Default on that promise would only be a failure of consideration, not a lack of consideration. See Barrett, supra. 
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Boyd, 16 So. 2d 30 (Miss. 1943) ("The relief of cancellation will not be granted against a bona 
fide purchaser for value and without notice for the fraud or other ground for cancellation. This 
rule applies irrespective of the grounds on which the rescission or cancellation is sought. From a 
purchaser for value without notice, a court of equity takes nothing away which the purchaser has 
honestly acquired."). 
To the extent the Corrected Quitclaim Deed is voidable for failure of consideration, this 
Court should not set aside the Bank's Deeds of Trust nor its priorities thereunder because the 
Bank is a bona fide lender for value with no notice of the alleged fraud committed by Daren 
Palmer or Trigon. 
B. Delivery 
The Harrises are claiming that the Corrected Quitclaim Deed is void because it was not 
"delivered" and because delivery was conditional on full payment. However, the Harrises' 
argumcnt is 110t supportcd by law or fact. 
1. Law 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that delivery of a deed is absolute unless it is delivered 
to a third party for the purpose of acting as an escrow or if the deed contains language expressing 
a condition required for delivery. See Whitney v. Dewey, 10 Idaho 633, 80 P. 1117 (1905). The 
Whitney Comi stated: 
It is a well-settled principle of law that a deed cannot be delivered by the 
grantor to the grantee therein named to be held by the grantee in escrow. If such 
thing be done, the result is that title vests at once in the grantee. The holder of an 
escrow must be a third party, who for such purpose becomes the agent of both the 
grantor and grantee. 
In 13 Cyclopedia, 564, the writer of the text says: "A deed cannot be 
delivered as an escrow to the grantee, and a delivery which purports to be such 
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will operate as an absolute one. This rule, however, applies only to those deeds 
which are upon their face complete contracts requiring nothing but delivery to 
make them perfect, and does not apply to those which upon their face import that 
something besides delivery is necessary to be done in order to make them 
complete." The writer cites many authorities in support of that text. 
In 1 Devlin on Deeds, section 315, it is said: "A deed cannot be delivered 
to the grantee as an escrow. Ifit be delivered to him, it becomes an operative 
deed, freed from any condition not expressed in the deed itself, and it will vest the 
title in him, though this may be contrary to the intention of the parties. One of the 
grounds upon which this rule is based is that parol evidence is inadmissible to 
show that the deed was to take effect upon condition." The author thereupon 
proceeds to quote as a part of the text, and with approval, from the opinion of 
Harris, J., in Lawton v. Sager, 11 Barb. 349, in whose opinion the following 
language is used: "Whether a deed has been delivered or not is a question of fact, 
upon which, from the very nature of the case, parol evidence is admissible. But 
whether a deed, when delivered, shall take effect absolutely or only upon the 
perfonl1ance of some condition unexpressed therein, cannot be detennined by 
parol evidence. To allow a deed absolute upon its face to be avoided by such 
evidence would be a dangerous violation of a cardinal rule of evidence." 
In Braman v. Bingham, 26 N. Y. 492, the Court of Appeals said: "The 
reason given for the rule excluding parol evidence of a conditional delivery to the 
grantee applies to all cases where the delivery is designed to give effect to the 
deed, in any event, without the further act of the grantor. 'When the words are 
contrary to the act, which is the delivery, the words are of none effect' (Co. Litt. 
36a), 'because then a bare avemlent, without any writing, would make void every 
deed' (Cra. Eliz. 884) .... 
Whitney, at 651-52, 80 P. at 1121 (1905). 
The written language of the Corrected Quitclaim Deed does not mention the delivery is 
conditional upon full payment of the $800,000.00. Moreover, there is no evidence that the 
Corrected Quitclaim Deed was delivered to a third party to be held in escrow and only delivered 
to Duane upon full payment of the $800,000.00. 
2. UncontI'overted Facts 
The uncontroverted facts do not support the Harrises claim that delivery was contingent 
upon the full payment of the $800,000.00. 
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First, the Complaint does not allege any conditional delivery. Instead, the Complaint 
alleges the following: 
12. Relying upon the [Bank of America] bank letter, the Harrises 
agreed to complete their planned transaction and deliver a deed. 
17. Subsequently, the Harrises' (sic) executed a corrected quitclaim 
deed conveying the subject property to the Yosts. That quitclaim deed was 
recorded December 2,2008, as Instrument No. 1317892 in the Recorder's Office 
for Bonneville County, Idaho. A copy of that quitclaim deed is attached as 
Exhibit C and incorporated here by reference. 
Second, the Harrises do not set f01ih any evidence to supp01i the claim that Darryl's 
delivery of both the first Quitclaim Deed and the subsequent Corrected Quitclaim Deed was 
"unquestionably contingent on payment." The Harrises' only reference to the record is as 
follows: "Because he knew Yost urgently needed the corrected quitclaim deed, Harris signed his 
wife's name to that deed and left it with Robert Crandall to be notarized." Memorandum in 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 4. 
The uncontroverted evidence indicates that Darryl knew that the Corrected Quitclaim 
Deed was delivered to Duane through Robert Crandall. After Darryl had signed the first 
Quitclaim Deed, Duane gave Darryl the Corrected Quitclaim Deed and told Darryl to get it back 
to him as fast as he could. Darryl Harris Depo. Tr., p. 60, 1. 21 to p. 62, 1. 2. Darryl testified that 
Duane told him that the Bank wanted Darryl to sign the new Corrected Quitclaim Deed. !d. at p. 
63, II. 17-18. Darryl understood the purpose of a deed was to show the transfer ofland from one 
person to another. lei. at p. 66, 1. 24 to p. 67, 1. 5. In addition, Darryl understood that a deed is 
recorded in the county recorder's office to put everyone on notice of who owns the property. Id. 
at p. 67, 1. 6 to p. 68, 1. 1. Darryl knew that the Bank was relying on the Corrected Quitclaim 
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Deed to make sure that title to the Subject Property had really been transferred to the Yosts and in 
order to secure its loan to Duane. ld. at p. 68, 11. 17. Darryl went to Robert Crandall's office 
and met Duane there. Duane gave Darryl the Corrected Quitclaim Deed and they both left. 
Darryl signed the Corrected Quitclaim Deed and then retumed to Robert Crandall's office where 
he left it. 5 ld. at p. 75, 11. 11-20. Darryl admitted that he had transferred the Subject Property. ld. 
at p. 116,1. 22 to p. 117,1. 8. Finally, the Corrected Quitclaim Deed was recorded on Duane's 
behalf by Robert Crandall in Bonneville County on December 2,2008. See Darryl Harris Depo. 
Tr., Exhibit 2, Corrected Quitclaim Deed. 
There is no genuine issue of material fact conceming the delivery of the Corrected 
Quitclaim Deed as Darryl intended to and did in fact deliver said deed. Its delivery was not 
contingent on full payment of the $800,000.00. 
C. Idaho Code § 32-912 
The Harrises argue that because Darryl forged Christine's signature on the Corrected 
Quitclaim Deed, it is void under Idaho Code § 32-912. However, the Harrises should be 
estopped from claiming the Corrected Quitclaim Deed is void pursuant to § 32-912. 
"Estoppel is a recognized exception to the spousal joinder requirement ofLC. § 32-912 
where the conduct of the non-consenting spouse is consistent with the existence and validity of 
the disputed contract." Lovelass v. Sword, 140 Idaho 105, 108,90 P.3d 330,333 (2004). 
"While it is true that a contract to convey community real estate is void ifnot 
signed and acknowledged by both the husband and wife under this statute, this is 
not an inexorable rule," Tew v. Manwaring, 94 Idaho 50, 53,480 P.2d 896, 899 
5 "While it is of course true that to be valid a deed must be delivered, such delivery does not have to be to the 
grantee personally. Code s 29-101. The Deed may be received by another authorized to do so by the grantee or may 
be received by a third person whose actions are later ratified by the grantee." Barrett, supra, 221 S.E.2d at 27. 
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(1971), and "conduct from which acquiescence can be inferred may be sufficient 
to establish an estoppel." Calvin v. Salmon River Sheep Ranch, 104 Idaho 301, 
305,658 P.2d 972,976 (1983). Further, a non-consenting spouse's "failure to 
participate in the negotiations is not determinative of the issue of estoppel." Id. 
Id. at 109,90 P.3d at 334. 
Id. 
"[E]ven if an instrument lacks an acknowledgement of a spouse's signature, the 
spouse will be deemed to have waived the defect ifhis or her conduct is consistent 
with the existence and validity ofthe instrument." Lowry v. Ireland Bank, 116 
Idaho 708, 711, 779 P.2d 22,25 (Ct.App.1989) (citing Tew, 94 Idaho at 54,480 
P.2d at 900). 
The Harrises argue that "the evidence shows Christine Harris engaged in no conduct 
suggesting acquiescence to the deed." However, this argument is not backed up by any citation 
to the record. 
On the contrary, the uncontroverted evidence does show Christine acquiesced to the 
Corrected Quitclaim Deed. 
Over the years, the Harrises have owned and sold several pieces of real property, 
including bare ground, houses and cabins. Christine Harris' Depo. Tr., p. 11,1. 11 to 24, 1. 20. 
Christine knew that each time she and Darryl sold a piece of real property that she would have to 
sign a deed giving her interest to the buyer. Id. at p. 16,11. 12-25; p. 18,11. 11 17; p. 30, 11. 11-14. 
Christine claims Darryl told her in December 2008, that he had forged her name on the Corrected 
QuitClaim Deed. Id. at p. 54, 11. 1-9,20 to p. 56,1. 9. More specifically, Darryl testified that he 
told Christine that he had signed her name on the deed about two weeks after he had done so. 
Darryl Harris Depo. Tr., p. 71,1. 21 to p. 72,1. 2. Prior to learning that Palmer and Trigon were a 
fraud, Darryl told Christine that he and Duane had agreed to transfer the Subject Property to the 
Yosts. Christine Harris Depo. Tr., p. 42, 11. 3-19. Also prior to learning about the fraud, 
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Christine learned that Duane had transferred $800,000.00 into Darry1's Trigon account. ld. at p. 
44,11. 6-17. Christine also admitted that Darryl probably told her what the purpose ofthe 
$800,000.00 was. ld. at p. 44, 11. 20-23. When Christine learned about the forgery, 
approximately two weeks after Darryl had signed her name to the Corrected QuitClaim Deed, she 
did not object to it but rather did nothing despite knowing that the forgery would be relied upon 
by others. Darryl Harris' Depo. Tr., p. 71, 1. 21 to p. 73, 1. 6; Christine Harris Depo. Tr., p. 57,11. 
12-16. In fact, Darryl's forgery did not even bother Christine at the time she learned about it. 
Christine Harris Depo. Tr., p. 56,11. 12-17. Moreover, she did not tell anyone about the forgery. 
ld. Not only did Christine not get upset with Darryl, she was okay with the fact that he had 
signed her name because she trusted him. ld. at p. 58,11. 11-24. If Duane had brought them the 
$800,000.00 in cash, Christine would not have objected to signing the deed to the forty (40) 
acres. ld. at p. 61, 11. 6-15. Because Christine believed that the $800,000.00 had been transferred 
into Darryl's Trigon account, she admitted she probably would not have objected to giving Duane 
the deed to the forty (40) acres and that she probably would have been okay with it. ld. at p. 61, 
I. 16 to p. 62, I. 10. As late as the date of her deposition on November 9,2010, Christine was not 
planning on pressing any criminal charges against Darryl for forging her name. ld. at p. 56,1. 18 
to p. 57, 1. 3. Knowing of the forgery, the Harrises still filed their Complaint in which they allege 
that both Darryl and Christine signed the Corrected Quitclaim Deed. Although the Complaint 
was signed by the Harrises' attorney, they subsequently signed the Plaintiffs' Response to the 
Defendants, The Bank of Commerce First Set ofInterrogatories and Requests for Production of 
Documents dated May 7,2010 ("Discovery Response") before a notary public. See 4th Aff. of 
Wiley Dennert, Exhibit "B". In Answer to Interrogatory No.1 of the Discovery Response, 
OPPOSITION TO THE HARRlSES' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 18 
Christine and Darryl state under oath that they "have knowledge of the facts and information 
contained in the Complaint." See id. at p. 2. Christine and Darryl have obtained a Judgment by 
Default against the Yosts in the amount of $800,000.00 plus interest, costs and attorney fees. 
After Christine learned about the Corrected Quitclaim Deed, her conduct has been 
consistent with the existence and validity of the instrument. Christine's conduct infers 
acquiescence to the transfer of the forty (40) acres to the Yosts. Christine's conduct is sufficient 
to establish an estoppel. Therefore, Christine and Darryl should be estopped from claiming the 
Corrected Quitclaim Deed violates § 32-912, Idaho Code.6 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The purchase and sell agreement between Darryl and Duane is not void for lack of 
consideration because Duane's promise to pay $800,000.00 is valid consideration. The Bank is a 
bona fide lender for value. Therefore, to the extent there may be a failure of consideration, the 
Bank's Deeds of Trust encumbering the Subject Property are superior to any claims made by the 
Harrises. 
The Harrises' claim that the deed was not delivered because it was conditioned on full 
payment of the $800,000 is not supported by law or the uncontroverted facts. 
Furthermore, the Harrises should be estopped from claiming the Corrected Quitclaim 
Deed is void under § 32-912. 
This Court should deny the Harrises' Motion for Summary Judgment and should grant the 
Bank summary judgment by dismissing the Hanises' complaint and entering an order allowing 
6 In addition, for all of the reasons set forth in the Bank's Memorandum in Support of its Second Motion for 
Summary Judgment, the Harrises should be estopped from claiming the Corrected Quitclaim Deed is void pursuant to 
§ 32-912. 
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the Bank to foreclose on the Subject Property and declaring that the Bank's priority rights are 
superior to all other claimed interests. 
In addition, to the extent there is a deficiency following the foreclosure sale, then the 
Court should enter a deficiency judgment against the Y osts in an amount to be calculated using 
the Affidavit of Michael Morrison. 
DATED this /0 ~ay of February, 2011. 
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Duane L. Yost, after being first dul : sw' iupon ~a~l deposes and states as follows! 
1 ! : j~ ; i ' ' 
County of Boru1eville, ) 
1. I am over the age of I g ye it: i :! 
II ' , 
2 . 
... 
.:>, 
~ I! ; I ' 
4. In the fall of 2007, Darryl S,' d I agr;eedithat he would sell to roe and I would 
I " ,I 
buy from him the forty (40) acres that are Ie su: ~ ct oft~is l~wsuit (the "Subject Real Property"). 
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We agreed that the purchase price for this ~1~anS: b ion w~s $~OO,OOO. 00. At the time we agreed to 
I 'I 'I 
this transaction, land in that area was rep~ll i dlY:VI iued ai or ~oing for aroutld $20,000.00 per acre. j" I 
, "1;1 I' 
. 'I • Therefore, the total purchase price was $80P,90 .. 10.1 . i , 
:1: ;1 
The source of the $800,O~~~OO ~! hase ~ric9 was not essential to the transaction; 
. ~II : I, ,II 
what was essential was thatI agreed to pay fl> ., arris $,8 OOi 000.00 for the Subj ect Real Property. ;:I! ,I I II . 
6. After we had agreed to the;,J~rch: land s~le of the Subject Real Property, 1 chose to Ji:i ;. II ' 
pay the $800,000.00 purchase price by JflS£': I ng $800,Oj>o.00 from my account with Trigon 
Group, Inc., ("Trigon') to Darryl Harris' yrligon ~ count. l At re time of the transfer, Darryl Harris 
"1 1 ;1 " 
", f 'I ,; . 
did not object to the transfer of the $80q,oloo.0 rito hi~ Trtgon account. Darryl Hanis did not 
'. :111, : il 
demand or require that the only method p~payi ,the $~OO,pOO.OO be a transfer from my Trigon 
account to his Trigon account. What was ~j*:1 :po' ' to th~ purthase and sale agreement was that the 
. .,:1 i Ir 
purchase price was $800,000.00, not the fi 1m 01 t 'e $800,00: .00. Although I could have paid the', 
I I, ' 
! 1 I I I 
I I I I 
$800,000.00 purchase price through variO~s fo ' s. I chose to' ay the purchase price by transferring 
.. J ! I 
$800,000.00 from my Trigon account to ~bli '8' Trig~ account. ~ I I I I tp ~ i: I I 
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THE BANK OF COMMERCE, an Idaho 
corporation, 
Y. 
CounterclaimantiCross-
claimantiThird-Party Claimant, 
DARRYL HARRIS and CHRISTINE 
HARRIS, husband and wife, 
Counterdefendants, 
and 
DUANE L. YOST and LORI YOST, husband 
and wife, DUANE L. YOST as Trustee of the 
DUANE L. YOST TRUST, JOHN DOES I-X, I 
Crossdefendants, 
and 
HAMPSHIRE HOLDINGS, LLC, 
Third-Party Defendant. 
The Bank of Commerce (the "Bank") by and through its attorneys of record, hereby replies 
to the Harrises' Response in Opposition to the Bank's Second Motion for Summary Judgment as 
follows: 
I. ARGUMENT 
Darryl and Christine Harris (collectively the "Harrises") argue that the Bank is not a bona 
fide encumbrancer because it had actual, constructive or inquiry notice.! Digging deeper into the 
I See Harrises' Response in Opposition to Bank ofComrnerce's Second Motion for Summary Judgment, dated 
February 8,2011, p. 2, referring to their previously filed Response in Opposition to Defendant, Bank of Commerce's 
Motion for Sununary Judgment, dated November 18, 2010. 
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Harrises' argument, it appears that they are claiming the Bank knew or should have known that 
Duane Yost ("Duane") was heavily invested with Daren Palmer ("Palmer") in Trigon Group, Inc. 
("Trigon"); that Trigon was struggling financially, and perhaps was failing; that although Duane 
listed the forty (40) acres of Subject Property on his April 2008 financial statement to the Bank, 
the Harrises had not deeded those forty (40) acres to the Duane as of July 2008; that as of 
November 7,2008, the Harrises were the title owners of the Subject Property; and that the Bank 
should have compared Darryl's forgery of Christine's name on the Corrected Quitclaim Deed 
with other documents the Bank had with Christine's real signature. 
However, none of these claims by the Harrises set forth any relevant facts to support their 
argument that the Bank is not a good faith encumbrancer. For the Bank to fail to be a good faith 
lender, it would have had to have actual or constructive notice of both ofthe following: First, 
that Duane had used money from his Trigon account to purchase the Subject Property from the 
Harrises. Second, that Palmer was a fraud and that Trigon was a Ponzi scheme, and therefore, 
the money transferred by Duane from his Trigon account into Darryl's Trigon account was of 
little or no value. The Bank did not know, nor should it have known, either of these. 
The following is what the Bank knew: 
1. In the latter end of2008, as a result of the world economic down turn, the Bank 
made effOlis with several of its customers to secure unsecured loans with collateral. In order to 
do so, many of the loans were rewritten with modified terms such as extended payoff dates, 
different interest rates, etc. Romrell Aff., 'l 7. 
2. Duane represented that he owned the Subject Property. Aff. of Counsel 
(Manwaring), Exhibit "B", Romrell Depo. Tr., p. 13,11.9-17. 
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3. In approximately September 2008, Harris and Steve Crandall informed the Bank 
the Subject Property belonged to Duane. Summers Aff., '110. 
4. At that time, Darryl and Steve Crandall told the Bank that the documents for the 
transfer of the Subject Property to Duane may not have been completed correctly and that they 
were in the process of making sure that the Bonneville County records reflected that the Subject 
Property was in Duane's name. Summers Aff., '112. 
5. When the Harrises signed a deed of trust, the security was not for the Subject 
Property, but for the adjacent 40 acres that were owned by them. Summers Aff., '1'1 5-14. More 
specifically, on November 24, 2008, the Harrises secured a loan from the Bank to their sons 
(which was used to pay the Harrises for their sons' purchase of Harris Publishing) by signing a 
deed of trust for the middle 40 acres, not for the Subject Property which was the west 40 acres. 
Dan'yl HalTis Depo. Tr., p. 48, 1. 23 to p. 50, 1. 10; p. 65, 1. 4 to 66, 1. 10. 
6. At some point it was detennined that the Harrises had not yet formally deeded the 
SUbject Property to the Yosts. Until just recently, the Bank believed that both of the Harrises had 
executed the Corrected QuitClaim Deed on December 1,2008, deeding the Subject Property to 
the Y osts. 2 The Corrected QuitClaim Deed was notarized by Robert Crandall, indicating that 
both Darryl and Christine had personally appeared before him and acknowledged to him that they 
had executed the Corrected QuitClaim Deed. The Corrected QuitClaim Deed was recorded in 
Bonneville County as Instrument No. 1317892 on December 2, 2008. Romrell Aff., '1 10; 
2 Tom Romrell denies that he learned about the forgery until after November 1,2010. Second ROlmell Aff., 
'1'15-7. DalTyl claims that sometime after learning about the POl1zi scheme on January 2,2009, and the time he met with 
his attorney to file the Complaint, he told Tom Romrell he had signed Christine's name to the COlTected Quitclaim Deed. 
This is not a material factual dispute because under either version, the Bank did not know about the forgery until well 
after the Corrected Quitclaim Deed was recorded on December 2,2008; Duane's two Deeds of Trust were recorded on 
December 17, 2008, and December 30,2008; and Palmer's fraud was exposed on or after January 2, 2009. 
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Second Aff. Romrell, '17; Corrected QuitClaim Deed. 
7. Duane's two Deeds of Trust which provided the Subject Property as security for 
his renewal loan from the Bank were recorded on December 17, 2008, and December 30,2008 
("Deeds of Trust"). Morrison Aff., '17. 
8. Romrell had a meeting on December 8, 2011, with several of the Trigon investors. 
Those investors had represented that their accountants had done due diligence regarding Trigon. 
Additionally, those investors represented to Romrell that Trigon had been caught up in the 
economic downturn that was exposing other large financial institutions, such as Lehman 
Brothers. Aff. of Counsel (Manwaring), Exhibit "B", Romrell Depo. Tr., p. 18, 1. 13 to p. 20, 1. 
2. These investors also represented that Trigon had eight to ten million dollars available to return 
to its investors. 3 lei., at p. 20, 11. 3-13. Even the Harrises' accountant, Steve Crandall, was 
working to get some updated financial statements to the Bank about where Duane was sitting 
financially. ld. at p. 20, 11. 14-24. 
9. Duane had other non-Trigon assets the Bank was looking at to detennine whether 
Duane would be able to repay his loans to the Bank, including cars, machinery, cargo trailers, real 
property in the Shadow Ridge subdivision, real property in the Waterstone division in Jefferson 
County, airport hangars in Palm Springs, and a large boat on Lake Mead. ld. at p. 28, 11. 8-12; p. 
54,1. 12 to p. 56, 1. 18. 
The following is what the Bank did not know: 
1. Duane did not tell anyone at the Bank what money he had used to purchase the 
3 This information is not provided to prove the truth of the matter asserted, specifically that Trigon was truly 
only suffering from the economic downturn or that it actually had eight to ten million dollars to return to investors. 
Rather this evidence is provided to give foundation and understanding to the Bank's actions and beliefs, based on the 
representations that were made to the Bank about Trigon. 
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Subject Property, either before he signed the Deeds of Trust or prior to learning that Trigon had 
been fraudulent. More specifically, when Duane was in the process of obtaining the renewal 
loan, he did not mention to anyone at the Bank that the $800,000 that he had used in the Fall of 
2007 to purchase the Subject Property was a transfer of $800,000 from his Trigon account to 
Darryl's Trigon account. 4 Yost Aff., '17; Summers Aff., '115; Romrell Aff., '117. 
2. At all relevant times, the Bank did not know that Darryl had signed Christine's 
name on the Corrected QuitClaim Deed. Nor did the Bank know that the notary public, Robert 
Crandall, had notarized the Corrected QuitClaim Deed even though neither Darryl nor Christine 
appeared before him to acknowledge their purported signatures. Second Romrell Aff., '1'1 5-7; 
Darryl Harris Depo. Tr., p. 75, 11. 3-22. The Bank did not know that Darryl had told Christine 
that he had signed her name on the Corrected QuitClaim Deed because the Harrises failed to tell 
anyone else about the forgery. Christine Harris Depo. Tr., p.54, 11. 20-23; p. 55, 1. 14 to p. 56,1. 
17; Darryl Harris Depo. Tr., p. 71, 1. 21 to p. 72, 1. 2. 
3. Before the January 12, 2009, telephone call from Yost to Tom Romrell 
("Romrell"), the Bank had no idea that Palmer was dishonest nor that the Trigon investment 
scheme was a hoax. Following that telephone call, Romrell heard others refer to Trigon as a 
Ponzi scheme, but neither Romrell nor the Bank had any prior knowledge that Trigon was a 
Ponzi scheme. Romrell Aff., '115; Yost Aff., '16. 
Other important infomlation regarding the Bank's knowledge, or lack thereof, regarding 
Palmer and Trigon, is that the Bank did not have a close relationship to either Palmer or Trigon. 
4 It is not common for a lender to ask a borrower where the borrower got the money to originally purchase the 
property that is subsequently being used as security for a loan. 
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The Bank has never made any loans to Palmer or Trigon. Romrell Aff., 'lI2. Furthermore, the 
Bank has never held any accounts owned by Palmer or Trigon. ld. at 'l13. 
Significantly, Darryl and the other investors felt they had no reason to doubt Palmer or 
Trigon. Darryl had his accountant check into Trigon and Palmer. Darryl and his accountant were 
satisfied that Palmer was legitimate. Darryl Harris Depo. Tr., p. 77,11. 1-4; p. 78,1. 5 to p. 79, 1. 
12. Darryl trusted Palmer and thought he was a "financial trading market genius". !d. at p. 77, 1. 
11-18. Despite the very high rate of return that Palmer was paying investors, Darryl did not have 
any doubts that maybe Trigon was a little too good to be true. ld. at p. 77, I. 19 to p. 78, 1. 4. 
Sometime in December 2008, Darryl had heard that Palmer or Trigon had written checks which 
had bounced. ld. at p. 88, 11. 5-13; p. 92, 11 3-10. Even when the Trigon and Palmer investments 
started to sour or not look like they were as good as they were during the last half of 2008, Darryl 
and the other investors thought it was all related to the downturn in the market because the stock 
market had taken huge hits. ld. at p. 81, 1. 14 to p. 82, I. 11. None of the investors suspected that 
the losses were really because of Palmer's fraud. ld. Even when Darryl and some of the other 
investors met with Palmer on December 15, 2008, and were told by Palmer there was only 
perhaps fifteen percent (15%) of the value left in Trigon, Darryl believed it was because of the 
market downturn, not because of any fraud committed by Palmer. ld. On December 15,2008, 
when he learned that Trigon had lost so much money, Darryl just accepted it because everybody 
was losing money in the stock market and in real estate values. !d. at p. 84, 11. 20-25. Darryl was 
completely shocked to learn on January 2,2009, that Palmer and Trigon had been frauds. ld. at 
p. 84, 1. 14 to p. 85,1. 3. As far as Darryl knows, everyone was surprised to learn of Palmer's 
fraud. ld. 
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Dan"yl testified that he does not have any inforn1ation, facts or evidence that the Bank 
knew about Palmer's fraud before Darryl learned about it on January 2,2009. Darryl Harris 
Depo. Tr., p. 92,11. 21-24; p. 93, 1. 24 to p. 94, 1. 3. 
If Darryl and all the other investors did not suspect Palmer of fraud until he confessed on 
January 2,2009, there is no reason to believe that the Bank should have known of the fraud until 
on or after January 2,2009. If the investors who had investigated Palmer and Trigon were 
fooled, then it is even less likely that the Bank, who had no loans or accounts with Palmer, would 
have been put on notice of the Ponzi scheme before Duane told Romrell about the fraud during 
their telephone conversation on January 12,2009. 
Recently, the Idaho Supreme Court discussed the lack-of-notice requirement for a 
purchaser to be a bona fide purchaser. 
"[W]hcn one is purchasing land, the rule of caveat emptor applies and ... 
'whatever is notice enough to excite the attention of a man of ordinary prudence 
and prompt him to further inquiry, amounts to notice of all such facts as a 
reasonable investigation would disclose. ,,, Hunter v. Shields, 131 Idaho 148, 153, 
953 P.2d 588,593 (1998) (quoting Hill v. Fed. Land Bank, 59 Idaho 136, 141,80 
P.2d 789, 791 (1938» .... 
In order to claim the protection of being a BFP, a party "must show that at 
the time ofthe purchase he paid a valuable consideration and upon the belief and 
the validity of the vendor's claim of title without notice, actual or constructive, of 
any outstanding adverse rights of another." Imig v. McDonald, 77 Idaho 314, 318, 
291 P.2d 852,855 (1955). 
Weitz v. Green, 148 Idaho 851, 858-59, 230 P.3d 743, 750-51 (2010). 
When the Bank secured Duane's renewal loans with the Subject Property in November 
and December 2008, it had no notice, actual or constructive, that the Harrises would subsequently 
claim that the COlTected Quitclaim Deed was invalid because the $800,000.00 transferred from 
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Duane's Trigon account to Darryl's Trigon account was part ofa fraudulent Ponzi scheme 
orchestrated by Palmer. Therefore, at the time the Deeds of Trust were signed and recorded, the 
Bank was without notice, actual or constructive, of any outstanding adverse rights of the Harrises 
in the Subject Property.5 
The Harrises also appear to argue that the Bank should have known that Christine had not 
signed the Corrected QuitClaim Deed because the Bank had signature cards with Christine's real 
signature. 6 Therefore, the Harrises imply that the Bank should have known about Christine's 
claim that the Corrected Quitclaim Deed is invalid under Idaho Code § 32-912. 
Courts have held that a person may rely on the representation made by a notary public. 
See lmmerrnan v. Ostertag, 199 A.2d 869,873 (1964) ("[Mortgagee] had a right to rely, and did 
in fact rely, upon [notary's] certification [that the mortgagors personally appeared before the 
notary and signed the loan documents] when making the loan."); Ameriseal of North East 
Florida, Inc. v. LeifJer, 673 So.2d 68, 69-70 (1996) ("Indeed, being able to rely on documents is 
the purpose of having them notarized."). 
Romrell testi fled that "[tJhe purpose of a signature card at the Bank is not to verify 
signatures on notarized documents." Second Romrell Aff., '1 8 
The Harrises have not pointed to any authority to support their argument that the Bank 
5 As the Harrises believed, at least until January 2, 2009, that they had been fully paid $800,000.00 for the 
Subject Property, they too were apparently without any notice they would subsequently claim an interest in those 40 
acres. 
6 Despite this argument, there is no evidence that even ifthe Bank had compared Christine's signature on other 
documents at the Bank with the Corrected Quitclaim Deed it would have discovered the forgery. Such a discovery is 
mere speculation. 
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should have compared Christine's signature cards on file at the Bank with the purported signature 
of Christine on the Corrected QuitClaim Deed. 
Instead, the Bank had the right to rely on the signatures on the Corrected QuitClaim Deed 
because the document had been notarized by Robert Crandall. Furtheml0re, even though Darryl 
told Christine sometime around the middle of December 2008, that he had forged her name on 
the Corrected QuitClaim Deed, neither Dan)'1 nor Christine told anyone else, let alone anyone at 
the Bank, about the forgery. It is unbelievable that the Harrises are now claiming that the Bank 
should have known about the forgery back in December 2008. None ofthe facts support such a 
claim. Furthermore, the Harrises should be estopped from claiming that the Bank is not a bona 
fide lender because it had constructive or inquiry notice that Darryl had forged his wife's name 
on the Corrected QuitClaim Deed. 
Because the Bank was a bona fide lender for value without notice of any adverse claims 
to the Subject Property, its Deeds of Trust should be foreclosed with the Bank taking the highest 
priority in that property and the proceeds from the sale of the property being applied first to 
Duane's obligations to the Bank. 
II. CONCLUSION 
The Bank is a bona fide lender for value. Therefore, the Bank's Deeds of Trust 
encumbering the Subject Property are superior to any claims made by the Harrises. 
This Court should deny the Harrises' Motion for Summary Judgment and should grant the 
Bank summary judgment by dismissing the Harrises' Complaint and entering an order allowing 
the Bank to foreclose on the Subject Property and declaring that the Bank's priority rights are 
superior to all other claimed interests. 
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In addition, to the extent there is a deficiency following the foreclosure sale, then the 
Court should enter a deficiency judgment against the Y osts in an amount to be calculated using 
the Affidavit of Michael Morrison. 
DATED this 11,q-ay of February, 2011. 
Dougla~-4.. ~ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I served a true copy of the foregoing document upon the following 
this I7-TIl day of February, 2011, by hand delivery, mailing with the necessary postage affixed 
thereto, facsimile, or overnight mail. 
Kipp L. Manwaring 
MANWARING LAW OFFICE 
381 Shoup Avenue, Suite 210 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
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IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE. 
DARRYL HARRIS and CHRlSTINE ) 
HARRISS, husband and wife, ) Case No. CV -09-3488 
) 
Plaintiffs, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
ORDER RE: MOTIONS FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
) 
DUANE L. YOST and LORI YOST, ) 
husband and wife, DUANE L. YOST as ) 
Trustee of the DUANE L. YOST TRUST, ) 
THE BANK OF COMMERCE, and Idaho ) 
Corporation and JOHN DOES I-X, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
During September and October 2007, Darryl and Christine Harris entered into a real 
) 
.. ) 
estate transaction with Duane and Lori Yost. The Harrises agreed to sell and the Y osts agreed to 
buy approximately forty acres of land (hereafter "Subject Property") for a purchase price of 
$800,000.00. When the Harrises and the Yosts were discussing the transaction, both parties 
believed there was money in their respective accounts with Trigon Group (hereafter "Trigon"), a 
company owned and operated by Daren Palmer. At the Yosts' direction, on or about October 1, 
2007, Trigon transferred $800,000.00 from the Yosts' account to the Harrises' account. 
The transaction between the Harrises and the Yosts related to a proposed joint venture 
wherein the Y osts would buy half of an eighty acre plot owned by the Harrises. The land would 
then be transferred to and developed by the proposed joint venture. Steve Crandall, Mr. Harris's 
accountant, organized Triad-Harris, LLC (hereafter "Triad-Harris") to be the development 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER RE: MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT-l 
company that would hold title to the land. The promoters of Triad-Harris never executed any 
formal written agreement. 
In September 2008, Mr. Harris and Mr. Crandall informed Trent Summers, a manager 
and vice president of the Bank of Commerce (hereafter "Bank"), that the Subject Property was 
owned by Mr. Yost. 
In November 2008, Mr. Yost was experiencing financial difficulties and had loans with 
the Bank that were due and owing. On November 21, 2008, the Y osts executed a deed of trust 
naming the Bank as beneficiary and identifying the Subject Property as security for a 
$1,000,000.00 renewal loan as well as any other debt owed by Mr. Yost to the Bank. Regarding 
the renewed loan, the Bank agreed to extend the maturity date one year, and Mr. Yost agreed to 
pay additional interest and loan processing fees and to provide collateral. The deed of trust to the 
Bank was recorded on November 21,2008, and re-recorded on December 17,2008, to correct an 
error in the legal description. 
On November 25, 2008, Mr. Harris executed a quitclaim deed (hereafter "First Quitclaim 
Deed") purportedly transferring the Subject Property to the Duane L. Yost Trust. However, 
because the Subject Property was community property and Mrs. Harris hand not signed the First 
Quitclaim Deed, it was presumed to be invalid. On December 1, 2008, a second quitclaim deed 
(hereafter "Corrected Quitclaim Deed") was executed and contained both Mr. and Mrs. Harris's 
signatures. That deed was recorded on December 2,2008, in Bonneville County. 
The Harrises now claim that Mr. Harris forged his wife's signature on the Corrected 
Quitclaim Deed. Mr. Harris testified that Mr. Yost came to him in a state of panic because he 
needed the Corrected Quitclaim Deed to satisfy the Bank. Mr. Harris said he could not find his 
wife at the time, so he forged her signature. Mrs. Harris admits her husband told her about the 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER RE: MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY 
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forgery sometime in December 2008, but she was okay with it because he "knew what he was 
doing" and she "trusted him." Mrs. Harris Deposition at 58. After Mr. Harris signed his name 
and his wife's name on the Corrected Quitclaim Deed, he gave it to Robert Crandall and 
instructed him to notarize it and give it to Mr. Yost. Robert Crandall notarized the Corrected 
Quitclaim Deed, indicating that both Mr. and Mrs. Harris had personally appeared before him 
and acknowledged to him that they executed the deed-when in fact Mrs. Crandall had not. 
On December 24, 2008, the Y osts executed another deed of trust naming the Bank as 
beneficiary and identifying the Subject Property as subject to that deed of trust. That deed of 
trust was recorded in Bonneville County on December 30, 2008. 
On December 31, 2008, Mr. Palmer held a meeting with Mr. Crandall, David Taylor and 
Mr. Taylor's accountant. Mr. Palmer confessed to them that his Trigon investments were a 
fraud. Mr. Harris received that information on January 2,2009. 
On January 12,2009, Thomas Romrell, the President and CEO of the Bank, received a 
telephone call from Mr. Yost. Mr. Yost stated that Mr. Palmer had admitted the Trigon 
investment scheme was a hoax and that the Department of Finance was investigating Mr. Palmer 
and Trigon. At that point, Mr. Yost and Mr. Harris were both aware that their Trigon accounts 
did not have the funds they previously believed existed. 
On June 12,2009, the Harrises filed a complaint seeking the return of the Subject 
Property or a Sherriff's sale of the Subject Property with the proceeds being paid to them first. 
In their complaint, the Harrises alleged that both Mr. and Mrs. Harris had executed the Corrected 
Quitclaim Deed. 
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On July 15,2009, the Bank filed a counterclaim, cross claim, and third-party claim 
seeking foreclosure of its two deeds of trust and seeking an order declaring its priority rights in 
the property to be superior to all other claimed interests. 
On October 7, 2009, the Harrises filed a motion for a default judgment. On October 16, 
2009, this Court granted the Harrises' motion and entered a Judgment by Default against the 
Yosts and the Duane 1. Yost Trust in the amount of$987,610.40. 
On January 26, 2011, the Harrises filed a motion for summary judgment (hereafter 
"Harrises'Motion"). On January 27, 2011, the Bank filed its own motion for summary judgment 
(hereafter "Bank's Motion"). On February 10, 2011, the Bank filed a brief in opposition to the 
Harrises' Motion. On February 11, 2011, the Harrises filed a brief in opposition to the Bank's 
Motion. On February 17,2011, the Bank filed a reply brief in support of its Motion. On 
February 18,2011, the Harrises filed a reply brief in support of their Motion (hereafter 
"Harrises'Reply"). This Court heard oral argument on February 24,2011. 
II. STANDARD OF ADJUDICATION 
A motion for summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, 
depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter 
oflaw." I.R.C.P. 56(c). See Grover v. Smith, l37 Idaho 247, 46 P.3d 1105; Rockefeller v. 
Grabow, l36 Idaho 637, 39 P.3d 577 (2002). The burden is, at all times, on the moving party to 
demonstrate the absence ofa genuine issue of material fact. Jordan v. Beeks, 135 Idaho 586,21 
P.3d 908 (2001). 
The United States Supreme Court, in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 
2548 (1986), stated: 
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Of course, a party seeking summary jUdgment always bears the initial 
responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and 
identifying those portions of "the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any," which 
it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. But unlike 
the Court of Appeals, we find no express or implied requirement in Rule 56 that 
the moving party support its motion with affidavits or other similar materials 
negating the opponent's claim. On the contrary, Rule 56(c), which refers to "the 
affidavits, if any" (emphasis added), suggests the absence of such a requirement. 
And if there were any doubt about the meaning of Rule 56( c) in this regard, such 
doubt is clearly removed by Rules 56(a) and (b), which provide the claimants and 
defendants, respectively, may move for summary judgment "with or without 
supporting affidavits" (emphasis added). The import of these subsections is that, 
regardless of whether the moving party accompanies its summary judgment 
motion with affidavits, the motion may, and should, be granted so long as 
whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the standard for the entry of 
summary judgment, as set forth in Rule 56( c), is satisfied. One of the principal 
purposes of the summary jUdgment rule is to isolate and dispose of factually 
unsupported claims or defenses, and we think it should be interpreted in a way 
that allows it to accomplish this purpose. 
ld. at 323,106 S.Ct. at 2553 (alterations in original). 
When assessing a motion for summary judgment, all controverted facts are to be liberally 
construed in favor of the non-moving party. Dodge-Farrar v. American Cleaning Services, Co., 
137 Idaho 838, 54 P.3d 954 (Ct. App. 2002). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a 
court is not permitted to weigh the evidence to resolve controverted factual issues. Meyers v. 
Loft, 133 Idaho 846,993 P.2d 609 (2000). Liberal construction of the facts in favor ofthe non-
moving party requires the court to draw all reasonable factual inferences in favor of the non-
moving party. Farnworth v. Ratliff, 134 Idaho 237, 999 P.2d 892 (2000); Madrid v. Roth, 134 
Idaho 802, 10 P.3d 751 (Ct. App. 2000). 
If the action will be tried by the court without ajury, an exception to this rule applies. In 
Riverside Development Co. v. Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515, 519-20,650 P.2d 657,661-62 (1982), our 
Supreme Court held that summary judgment is appropriate despite the possibility of conflicting 
inferences if the evidentiary facts are not disputed and the trial court rather than a jury will be the 
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trier of facts. Moreover, in such a situation, the judge is not required to draw inferences in favor 
of the party opposing the motion for summary judgment. Id. "Conflicting evidentiary facts, 
however, must still be viewed in favor of the nonmoving party." Banner Life Ins. Co. v. Mark 
Wallace Dixson Irrevocable Trust, 147 Idaho 117, 124,206 P.3d 481, 488 (2009). 
The Idaho appellate courts have followed the United States Supreme Court's decision in 
Celotex, which stated: 
Summary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural 
shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are 
designed "to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every 
action." ... Rule 56 must be construed with due regard not only for the rights of 
persons asserting claims and defenses that are adequately based in fact to have 
those claims and defenses tried to a jury, but also for the rights of persons 
opposing such claims and defenses to demonstrate in the manner provided by the 
Rule, prior to trial, that the claims and defenses have no factual basis. 
Id. at 327,106 S.Ct. at 2555 (citations omitted); see Win of Michigan, Inc. v. Yreka United, Inc., 
137 Idaho 747, 53 P.3d 330 (2002); Thomson v. City of Lewiston, 137 Idaho 473,50 P.3d 488 
(2002). 
A party against whom a summary judgment is sought cannot merely rest on his pleadings 
but, when faced with affidavits or depositions supporting the motion, must corne forward by way 
of affidavit, deposition, admissions or other documentation to establish the existence of material 
issues of fact, which preclude the issuance of summary judgment. Anderson v. Hollingsworth, 
136 Idaho 800,41 P.3d 228 (2001); Baxter v. Craney, 135 Idaho 166, 16 P.3d 263 (2000). The 
non-moving party's case, however, must be anchored in something more than speculation, and a 
mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to create a genuine issue of fact. Wait v. Leavell Cattle, 
Inc., 136 Idaho 792, 41 P .3d 220 (2001). 
The moving party is entitled to judgment when the non-moving party fails to make a 
sufficient showing as to the essential elements to which that party will bear the burden of proof 
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at trial. Primary Health Network, Inc. v. State, Dept. of Admin., 137 Idaho 663, 52 P.3d 307 
(2002). Facts in dispute cease to be "material" facts when the plaintiff fails to establish a prima 
facie case. Post Falls Trailer Parkv. Fredekind, 131 Idaho 634, 962 P.2d 1018, (1998). In such 
a situation, there can be no genuine issue of material fact, since a complete failure of proof 
concerning an essential element ofthe non-moving party's case necessarily renders all other 
facts immaterial. Id. 
III. DISCUSSION 
Attempting to establish either their ownership of or a priority interest in the Subject 
Property, the Harrises' Complaint alleges the following theories: vendor's lien, equitable 
mortgage, lack of consideration, failure of consideration, mutual mistake, quiet title, deed as 
security, and foreclosure. The Bank argues that each of those theories fail against the Bank 
because the Bank is a bona fide lender for value, and as such, it has a superior interest in the 
Subject Property. Thus, the Bank seeks to foreclose its deeds of trust and apply the proceeds of 
the sale to Mr. Yost's indebtedness to the Bank. 
The Harrises argue they are entitled to summary judgment because the Corrected 
Quitclaim Deed is void due to lack of consideration, failure of delivery, and violation of Idaho 
Code § 32-912. The Harrises argue the Bank is not a bona fide lender, and even if it is, the Bank 
has no interest in the Subject Property because the Corrected Quitclaim Deed is void. 
This Court will not address the validity of the First Quitclaim Deed because neither party 
asserts it is valid. The Court will first address whether the Corrected Quitclaim Deeds is void. 
Second, the Court will address whether the Bank is a bona fide lender. 
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A. Validity of the Corrected Quitclaim Deed 
1. Consideration 
The Harrises claim there was "an absolute lack of consideration from Yost to the Harrises 
for either the first quitclaim deed or the corrected quitclaim deed," and as a result, "both 
quitclaim deeds are void." Harrises' Motion at 6. The Harrises assert that the only consideration 
that could have supported the agreement between them and Mr. Yost was actual payment, and 
that Mr. Yost's promise to pay, or assurance that he had paid, does not constitute consideration. 
The Harrises claim that parol evidence is admissible to prove the recital of consideration in the 
Corrected Quitclaim Deed is untrue. They also claim they were fraudulently induced into 
executing the deed. 
The Bank argues that the Corrected Quitclaim Deed unambiguously recites that the 
transfer of the Subject Property was made for good and valuable consideration and that parol 
evidence is inadmissible to show otherwise. The Bank argues that even if parol evidence were 
admissible, the Harrises have not introduced any parol evidence that would prove a lack of 
consideration. The Bank concedes there may have been afailure of consideration but not a lack 
of consideration. 
a. Parol Evidence 
The Corrected Quitclaim Deed provides as follows: "Darryl Harris and Christine 
Harris, Husband and Wife, Grantors, of Idaho Falls, Idaho hereby RELEASES, and Forever 
QUITCLAIMS to Duane Yost and Lori Yost, Grantees, for good and valuable consideration 
the following described tract ofland .... " 
In Hall v. Hall, 116 Idaho 483,888 P.2d 255 (1989), the Idaho Supreme Court stated, 
Where possible, the court should give effect to the intention of the parties 
to a deed. Where the language of a deed is plain and unambiguous the intention 
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of the parties must be determined from the deed itself, and parol evidence is not 
admissible to show intent. Oral and written statements are generally inadmissible 
to contradict or vary unambiguous terms contained in a deed. . .. Where, as here, 
the consideration clause clearly recites that the transfer was made "For Value 
Received," parol evidence is not admissible to contradict the deed by attempting 
to show the transfer was in part a "gift" rather than "for value." 
Id. at 484,888 P.2d at 256. Our Supreme Court, however, has also stated that the parol evidence 
rule is inapplicable if the party challenging the instrument is not trying to vary the terms of the 
instrument, but rather trying to prove that a fact recited in the instrument is untrue. See Treasure 
Valley Bank v. Butcher, 117 Idaho 974, 793 P.2d 206 (1990). 
Initially we note that "[a] written instrument is presumptive evidence of a 
consideration." I.C. § 29-103; see also WI. Scott, Inc. v. Madras Aerotech, Inc., 
103 Idaho 736, 653 P.2d 791 (1982). "Once this presumption arises, the party 
seeking to assert the affirmative defense of lack of consideration must establish 
that defense by a preponderance of the evidence." Id. at 741, 653 P.2d at 796. The 
presumption may be rebutted by any substantial evidence. It has been held, for 
example, "where a deed contains recitals of fact purporting to evidence receipt or 
acknowledgement of payment, such recitals may be challenged as untrue, and 
parol evidence is admissible for that purpose. The law uniformly allows the 
admission of parol evidence to prove that a recital of fact is untrue." Vanoski v. 
Thomson, 114 Idaho 381, 383, 757 P.2d 244,246 (Ct. App. 1988). 
McCandless v. Carpenter, 123 Idaho 386,388-89,848 P.2d 444,446-47 (Ct. App. 1993). 
This Court concludes parol evidence is admissible to prove that the recital of "good and 
valuable consideration" in the Corrected Quitclaim Deed is untrue. 
b. Failure of Lack of Consideration 
The Harrises claim that because no actual funds existed in Mr. Yost' s Trigon account, no 
actual funds were transferred to Mr. Harris, and the Corrected Quitclaim Deed was therefore not 
supported by consideration. 
The Bank asserts that the problem of insufficient or nonexistent funds in Mr. Yost's 
Trigon account, at best, may constitute a failure of consideration, but does not constitute a lack 
of consideration. Further, the Bank asserts that even ifthere was a failure of consideration, the 
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quitclaim deed would be voidable, not void, and the Bank would still take priority as a bona fide 
lender. 
The term "failure of consideration" includes instances where a proper 
contract was entered into when the agreement was made, but because of 
supervening events, the promised performance fails, rendering the contract 
unenforceable. Failure of consideration generally refers to failure of performance 
of a contract. "Failure" of consideration is to be distinguished from "want" or 
"lack" of consideration, which refers to instances where no consideration ever 
existed to support the contract, rendering the contract invalid from the beginning. 
World Wide Lease, Inc. v. Woodworth, 111 Idaho 880, 884-85, 728 P.2d 769, 783-84 (Ct. 
App. 1986) (internal citations omitted). 
"[A]n accord and satisfaction must be founded on a proper consideration, consisting of 
some benefit to the creditor or detriment to the debtor which would support a simple contract." 1 
C.J.S. Accord and Satisfaction § 11 Consideration. 
Consideration for an accord and satisfaction exists . . . where something 
substantial which the debtor is not bound by law to do is done by him or her, or 
where he or she abstains, at the request of the creditor, from doing something 
which he or she has a right to do. It may consist in the performance of an act, or 
even the giving of a promise. The delivery of specific property, of whatever value, 
is sufficient consideration, as is the substitution of a certainty for an uncertainty, 
the acknowledgment of a disputed right or title asserted by the creditor, or the 
waiver or abandonment of a claim being made in good faith against the other 
party, giving security for a debt or doubtful claim, or promissory notes for the 
amount of an open account. 
Id. at § 12 Consideration-What Constitutes Consideration (footnotes omitted). 
In this case, as evidenced by the behavior of the parties, Mr. Yost promised to pay 
$800,000.00 to Mr. Harris, and Mr. Harris agreed to transfer the Subject Property to Mr. Yost. 
Prior to the agreement, Mr. Yost had no legal or contractual duty to pay $800,000.00 to Mr. 
Harris, and Mr. Harris had no legal or contractual duty to transfer property to Mr. Yost. The 
Harrises' quarterly account statement from Trigon in December 2007 reflects an $800,000.00 
transfer from Mr. Yost on October 1,2007. Regardless of whether those funds were actually 
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accessible at that time, the right to withdraw--or attempt to withdraw-those funds transferred 
from Mr. Yost to Mr. Harris. In exchange, Mr. Harris executed the Corrected Quitclaim Deed. 
When Mr. Harris transferred the Subject Property to Mr. Yost, both men believed that the 
$800,000.00 existed and had been transferred to the Harrises. There is substantial evidence that 
the Harrises received, or had access to, at least some of the $800,000.00. The Harrises made the 
following withdrawals from his Trigon account subsequent to October 1,2007, the date when 
Mr. Yost transferred the money to Mr. Harris' Trigon account: $20,000.00 on October 8,2007; 
$18,000.00 on October 16,2007; $85,000.00 on December 13,2007; $200,000.00 on July 14, 
2008; and $40,000.00 on September 19,2008. 
It is possible that some ofthe money the Harrises withdrew after October 1, 2007, came 
from Mr. Yost's $800,000.00 transfer into the Harrises' Trigon account. Even if that is untrue, it 
appears that the Harrises had access to the money and could have withdrawn some or all of it up 
until the fall of 2008. Mr. Harris stated that he had no knowledge of any Trigon checks bouncing 
until late December 2008. Even if Mr. Yost's Trigon account was empty when he made the 
transfer, that deficiency is only relevant to his ability to perform on his promise to pay; it has 
noting to do with consideration. 
The Harrises would like to construe the purchase and sell agreement as some kind of 
unilateral agreement wherein the land transfer would only become effective, or maintain its 
effectiveness, if the money transfer from Mr. Yost was valid and continued to be valid 
indefinitely. Such a proposition would require unconventional application of contract law 
principles. The Harrises supplement their argument by alleging they were fraudulently induced 
into the agreement. I Mr. Yost and Mr. Harris both believed the funds existed at the time of 
I Fraud in the inducement is a defect, which if proved would render the deed voidable, meaning the deed could not 
be set aside as against a bona fide purchaser. See Blaise v. Ratliff, 672 S. W.2d 683 (Mo. App. 1984). Fraud in the 
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transfer, and they carried that belief until the end of December 2008. The fraud of Mr. Palmer is 
only tangentially related to the purchase and sell agreement. Mr. Palmer had nothing to do with 
the agreement between the Harrises and the Y osts. Under no construction of the facts can this 
Court conclude the Yosts fraudulently induced the Harrises into executing the Corrected 
Quitclaim Deed. 
It would be improper for this Court to conclude the contract is void simply because the 
party who promises to pay, and who attempts ta pay in gaadfaith, later discovers that his funds 
were insufficient-regardless of the reason for the deficiency. In such a situation, the Harrises 
would retain their right to payment and enforcement of the contract, but the contract would not 
be void. Thus, this Court concludes based upon the facts and authority discussed above the 
Corrected Quitclaim Deed was not void due to a lack of consideration in the purchase and sell 
agreement. 
The evidence before this Court is insufficient to draw any conclusion regarding the actual 
value ofMr. Yost's attempt to transfer $800,000.00. While that question may be relevant to the 
failure of consideration issue, this Court need not address the issue in light of its conclusion 
below regarding the Bank's status as a bona fide lender. 
2. Delivery 
The Harrises claim that title to the Subject Property never passed to Mr. Yost 
because delivery of the deed was "unquestionably conditional on payment," and Mr. 
Harris "agreed to sign and deliver the corrected quitclaim deed only upon the assurance 
offunding." Harrises' Motion at 11-12. 
factum (i.e., fraud of such a nature that the grantor does not realized the document her or she is signing is a deed) 
would render the deed void. See Nixon v. Nixon, 132 S.E.2d 590 (N.C. 1963). To the extent the Harrises allege 
fraud in the factum, there is no evidence to support such a claim. 
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A deed "does not take effect as a deed until delivery with intent that it shall 
operate. The intent with which it is delivered is important. This restricts or 
enlarges the effect of the instrument." Bowers v. Cottrell, 15 Idaho 221, 228, 96 P. 
936, 938 (1908) (internal quotations omitted). In addition, "[ e ]ven where the 
grantee is in possession of the deed, though that may raise a presumption of 
delivery, still it may be shown by parol evidence that a deed in possession of the 
grantee was not delivered." Id (internal quotations omitted). The "controlling 
element in the question of delivery" is the intention of the grantor and grantee. Id 
"The question of delivery is one of intention, and the rule is that a delivery is 
complete when there is an intention manifested on the part of the grantor to make 
the instrument his deed." Id (internal quotations omitted). "[T]he real test of the 
delivery of a deed is this: Did the grantor by his acts or words, or both, intend to 
divest himself of title? If so, the deed is delivered. Estate of Skvorak, 140 Idaho 
16,21,89 P.3d 856, 861 (2004). 
Barmore v. Perrone, 145 Idaho 340, 344-45, 179 P.3d 303,307-08 (2008). 
In this Case, the Y osts are in possession of the Corrected Quitclaim Deed, and there is a 
presumption of delivery. Regarding Mr. Harris's intent to deliver the deed, the question is not 
simply whether Mr. Harris intended a conditional delivery. The question, rather, is whether Mr. 
Harris manifested such intent by his acts and words. Although there is evidence that Mr. Harris 
wanted to be paid in full-which is highly typical-there is no evidence of words or conduct by 
Mr. Harris that would lead anyone to question the immediate effectiveness and validity of the 
deed at the time Mr. Harris executed it and delivered it to Mr. Yost. 
Furthermore, the Harrises concede that Mr. Yost provided "assurance of available funds 
to complete the transaction." Harrises' Reply at 3. By virtue ofthe fact that Mr. Harris executed 
the deed and gave it to Mr. Yost, it is apparent that Mr. Harris relied on Mr. Yost's assurance of 
adequate funds. The Harrises, however, believe that Mr. Yost's assurance was "fraudulent" and 
the fraud negates Mr. Harrises' intent to deliver. 
As stated above, Mr. Yost was not the perpetrator of fraud. There is no evidence that Mr. 
Yost transferred the $800,000.00 in bad faith. When Mr. Harris delivered the deed, both he and 
Mr. Yost believed the funds existed. Even if the funds did not exist at that time, it was the fraud 
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ofa third party that undermined Mr. Yost's source of funding. Mr. Palmer's fraudulent scheme 
was not exposed until approximately one year after Mr. Yost transferred the funds and one 
month after Mr. Harris executed the Corrected Quitclaim Deed. 
The Harrises have not presented any evidence to rebut the presumption of delivery 
regarding the Corrected Quitclaim Deed. 
3. § 32-912 
The Harrises argue that because Mr. Harris forged his wife's signature on the Corrected 
Quitclaim Deed, that deed is void under Idaho Code § 32-912. 
The Bank asserts the Harrises should be estopped from claiming the Corrected Quitclaim 
Deed is void under § 32-912. 
Section 32-912 sets out the general rule that the conveyance of community real property 
is void without the written consent of both spouses. See § 32-912. 
"Estoppel is a recognized exception to the spousal joinder requirement ofLC. § 32-912 
where the conduct of the non-consenting spouse is consistent with the existence and validity of 
the disputed contract." Lovelass v. Sword, 140 Idaho 105, 108,90 P.3d 330, 333 (2004). 
"While it is true that a contract to convey community real estate is void if 
not signed and acknowledged by both the husband and wife under this statute, this 
is not an inexorable rule," Tew v. Manwaring, 94 Idaho 50, 53, 480 P.2d 896, 899 
(1971), and "conduct from which acquiescence can be inferred may be sufficient 
to establish an estoppel." Calvin v. Salmon River Sheep Ranch, 104 Idaho 301, 
305, 658 P.2d 972, 976 (1983). Further, a non-consenting spouse's "failure to 
participate in the negotiations is not determinative of the issue of estoppel." Id. 
"[E]ven if an instrument lacks an acknowledgement of a spouse's 
signature, the spouse will be deemed to have waived the defect if his or her 
conduct is consistent with the existence and validity of the instrument." Lowry v. 
Ireland Bank, 116 Idaho 708, 711,779 P.2d 22,25 (Ct. App. 1989) (citing Tew, 
94 Idaho at 54, 480 P.2d at 900). 
Id. at 109, 90 P.3d at 334. 
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Mrs. Harris stated she knew that her signature was required on any deed that transferred 
property in which she had a community interest. Mrs. Harris admits her husband told her in 
December 2008, that he had forged her signature on the Corrected Quitclaim Deed. Mr. Harris 
also testified that he told his wife, approximately two weeks after signing the Corrected 
Quitclaim Deed, that he had forged her signature. When Mrs. Harris learned of the forgery, she 
was not bothered by it, stating she trusted her husband and was okay with the fact that he forged 
her signature. Christine Harris Deposition at 58. Although there is some doubt about the extent 
of Mrs. Harris's knowledge regarding the purpose of the transaction with Mr. Yost, she 
unquestionably had some knowledge of it, and she knew that Mr. Yost had transferred 
$800,000.00 into the Harrises' Trigon account. The fact that Mrs. Harris did not participate in 
negotiating the transaction does not negate the evidence of her acquiescence to it. 
In June 2009, the Harrises filed their complaint and other pleadings in this action, which 
allege that they both signed the Corrected Quitclaim Deed. The only conduct by Mrs. Harris that 
has been inconsistent with the existence and validity of the Corrected Quitclaim Deed has arisen 
recently as the Harrises have sought to use the forgery as a means of defeating the Bank's 
interest by voiding the Corrected Quitclaim Deed. 
The Harrises should be estopped from invalidating the Corrected Quitclaim Deed based 
on the forgery of Mrs. Harris's name by Mr. Harris. 
B. Bona Fide Lender 
The Bank asserts it is a bona fide lender for value, and its status as such gives it priority 
over any interest the Harrises may have in the Subject Property. 
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The Harrises assert the Bank had notice that Mr. Yost paid for the Subject Property with 
Trigon funds and that Trigon was having problems. Based on the Bank's alleged knowledge of 
those facts, the Harrises assert the Bank cannot be a bona fide lender. 
Idaho Code § 55-812 provides, "Every conveyance of real property ... is void as against 
any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee of the same property, or any part thereof, in good faith 
and for a valuable consideration, whose conveyance is first duly recorded." 
Regarding a buyer's status as a bona fide purchaser, the Idaho Supreme Court recently 
stated, 
In order to claim the protection of being a BFP, a party "must show that at 
the time of the purchase he paid a valuable consideration and upon the belief and 
the validity of the vendor's claim of title without notice, actual or constructive, of 
any outstanding adverse rights of another." Imig v. McDonald, 77 Idaho 314, 
318,291 P.2d 852,855 (1995). 
Weitz v. Green, 148 Idaho 851, 859,230 P.3d 743,751 (2010). 
"[W]hen one is purchasing land, the rule of caveat emptor applies and ... 
'whatever is notice enough to excite the attention of a man of ordinary prudence 
and prompt him to further inquiry, amounts to notice of all such facts as a 
reasonable investigation would disclose. '" Hunter v. Shields, 131 Idaho 148, 153, 
953 P.2d 588,593 (1998) (quoting Hill v. Fed. Land Bank, 59 Idaho 136, 141,80 
P.2d 789, 791 (1938)). 
Id. at 858-59, 230 P.3d at 750-51. Regarding an encumbrancer's status as a bona fide purchaser, 
the Idaho Court of Appeals stated, 
A bona fide purchaser is one who takes real property by paying valuable 
consideration and in good faith, i.e., without knowing of adverse claims. I.C. § 
55-606; § 55-812. The theory behind the rule is to protect innocent purchasers and 
to allow them to obtain and convey unsullied interests. Generally, a person must 
take property through a "conveyance" in order to be afforded the protective status 
of a bona fide purchaser. Although a mortgage is a lien, it is also considered a 
conveyance, which includes "every instrument in writing by which an estate or 
interest in real property is created, alienated, mortgaged, or encumbered, or by 
which the title to any real property may be affected, except wills." I.C. § 55-813 
(emphasis added). A mortgagee may become a bona fide purchaser. I.C. § 55-606; 
Imig v. lvfcDonald, 77 Idaho 314, 291 P.2d 852 (1955) (defining a bona fide 
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purchaser as one who takes for value, upon the belief of the validity of the 
vendor's claim of title, and without notice of adverse claims); Spencer v. Steward, 
37 Idaho 610, 218 P. 369 (1923) (mortgagee, with first recorded interest and 
without notice of adverse claim, may take as a bona fide purchaser); See also, 59 
C.J.S. Mortgages § 232 (1949); 55 AM.JUR.2d Mortgages § 324 (1971). Further, 
even though a mortgage is considered a lien: 
The analogy of the mortgage as passing title is universally 
retained to the extent that the mortgagee may be recognized as a 
bona fide purchaser for value without notice, provided there are 
present the elements of valuable consideration, good faith and want 
of notice. 
(Emphasis added.) THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, § 4778 at 501-02 
(1963) citing Spencer, supra. 
Sun Valley Land and Minerals, Inc. v. Burt, 123 Idaho 862, 866, 853 P.2d 607,611 (Ct. App. 
1993). 
The Harrises do not allege the Bank took its deeds of trust in bad faith or without 
valuable consideration. The Harrises do, however, contend the bank had actual notice, 
constructive notice, or inquiry notice sufficient to create a material question of fact regarding the 
Bank's status as a bona fide lender. 
At the outset of this discussion, this Court notes that the notice, whether actual, 
constructive, or inquiry, must be notice ofthe "outstanding adverse rights of another." lmig, 77 
Idaho at 318, 291 P .2d at 855. In other words, the Bank's claim of being a bona fide lender will 
fail if it had notice of defects in the Corrected Quitclaim Deed. Having concluded the Corrected 
Quitclaim Deed was not void, this Court notes that it would have been impossible for the Bank to 
have known or discovered through reasonable inquiry that the deed was void. However, if the 
Bank knew or reasonably should have discovered that the Corrected Quitclaim Deed was 
voidable due to a failure of consideration, then the Bank would not qualify as a bona fide lender 
regarding its deeds of trust. 
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In this Court's view, the Harrises' argument regarding notice is undermined by the 
uncontested fact that in September 2008, Mr. Harris and Mr. Crandal told the Bank that the 
Subject Property belonged to Duane Yost. Further, Mr. Harris and Mr. Crandal told the Bank 
they were in the process of making sure the Bonneville County records correctly reflected Mr. 
Yost's ownership of the Subject Property. When the Bank saw the Corrected Quitclaim Deed in 
early December 2008, it had little, if any, reason to suspect that anything was amiss with the 
deed. 
The Bank recorded its first deed of trust on November 21,2008, and its second deed of 
trust on December 30, 2008. Regardless of whether the Bank knew that Mr. Yost had paid for 
the Subject Property with Trigon funds and regardless of how much the Bank knew-if it knew 
anything-regarding Trigon's financial difficulties, there is no evidence that anyone other than 
Mr. Palmer knew Trigon was a fraud until December 31, 2008. The Harrises argue that the Bank 
should have suspected that Trigon was engaging is suspicious behavior, but the Harrises have not 
presented any evidence that would suggest the Bank could have discovered that Trigon was 
engaged in fraudulent behavior. Thus, when the Bank recorded its deeds of trust, it did not have 
notice of any kind that Trigon was a fraud. Mr. Harris testified that prior to learning that Trigon 
was a fraud, he believed the diminishing value of his Trigon account was due to the downturn in 
the market. Thus, when the Bank's deeds of trust were recorded, the Harrises may have known 
that the value of the $800,000.00 transfer from Mr. Yost had decreased in value, but even they 
did not have notice of their adverse claim because they did not have reason to believe the 
consideration from Mr. Yost had failed. The Harrises, as parties to the agreement with the Y osts 
and as investors with Trigon, certainly had more knowledge of the pertinent facts than the Bank 
would have had. 
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This Court concludes that the Bank did not have notice of any adverse claim to the 
Subject Property when it took its deeds of trust. As a result, the Bank qualifies for the 
protections afforded to a bona fide lender, and any issue regarding a failure of consideration is 
moot. See 59A C.J.S. Mortgages § 842 ("It has been held that a bona fide purchaser may be 
protected even though a mortgage or trust deed is invalid for want or failure of consideration 
.... "). 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Harrises' Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED. 
The Bank's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this -3 \ day of March 2011. 
H. WATKINS, JR. 
District Judge 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO, COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
DARRYL HARRIS and CHRISTINE ) 
HARRIS, husband and wife, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs, ) Case No. CV -09-3488 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
DUANE L. YOST and LORI YOST, ) MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
husband and wife, DUANE L. YOST ) 
as Trustee of the DUANE L. YOST ) 
TRUST, THE BANK OF COMMERCE, ) 
an Idaho Corporation and JOHN DOES I-X,) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
In accordance with LR.C.P. 11 (a)(2)(B), the Plaintiffs move this court to 
reconsider its memorandum decision denying the Plaintiffs' motion for summary 
judgment and granting Defendant, Bank of Commerce's, motion for summary judgment. 
This motion is based upon the pleadings of record, the additional affidavit of 
Wayne Klein filed simultaneously with this motion, and the Plaintiffs' memorandum in 
support of their motion for reconsideration. 
Oral argument is requested. 
Dated this .::4 '3 day of April 2011. 
Motion For Reconsideration 
Harris v. Yost/Bank of Commerce 
Case No. CV-09-3488 
~~~ 
Kipp L Manwaring ~ 
Attorney for the Plaintiffs 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STA TE OF IDAHO, COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
DARRYL HARRIS and CHRISTINE 
HARRIS, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DUANE L. YOST and LORI YOST, 
husband and wife, DUANE L. YOST 
as Trustee of the DUANE L. YOST 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
TRUST, THE BANK OF COMMERCE, ) 
an Idaho Corporation and JOHN DOES I-X, ) 
Defendants. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss. 
County of Salt Lake ) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV-09-3488 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
WAYNE KLEIN 
WAYNE KLEIN, being first duly sworn under oath, deposes and states as 
follows: 
1. I am eighteen years of age or older and have personal knowledge of the 
facts and information contained in this affidavit. 
2. I am a licensed attorney in the state of Idaho (inactive) and the state of 
Utah. I am the court appointed receiver in that certain action styled, Securities and 
Exchange Commission v. Daren Palmer and Trigon Group, Inc., United States District 
Court for the District ofIdaho, Civil No. 09-75-S-EJL. 
Affidavit of Wayne Klein 
Harn's v. Yost/Bank o/Commerce 
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3. As the court appointed receIver, my responsibility was to reVIew all 
records of Palmer and Trigon to identify and trace investment payments received, 
disbursement payments made, accounting and use of all funds held or controlled by 
Palmer, Trigon and Duane Yost. 
4. I have reviewed and am familiar with all records delivered to me 
pertaining to actual and purported transactions involving Palmer, Trigon, Yost and Darryl 
Harris. 
5. Attached as Exhibit A and incorporated here by reference is a true and 
correct copy of a Trigon quarterly account statement for Darryl Harris I have reviewed 
and examined as part of my duties as receiver. 
6. The account statement reflects Trigon's credits given to Harris, not actual 
funds received from Harris. 
7. In my analysis of Trigon's records, including bank account records, and 
the records of Yost companies involved with Trigon, I have found no indication that 
$800,000 in actual funds, or any portion of said amount, were ever transferred by Yost to 
Trigon as suggested by the account statement. 
8. Similarly, I have found no indications of payment of $800,000 by Yost to 
Harris. It is my understanding that Yost made arrangements so that Harris would receive 
investment credits, but no cash. Due to Palmer's fraud, the account statements are not 
accurate reflections of funds held by Trigon; the amounts represented to investors as their 
investment balances were fictitious. As a result, the vast majority of investment credits 
listed on investor account statements were merely paper representations and did not 
represent actual tangible assets held by Trigon. 
9. Based on my discussions with Duane Yost, and my review of financial 
and other records, it is my conclusion that the property transaction between Yost and 
Harris was structured by Yost so that Yost would transfer $800,000 of investment credits 
Yost supposedly had with Trigon to Harris. Thus, Yost's expressed intent was that his 
investment balance with Trigon would be reduced by $800,000 and Harris' investment 
balance with Trigon would be increased by $800,000. But, there were no actual money 
transfers. 
Affidavit of Wayne Klein 
Harris v. Yost/Bank o/Commerce 
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10. From my review of Trigon's records, the account statements created by 
Trigon are not reliable indicators of actual money transfers. In many instances there were 
bookkeeping entries that were not matched by actual money transfers. This occurred 
frequently with investors who dealt through Yost. The attached account statement falls 
within the described category as unreliable. 
11. Receivership records based on examination of Trigon's records, show that 
Harris received substantially less in distributions from Trigon than the amounts of money 
he invested. In other words, Harris is a net loss investor with Trigon. 
12. In my opInIon the Trigon and Yost entities were operating as Ponzi 
schemes. 
Dated this IS; -r! day of April 2011. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this hi-lft day of April 2011. 
Affidavit of Wayne Klein 
Harris v. Yost/Bank a/Commerce 
Case No. CV-09-3488 
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Residing at: 
My Commission Expires: 
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AFFIDAVIT OF WAYNE KLEIN 
Douglas R. Nelson 
Nelson Hall Parry Tucker 
PO Box 51630 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-1630 
MAILED 
Legal Assistant 
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Trigon Group, 
1075, S. Utah Ave. Suite 325 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
(208) 524-4496 
To: 
Darryl Harris 
3232 E. 65th S. 
Idaho Falls, 10 83406 
Account No. . . 
1<2-1107 
Date 
30-Sep-07 
Page 
1 of 1 
Summary Account Quarterly Statement 
Regulated / Non-segragated funds - $ 
Account of: Darryl Harris (Regular) 
OHIU~9 
Douglas R. Nelson - ISB# 1580 
Brian T. Tucker - ISB# 5236 
Wiley R. Dennert - ISB# 6216 
NELSON HALL PARRY TUCKER, P.A. 
490 Memorial Drive 
P.O. Box 51630 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-1630 
Telephone:(208) 522-3001 
Facsimile: (208) 523-7254 
Attorneys for The Bank of Commerce 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
DARR YL HARRIS and CHRISTINE 
HARRIS, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
DUANE L. YOST and LORI YOST, husband 
and wife, DUANE L. YOST as Trustee of the 
DUANE L. YOST TRUST, THE BANK OF 
COMMERCE, an Idaho Corporation and 
JOHN DOES I-X, 
Defendants. 
OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR RECONSIDERA TlON - 1 
Case No. CV -09-3488 
OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION 
THE BANK OF COMMERCE, an Idaho 
corporation, 
v. 
Counterclaimant/Cross-
claimant/Third-Party 
Claimant, 
DARRYL HARRIS and CHRISTINE 
HARRIS, husband and wife, 
Counterdefendants, 
and 
DUANE L. YOST and LORI YOST, husband 
and wife, DUANE L. YOST as Trustee of the 
DUANE L. YOST TRUST, JOHN DOES I-X, 
Crossdefendants, 
and 
HAMPSHIRE HOLDINGS, LLC, 
Third-Party Defendant. 
COMES NOW DefendantiCounterclaimantiCross-claimantiThird-Party Claimant The Bank 
of Commerce (the "Bank"), through counsel of record, and objects to and opposes the Motion for 
Reconsideration filed by Darryl Harris ("Darryl") and Christine Harris ("Christine") (collectively the 
"HaITises"). The Harrises' Motion for Reconsideration does not provide any new insights, but 
simply rehashes their previous arguments. Their Motion for Reconsideration is brought and pursued 
unreasonably, frivolously and without foundation. Because the Court correctly granted the Barue 
summary judgment, the Court should now deny the HalTises' Motion for Reconsideration. The Bank 
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responds to the Motion for Reconsideration as follows: 
I. AUTHORITY AND ARGUMENT 
A. Lack of Consideration 
In an effort to show that no consideration was actually paid from Duane Yost ("Yost") to 
them, the Harrises have submitted the Affidavit of Wayne Klein. However, Mr. Klein's testimony 
is irrelevant because, at most, it would support a failure of consideration, but still does nothing to 
show a lack of consideration. 
The agreement between Dan'yl and Yost was that Yost agreed to pay $800,000 to Darryl in 
exchange for the Subject Real Propeliy. Whether Yost actualIy paid the $800,000 or not does not 
change the outcome of this case. 
This Court correctly detennined that "[ e ]ven if Mr. Yost's Trigon account was empty when 
he made the transfer [of the $800,000], that deficiency is only relevant to his ability to perform on 
his promise to pay; it has nothing to do with consideration." Memorandum Decision, p. 11. 
Prior to the transaction, Yost had no obligation to give the Harrises $800,000. However, 
because of their agreement, the Harrises were obligated to transfer the Subject Real Property to the 
Yosts and the Yosts were obligated to give $800,000 to the Harrises. When the $800,000 of 
"investment credit" was transferred from Yost to Dan'yl, the parties believed Yost had perfonned 
his part of the bargain. The Harrises subsequently perf01111ed their part of the bargain when they 
transferred the S ubj ect Real Property to the Y osts. Only later, after discovering Daren Palmer's 
fraud, did the parties leam that the "vast majority of investment credits listed on investor account 
statements were merely paper representations and did not represent actual tangible assets held by 
Trigon." See Klein Aff., ,r 8. This revelation may have given rise to a failure of consideration, but 
not a lack of consideration. Yost was still obligated to pay the Harrises $800,000. In fact, the 
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Harrises sued the Yosts and obtained a judgment against them in the amount of $800,000 plus 
interest and costs. It would not be legal or ethical for the Harrises to have requested and obtained 
a judgment for the $800,000, if the Yosts were not legally obligated to pay the $800,000 to the 
Harrises in exchange for the transfer of the Subject Real Property. 
Because the Yosts were legally obligated to pay the Harrises $800,000, their failure to 
actually do so, at most, resulted in a failure of consideration. Failure of consideration could only 
make the Corrected Quitclaim Deed voidable, not void. "Where a deed is only voidable, the defense 
of bona fide purchaser is available." First Interstate Bank o/Sheridan v. First Wyoming Bank, N.A. 
Sheridan, 762 P .2d 379, 382 (Wyo. 1988). Therefore, this Court correctly detem1ined that "the Bank 
quali fies for the protections afforded to a bona fide lender, and any issue regarding the failure of 
consideration is moot." Memorandum Decision, p. 19. 
B. Delivery of Deed 
The Harrises argue that the Court made inconsistent findings regarding the delivery of the 
Conected Quitclaim Deed. However, the Comi did not state, as the Harrises contend, that "there is 
no evidence of words or conduct manifesting Mr. Harris' intent conceming delivery of the deed." 
Memo. in SUPPOli of Mot. for Reconsideration, p. 5 (emphasis added). 
In fact, all of the evidence, even when construed in favor ofthe Harrises, shows that Darryl's 
words and conduct manifested an intent to deliver the Corrected Quitclaim Deed. The following are 
the uncontroverted facts relating to Darryl's manifested words and conduct. After Darryl had signed 
the first Quitclaim Deed, he delivered it to Yost. Because of mistakes on the first Quitclaim Deed, 
Yost subsequently gave Darryl the Corrected Quitclaim Deed and told Darryl to get it back to him 
as fast as he could. Darryl Harris Depo. Tr., p. 60, 1. 21 to p. 62, 1. 2. Darryl testified that Yost told 
him that the Bank wanted Darryl to sign the new Corrected Quitclaim Deed. Id. at p. 63, 11. 17-18. 
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Darryl understood the purpose of a deed was to show the transfer ofland from one person to another. 
Id. at p. 66, 1. 24 to p. 67, I. 5. In addition, Darryl understood that a deed is recorded in the county 
recorder's office to put everyone on notice of who owns the property. Id. at p. 67, 1. 6 to p. 68,1. 1. 
Darryl knew that the Bank was relying on the Corrected Quitclaim Deed to make sure that title to 
the Subject Real Property had really been transferred to the Yosts and in order to secure its loan to 
Yost. Id. at p. 68, 11. 2-17. Darryl went to Robert Crandall's office and met Yost there. Yost gave 
Darryl the Corrected Quitclaim Deed and they both left. Darryl signed the Corrected Quitclaim Deed 
and then returned it to Robert Crandall's office. Id. at p. 75, II. 11-20. Darryl admitted that he had 
transferred the Subject Real Property. Id. at p. 116, 1. 22 to p. 117, 1. 8. Finally, the Corrected 
Quitclaim Deed was recorded by Robert Crandall in Bonneville County on December 2, 2008. See 
Darryl Harris Depo. Tr., Exhibit 2, Corrected Quitclaim Deed. Furthermore, there is no evidence 
that Darryl intended for Robert Crandall, or anyone else, to hold the Corrected Quitclaim Deed in 
escrow until the HaITises had actually received the full $800,000 payment. In fact, Darryl believed 
he had already received the $800,000. Leaving the signed Corrected Quitclaim Deed at Robert 
Crandall's office was an act manifesting Darry's intent to deliver. 
In Idaho, "the real test of the delivery of a deed is this: Did the grantor by his acts or words, 
or both, intend to divest himself of title? If so, the deed is delivered. Barmore v. Perrone, 145 Idaho 
340, 345, 179 P.3d 303, 308 (2008). Idaho law regarding delivery does not include the SUbjective 
and silent desires ofthe grantor. Under all reasonably possible interpretations ofthe evidence, Darryl 
manifested his intention to deliver the Corrected Quitclaim Deed when he signed it and left it at 
Robert Crandall's office. 
Consistent with that detennination, and supported by all of the evidence, is what the Court 
actually stated: "[T]here is no evidence of words or conduct by Mr. Harris that would lead anyone 
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to question the immediate effectiveness and validity of the deed at the time Mr. Harris executed it 
and delivered it to Mr. Yost." Memorandum Decision, p. 13. 
In other words, all of the evidence regarding Darryl's words and actions reasonably manifest 
his intent to deliver the Corrected Quitclaim Deed, and no evidence shows that Darryl's words or 
actions manifested a conditional deliver. 
Therefore, the Court should deny the Harrises' Motion for Reconsideration. 
c. I.e. § 32-912 
1. Christine's Acquiescence and Failure to Object After She Learned about the Forgery 
The Harrises argue that this Court erred when it relied upon "testimony concerning Christine 
Harris' understanding of the execution of the deed well after the fact and not before." See 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration, p. 6. The Harrises suppoli their argument 
by eIToneously claiming that "[f]or estoppel to apply as Lovelass v. Sword, 140 Idaho 105, 109,90 
P.3d 330, 334 (2004) instructs, there must be conduct on the part of the non-signing spouse before 
or at the time ofthe transaction to establish both notice of the transaction and acquiescence in the 
transaction." Id. 
However, the Harrises' argument is not valid because Lovelass does not provide any authority 
for their argument. In fact, Loveless does not hold or in anyway instruct that the conduct by the non-
signing spouse must be before or at the time of the transaction. On the contrary, the Loveless Court 
held that Mrs. Loveless was not estopped from asserting § 32-912 because she was unaware of and 
did not consent to the improvements made by the Swords during the three (3) years after Mr. 
Loveless and the Swords entered into the oral agreement to purchase the house in August 1997. The 
Supreme Court emphasized that to overcome the evidence that Mrs. Sword thought the payments 
were for rent and not for the purchase ofthe property "one must infer that Mrs. Loveless knew of the 
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improvements to the property." It is important to recognize that those improvements occurred during 
the three (3) years after the oral agreement was entered into. Because there was no evidence that 
Mrs. Loveless ever knew about the improvements, there was no evidence that she ever acquiesced 
in the agreement to purchase the property. The implication is that if Mrs. Sword had been aware of 
the improvements as they occurred over the three (3) years following the oral agreement between her 
husband and the Lovelesses, then her failure to object, while at the same time benefitting from the 
Lovelesses' monthly payments, would have indicated her acquiescence to the agreement. As a result 
ofher acquiescence, she would have been estopped from denying the agreement to sell the house and 
real property to the Lovelesses. 
The tem1 "acquiescence" includes the recognition of an existing transaction, which by 
necessity involves action occurring after the transaction. Specifically, "acquiescence" is defined as 
follows: 
Conduct recognizing the existence of a transaction, and intended, in some 
extent at least, to carry the transaction, or permit it to be carried, into effect. It is 
some act, not deliberately intended to ratify a former transaction known to be 
voidable, but recognizing the transaction as existing, and intended, in some extent at 
least, to carry it into effect, and to obtain or claim the benefits resulting from it, and 
thus differs from "confirmation," which implies a deliberate act, intended to renew 
and ratify a transaction known to be voidable. Passive compliance or satisfaction; 
distinguished from avowed consent on the one hand, and, on the other, from 
opposition or open discontent. Conduct from which assent may be reasonably 
inferred. Equivalent to assent inferred fi'om silence with knowleddge or from 
encouragement and presupposes knowledge and assent. Imports tacit consent, 
concurrence, acceptance and assent. A silent appearance of consent. Failure to make 
any objections. Submission to an act of which one had knowledge. Exists where a 
person knows or ought to know that he is entitled to enforce his right or to impeach 
a transaction, and neglects to do so for such a length of time as would imply that he 
intended to waive or abandon his right. 
Black's Law Dictionary 24 (6th ed. 1990) (case citations omitted). 
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In Grice v. Woodworth, 10 Idaho 459,80 P.912 (1904), the Idaho Supreme Court held that 
a wife was estopped from asse11ing the statutes (similar to § 32-912) that required both husband and 
wi fe to execute and acknowledge the conveyance of community property because she had failed to 
objectfollowing the agreement between the husband and the purchaser ofthe property. In that case, 
"after [ the purchaser] had so entered into the possession the [wife] was informed of the 
improvements made thereon, and knew that said improvements had been made and possession taken 
by the [purchaser] under the belief that he was the owner of said premises, and to all of which said 
[wife] made no objection." ld. at 464,80 P. at 913 (emphasis added). In his dissent, Justice Ailshie 
raised issues similar to those now made by the HaITises. For example, Justice Ailshie argued that 
the acts and declarations of the wife, by which she was estopped from asseliing her rights, took place 
long after the purchaser had paid the purchase price. In his dissent, Justice Ailshie lamented that 
"[t]he majority have told the good wives of this state that they must talk [meaning object and 
complain] or be estopped." ld. at 475, 80 P. at 917. 
On the other hand, the Grice majority held: 
Courts of equity will not permit the statute of frauds or the statute in regard to 
conveyance of married women to be a shield to protect fraud, and those statutes were 
not enacted to encourage frauds and cheats .... Because of the facts of this case, the 
principle that governs is more in the nature of an estoppel or waiver on the part of 
[the wife], and not the broad principle of abandonment, as suggested by the 
provisions of section 3041, Rev. St., above quoted. While the provisions of the 
sections above quoted were made for the protection of married women, they were not 
intended to operate as a shield to relieve them against a fraudulent transaction, such 
as the one under consideration, and she is estopped by her own acts from interposing 
the provision of said sections as a valid defense to this action .... 
ld. at 468,80 P. at 915. 
On rehearing, the majority stated: 
Now, what was the duty of [the wife] when she visited the premises in dispute, and 
found them occupied by [the purchaser] and his family, making valuable and lasting 
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improvements upon the house In good faith, believing they were the owners 
thereof? ... 
... If[the wife] desired to deal fairly with the [purchasers] when she returned from 
Moscow, and found them in possession of her property, upon which she had filed a 
homestead declaration (if she did not know they were occupying the property under 
a claim of purchase prior to that time), she should have then said to them: "You are 
improving property, upon which I have filed my homestead declaration. I have never 
consented to the sale of it, and still desire to claim it as my home." This would have 
been good faith and reasonable diligence. Equity does not permit her to remain silent 
as to her claims, and by her conversation encourage appellants to continue their 
payments and improvements on the property, ... 
Id. at 470-72,80 P. at 916. Of course, it is the majority opinion in Grice that is the law ofthis state. 
Under Idaho law, this Court is not bound to only consider what action and inaction Christine 
took before and at the time Darryl forged her name on the Corrected Quitclaim Deed in determining 
whether she should be estopped from asserting § 32-912. Rather this Court may properly consider 
Christine's acquiescence and her failure to object after Darryl told her he had forged her name on the 
Corrected Quitclaim Deed. 
2. Christine's Silence and Other Actions 
The Harrises also imply that because mere silence is not sufficient to invoke estoppel, the 
Court should not have considered Christine's silence as another factor for applying estoppel. 
However, Idaho appellate courts have held that silence, coupled with other circumstances, can 
support estoppel. 
The Harrises cite only one sentence from Joplin v. Kitchens, 87 Idaho 530, 394 P.2d 313 
(1964). However, to understand the role that silence can play in estoppel, a more extensive citation 
is helpful. The Idaho Supreme Court stated: 
Mere silence of itself will not raise an estoppel. To make the silence of a 
party operate as an estoppel the circumstances must have been such as to render it his 
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duty to speak, and there must also have been an opportunity to speak. 
It is essential that the one claimed to be estopped should have had knowledge 
of the facts, and that the adverse party should have been ignorant of the truth, and 
have been misled into doing that which he would not have done but for such silence. 
Silence will not support an estoppel unless the person claiming an estoppel justifiably 
relied on the silence to his prejudice, and such conduct in reliance must be intended 
or reasonably anticipated by the one who remained silent. 
ld. at 535,394 P.2d at 315 (1964). 
In KTVB, Inc., v. Boise City, 94 Idaho 279 (1971), the Idaho Supreme Court stated: 
Appellants contend that a mere acquiescence where there is no duty to speak 
does not raise an estoppel, and further that there was no duty to speak in this instance. 
Appellants cite 31 c.J.S. Estoppel § 114, pp. 593-594 in support ofthis contention. 
However, it is there said that, 
"Where nonaction or passIVIty is relied on to create an 
estoppel, it must appear that the party to be estopped was under a duty 
to act under the circumstances, or, as is sometimes declared, was 
bound in equity and good conscience actively to evidence his 
intention not to be bound by the transaction." (Emphasis added) 
In the Idaho case of Neer v. McFarland, plaintiff asserted certain slots were 
contemplated in the foundation defendant was building as part perfonnance of a 
contract between plaintiff and defendant. This Court held plaintiff was estopped 
from asserting the slots were contemplated by the parties, because plaintiff 
acquiesced in defendant's construction of the foundation without the slots when he 
had ample opportunity to tell defendant of the alleged error. The only duty to speak 
was the duty imposed by the requirements of good conscience and equity. There may 
be an equitable duty to speak, if subsequent maintenance of a position inconsistent 
with that acquiesced in would lead to unconscionable results .... 
KTVB, Inc. v. Boise City, 94 Idaho 279, 284, 486 P.2d 992, 997 (1971) (emphasis in original) 
(footnote omitted). 
Christine was bound by the requircments of good conscience and equity to infonn Yost and 
the Bank that Darryl had forged her name on the Corrected Quitclaim Deed. It would be 
unconscionable for Dan)'l to have forged the Con'ccted Quitclaim Deed and to have told Christine 
that he had done so, and to allow Christine to fail to infonn anyone about the forgery, especially Yost 
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and the Bank, and then to allow Christine to raise the protection ofIdaho Code § 32-912 nearly two 
(2) years after she learned of the forgery and after she had brought suit and obtained a judgment 
against the Yosts for $800,000 plus interest and costs. 
Under the doctrines of estoppel, including, but not limited to, quasi estoppel and judicial 
estoppel, Christine should be estopped from now arguing that the Corrected Quitclaim Deed is void 
under § 32-912. Again, in KTVB, Inc. v. Boise City, the Idaho Supreme Court stated: 
"The doctrine classified as quasi estoppel has its basis in election, ratification, 
affirmance, acquiescence, or acceptance of benefits; and the principle precludes a 
party from asserting, to another's disadvantage, a right inconsistent with a position 
previously taken by him. The doctrine applies where it would be unconscionable to 
allow a person to maintain a position inconsistent with one in which he acquiesced, 
or of which he accepted a benefit." 
Id. at 281, 486 P.2d at 994 (quoting Clontz v. Fortner, 88 Idaho 355, 364-65, 399 P.2d 949, 954 
(1965). KTVB had participated in the bid process in the hopes of receiving cable television 
franchises by the participating cities. After a lengthy bidding process, KTVB was not granted the 
franchise. Only then did KTVB raise the issue that the bidding process had been conducted illegally. 
The Court stated: 
While appellants may not have been required to forego bidding on the 
franchise in order to raise the objections to the franchise that they now make, it is 
clear from Godoy that they at least were required to make some objection to the 
various deficiencies which they now claim existed in the bidding and granting 
processes, rather than to intimate full approval by their acquiescent conduct while 
harboring serious reservations about the processes. 
The requirements for proper application of quasi estoppel are, then, that the 
person against whom it is sought to be applied has previously taken an inconsistent 
position, with knowledge of the facts and his rights, to the detriment of the person 
seeking application of the doctrine. It is therefore, incumbent upon this Court to 
consider the appellants' assertions of irregularity ofthe procedure and illegality ofthe 
franchise in light of appellants' previous position in the award process. 
Appellants' prior conduct can only be characterized as full acquiescence in 
the bidding and award process they now challenge. Appellants' participation in the 
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bidding and award process, guided consistently by competent legal counsel, was 
clearly aimed at securing the franchise, within the framework ofthe process they now 
challenge, for their proposed joint venture. It seems clear that it is only the end result 
of the process, and not the process itself, which prompts appellants' allegations of 
illegality at this time. No protest was made by appellants when the several city 
governments banded together to form the Treasure Valley Cable Television 
Committee to investigate the award of a franchise and recommend a franchisee, nor 
was any objection lodged against the prospect of the various cities granting 
franchises .... 
ld. at 282, 486 P.2d at 995. Finally, the Idaho Supreme Court stated that "the essence of the proper 
application of the doctrine of quasi estoppel is the focus of the Court's attention upon the specific 
facts and circumstances of the case at bar." ld. 
Over the years, the Han-ises have owned and sold several pieces of real property, including 
bare ground, houses and cabins. Christine Harris' Depo. Tr., p. 11,1. 11 to 24, 1. 20. Christine knew 
that each time she and Darryl sold a piece of real property that she would have to sign a deed giving 
her interest to the buyer. lei. at p. 16, II. 12-25; p. 18,11. 11-17; p. 30, II. 11-14. Christine claims 
Dan-yl told her in December 2008, that he had forged her name on the Corrected QuitClaim Deed. 
ld. at p. 54, II. 1-9,20 to p. 56, 1. 9. More specifically, Dan-yl testified that he told Christine that he 
had signed her name on the deed about two weeks after he had done so. Dan-yl Harris Depo. Tr., p. 
71, 1. 21 to p. 72, 1. 2. Prior to learning that Palmer and Trigon were a fraud, Darryl told Christine 
that he and Yost had agreed to transfer the Subject Real Property to the Yosts. Christine Han-is 
Depo. Tr., p. 42, II. 3-19. Also prior to learning about the fraud, Christine learned that Yost had 
transfen-ed $800,000.00 into Dan-yl's Trigon account. !d. at p. 44, II. 6-17. Christine also admitted 
that Dan-yl probably told her what the purpose ofthe $800,000.00 was. ld. at p. 44, n. 20-23. When 
Christine learned about the forgery, approximately two weeks after Dan-yl had signed her name to 
the Con-eeted QuitClaim Deed, she did not object to it but rather did nothing despite knowing that 
the forgery would be relied upon by others. Dan-yl Harris' Depo. Tr., p. 71, I. 21 to p. 73, 1. 6; 
OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 12 
r" ,'\ 
.J ~.) .-' 
Christine Harris Depo. Tr., p. 57,11. 12-16. In fact, Darryl's forgery did not even bother Christine 
at the time she learned about it. Christine Harris Depo. Tr., p. 56, 11. 12-17. Moreover, she did not 
tell anyone about the forgery. Id. Not only did Christine not get upset with Darryl, she was okay 
with the fact that he had signed her name because she trusted him. Id. at p. 58,11. 11-24. If Yost had 
brought them the $800,000.00 in cash, Christine would not have objected to signing the deed to the 
f0!1y (40) acres. Id. at p. 61, 11. 6-15. Because Christine believed that the $800,000.00 had been 
transferred into Darryl's Trigon account, she admitted she probably would not have objected to 
giving Yost the deed to the forty (40) acres and that she probably would have been okay with it. Id. 
at p. 61, 1. 16 to p. 62, 1. 10. As late as the date of her deposition on November 9, 2010, Christine 
was not planning on pressing any criminal charges against Darryl for forging her name. Id. at p. 56, 
1. 18 to p. 57, I. 3. Despite knowing of the forgery, the Harrises filed their Complaint in which they 
allege that both Darryl and Christine signed the Corrected Quitclaim Deed. Although the Complaint 
was signed by the Harrises' attorney, they subsequently signed the Plaintiffs' Response to the 
Defendants, The Bank of Commerce First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of 
Documents dated May 7,2010 ("Discovery Response") before a notary public. See 4th Aff. of Wiley 
Dennert, Exhibit "B". In Answer to Interrogatory No.1 of the Discovery Response, Christine and 
Darryl stated under oath that they "have knowledge of the facts and information contained in the 
Complaint." See id. at p. 2. On October 15,2009, Christine and Darryl then obtained a Judgment 
by Default against the Yosts in the amount of $800,000.00 plus interest, costs and attorney fees. 
Christine did not raise the issue of the forgery until November 2010, nearly two (2) years after she 
leamed about the forgery and more than one (1) year after she had obtained the judgment against the 
Yosts. 
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After Christine learned about the Corrected Quitclaim Deed, her conduct has been consistent 
with the existence and validity of the instrument as well as her acquiescence to the transfer of the 
forty (40) acres to the Y osts. 
In addition, the Bank did not know about the forgery and relied on Christine's acquiescence 
to the transfer of the Subject Real Propeliy to the Yosts. Darryl told Christine about the forgery on 
or about December 15, 2008. 1 Thereafter, believing that the Corrected Quitclaim Deed was properly 
signed by both of the Harrises, the Bank had its first Deed of Trust "re-recorded to correct an error 
on the legal description on December 17,2008 as Instrument No. 1319093 in the Recorder's Office 
for Bonneville County, Idaho." See Complaint, '118. Later, still believing that the Harrises had 
finalized the transfer of the forty (40) acres to the Yosts, the Bank had the Yosts sign the second 
Deed of Trust and the Bank recorded it in the Bonneville County Recorder's Office on December 
30,2008. See id. at,r 19. Thomas Romrell, the president and CEO of the Bank testified, "If the 
Bank had learned in December 2008 that Darryl Harris had forged his wife's name on the Corrected 
Quitclaim Deed, the Bank would have immediately requested that a second Corrected Quitclaim 
Deed be signed by both Darryl Harris and Christine Harris. See Second Romrell Aff. at ,r 9. 
Christine did not raise the issue of Darryl's forgery until November 2010, after she had already 
commenced this action, acknowledged the facts contained in the Complaint and obtained a judgment 
against the Yosts for $800,000 plus interest and costs. Thus, Christine's acquiescence in the entire 
transaction gained some advantage for her (the $800,000 judgment plus interests and costs). 
Moreover, her acquiescence in the transaction and her failure to notify anyone about the forgery has 
produced a disadvantage to the Bank (the recording of both ofthe Deeds of Trust while not knowing 
I DalTyl signed the COlTected Quitclaim Deed on December 1, 2011. He testified that he told Christine about 
the forgery about two weeks later. 
OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 14 r- \.' 
'4.) (_:1 'J: 
that Darryl had forged Christine's name and the inability to now 'obtain a second corrected quitclaim 
deed signed by both Darryl and Christine). 
Christine's conduct and acquiescence is more than sufficient to establish an estoppel. 
II. CONCLUSION 
This Court should deny the Harrises' Motion for Reconsideration. 
DATED this ----Y~,..L day of May, 2011. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
DARRYL HARRIS and CHRISTINE 
HARRIS, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
DUANE L. YOST and LORI YOST, husband 
and wife, DUANE L. YOST as Trustee of the 
DUANE L. YOST TRUST, THE BANK OF 
COMMERCE, an Idaho Corporation and 
JOHN DOES I-X, 
Defendants. 
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THE BANK OF COMMERCE, an Idaho 
corporation, 
v. 
Counterclaimant/Cross-
claimant/Third-Party 
Claimant, 
DARRYL HARRIS and CHRISTINE 
HARRIS, husband and wife, 
Counterdefendants, 
and 
DUANE L. YOST and LORI YOST, husband 
and wife, DUANE L. YOST as Trustee ofthe 
DUANE L. YOST TRUST, JOHN DOES I-X, 
Crossdefendants, 
and 
HAMPSHIRE HOLDINGS, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability company, ROBERT 
PARKINSON CRANDALL, an individual, 
and F AMIL Y ASSET PROTECTION 
LEGAL SERVICES, P.L.L.c., an Idaho 
professional limited liability company, 
Third-Party Defendants. 
AMENDED ANSWER 
COMES NOW Defendant Bank of Commerce (the "Bank") by and through its attorneys 
of record, Nelson Hall Parry Tucker, P.A., for its amended answer to Plaintiffs' Complaint 
admits, denies and alleges as follows: 
FIRST DEFENSE 
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Plaintiffs' Complaint fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted. 
SECOND DEFENSE 
The Bank denies each and every allegation or averment of the Complaint not specifically 
admitted. 
THIRD DEFENSE 
The Bank answers the specific allegations of the Complaint as follows: 
1. Admits paragraphs 1,2,4, 16, 17, 18, 19,47, and 48. 
2. Denies paragraphs 23,24,30,39,44,49,50,51,52,56,62 and 63. 
3. With regards to paragraphs 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14,20,21,26,27, 28, 
29, 31, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 41, 42, 43, 46, 54, 55, 57, 59, 60 and 61, said paragraphs are 
allegations between the Plaintiffs and Defendants Duane L. Yost and Lori Yost, husband and 
wife, and/or Duane L. Yost as Trustee of the Duane L. Yost Trust, and therefore do not require 
an answer by the Bank. To the extent said paragraphs apply to the Bank, the Bank is without 
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the matters asserted in said 
paragraphs and, therefore, denies the same. Even if any or all of the allegations in said 
paragraphs were true, the Bank still has a priority lien position superior to any lien that the 
Plaintiffs may have. 
4. With regards to paragraph 15, the Bank is without sufficient information whether 
it was "[ u ]pon the Y osts' direction and in reliance on Palmers's letter," and therefore denies the 
same. To the extent said portion of paragraph 15 were true, the Bank still has a priority lien 
position superior to any lien that the Plaintiffs may have. The Bank admits the remainder of 
paragraph 15. 
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5. Paragraphs 22, 25, 32, 40, 45, 53 and 58 are merely restatements of previous 
paragraphs and, therefore, do not require a response. 
6. Furthermore, the Bank denies the Plaintiffs are entitled to costs and attorneys fees 
against the Bank. 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
The Bank asserts the following affinnative defenses in response to the Complaint: 
First Affirmative Defense 
As and for a first affirnlative defense, the Bank alleges Plaintiffs fail to state a claim 
upon which relief may be granted. 
Second Affirmative Defense 
As and for a second affirmative defense, the Bank alleges it is a bona fide lender and/or 
a bona fide purchaser. 
Third Affirmative Defense 
As and for a third affinnative defense, the Bank alleges estoppel in all its forn1s 
including, but not limited to, judicial estoppel, equitable estoppel, quasi-estoppel, promissory 
estoppel, etc. 
Fourth Affirmative Defense 
As and for a fourth affinnative defense, the Bank alleges waiver. 
Fifth Affirmative Defense 
As and for a fifth affimlative defense, the Bank alleges laches. 
Sixth Affirmative Defense 
As and for a sixth affinnative defense, the Bank alleges unclean hands. 
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Seventh Affirmative Defense 
As and for a seventh affinnative defense, the Bank alleges assumption of the risk. 
Eighth Affirmative Defense 
As and for an eighth affinnative defense, the Bank alleges payment. 
Ninth Affirmative Defense 
As and for a ninth affinnative defense, the Bank alleges ratification. 
Tenth Affirmative Defense 
As and for a tenth affinnative defense, the Bank alleges unjust enrichment. 
Eleventh Affirmative Defense 
As and for an eleventh affirmative defense, the Bank alleges constructive trust. 
Twelfth Affirmative Defense 
As and for a twelfth affirmative defense, the Bank alleges part perfonnance. 
Thirteenth Affirmative Defense 
As and for a thirteenth affirnlative defense, the Bank alleges election of remedies. 
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS 
The Bank has been required to retain the services of attorneys to defend against the 
Complaint. The Bank therefore seeks its reasonable costs and attorneys fees incurred in the 
defense against the Complaint pursuant to Rule 54, LR.C.P., and Idaho Code §§ 12-120,12-121 
and 12-123. 
REQUEST FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, the Defendant respectfully requests relief as follows: 
1. Dismissal of Plaintiffs' Complaint with prejudice; 
AMENDED ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM, CROSS CLAIM AND THIRD-PARTY CLAIM - 5 
2. Enter a Judgment in favor of the Bank and against Plaintiffs; 
3. Award reasonable attorney fees and costs to the Bank; and 
4. Grant the Bank such other and fUliher relief as the Court deems just and proper. 
AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM, CROSS CLAIM AND THIRD-PARTY CLAIM 
COMES NOW the CounterclaimantiCrossclaimantiThird Party Claimant, The Bank of 
Commerce (the "Bank"), by and through its attorneys of record, Nelson Hall Parry Tucker, 
P.A., and for its complaint alleges as follows: 
1. Status of the Bank . At all times mentioned herein, the Bank is an Idaho 
corporation with its principal place of business in Bonneville County, Idaho. The Bank is the 
beneficiary of a Deed of Trust sought to be judicially foreclosed in this matter. 
2. Status of the Other Parties 
A. Counterdefendants Darryl Harris and Christine Harris ("Harris" herein), 
are husband and wife and at all times relevant hereto were residents of 
Bonneville County, Idaho. Said Counterdefendants have or claim some 
interest in the real property described herein as Tract II by reason of a deed 
of trust granted by Duane Yost and Lori Yost, husband and wife to Idaho 
Title and Trust Co. an Idaho Corporation, as trustee for the benefit of 
Darryl HalTis and Christine Harris, dated June 13, 2005, and recorded 
June 20, 2005, as Instrument No. 1189682 in the records of Bonneville 
County, State ofIdaho. 
B. Crossdefendants Duane L. Yost and Lori Yost ("Yost" herein), are 
husband and wife and at all times relevant hereto were residents of 
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Bonneville County, Idaho. Yost is the vested owner of the real property 
sought to be foreclosed in this matter and the makers of the notes, deeds 
of trust and other security documents sought to be foreclosed. 
C. Crossdefendant Duane L. Yost as Trustee of the Duane L. Yost Trust 
("Trust" herein) upon infonnation and belief is a living trust created and 
registered in Bonneville County, Idaho. 
D. Crossdefendants John Does I-X, are persons or entities whose identities 
are not known that may have or claim an interest in the subject real 
property. 
E. Third-Party Defendant Hampshire Holdings, LLC, is an Idaho limited 
liability company with its principal place of business in Idaho Falls, 
Idaho. 
F. The above named Counterdefendants, Crossdefendants, and Third-Party 
Defendant Hampshire Holdings, LLC, and each of them, may claim some 
right, title, lien, or interest in the real property described below, but their 
interest, if any, in and to said real property, is junior, subordinate, and 
subsequent to the right and lien of the Bank. 
G. Third-Party Defendant Robert Parkinson Crandall ("Crandall"), is an 
individual believed to reside in Bonneville County. Crandall is an attorney 
licensed to practice law in the state of Idaho, a certified public accountant, 
an Idaho notary public and an employee of Third-Party Defendant Family 
Asset Protection Legal Services, P.L.L.c. ("Family Asset Protection"). 
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H. Family Asset Protection is an Idaho professional limited liability 
company, organized for the practice in the profession of law. 
3. Amounts Due and in Default. 
A. The Bank is the holder of a Promissory Note made by Duane Yost dated 
April 16, 2008, in the amount of $2,000,000.00 which is past due and fully matured. Said Note 
requires payments on demand and provides for an initial interest rate of 5.75% per annum and 
then beginning on April 17, 2008, a variable interest rate of 0.500% above the following index 
rate: the highest published Wall Street Joumal prime. A true and correct copy of said 
Promissory Note is attached hereto as Exhibit "A". Yost is in default of said Note having not 
made timely and full payment. As of July 13, 2009 the principal and interest amount which is 
fully due and owing is approximately $1,250,155.18 plus a per diem interest accrual after July 
13,2009 at the per diem rate of approximately $188.37955. 
B. The Bank is the holder of a Promissory Note made by Duane Yost dated 
November 21,2008 in the amount of$I,OOO,OOO.OO with a maturity date of November 21,2009. 
Said Note requires one balloon payment of $1 ,055,000.00 and provides for an initial interest rate 
of 5.5% per annum and then beginning on November 22, 2008, a variable interest rate of 0.500% 
above the following index rate: the highest published Wall Street Joumal prime. A true and 
conect copy of said Promissory Note is attached hereto as Exhibit "B". Yost is in default of 
said Note due to the default provisions. As of July 13, 2009 the principal and interest amount 
owing is approximately $1,035,260.27 plus a per diem interest accrual after July 13, 2009 at the 
per diem rate of approximately $150.68493. 
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4. Description of the Collateral. 
A. As security for the repayment of said Promissory Notes, together with 
interest, costs, and attorney's fees, the Crossdefendants, Yost, made, executed, and delivered 
to The Bank, that certain Deed of Trust executed on November 21, 2008, which was recorded 
on November 21, 2008, and re-recorded on December 17, 2008, in the real estate records of 
Bonneville County, Idaho, under Instrument Nos. 1317355 and 1319093, respectively, and 
attached hereto as Exhibit "C" and that certain Deed of Trust executed on December 24, 2008, 
which was recorded on December 30, 2008, in the real estate records of Bonneville County, 
Idaho, under Instrument No. 1319937, and attached hereto as Exhibit "D". Said Deeds of Trust 
are incorporated herein as though set forth in full covering the following described real property 
situated in Bonneville County, Idaho: 
TRACT I 
Beginning at a point that is South 89°55'28" West along the 
Section line 1326.98 feet from the North 114 Comer of Section 1 0, 
Township 1 North, Range 38 East of the Boise Meridian; running 
thence South 89°55'28" West along said Section line 1236.12 feet 
to the South Right-of-Way line of 65 th South; thence along said 
South Right-of-Way line of 65 th South and the East Right-of-Way 
line of 25 th East the following three (3) courses; South 00°12'54" 
East 28.10 feet to a point of curve with a radius of 69.34 feet and 
a chord bearing South 44°18'28" West 98.29 feet; thence to the left 
along said curve 109.24 feet through a central angle of 90°16'00"; 
thence South 89°10'28" West 28.71 feet to the West line of said 
Section 10; thence South 00° 19'04" East 1216.86 feet to the South 
line of the North Y2 of the Northwest 114 of said Section 10, thence 
North 89°54'09" East along said South line 1327.87 feet; thence 
North 00°03'13" West 1312.06 feet to the POINT OF 
BEGINNING. 
Excepting 
That portion thereof conveyed to the State of Idaho by that deed 
recorded on May 8, 1950 in Book 70 of Deeds at Page 287 of 
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Official Records of Bonneville County, Idaho. 
("Real Property Collateral" herein) 
B. As security for the repayment of said Promissory Notes, together with 
interest, costs, and attorney's fees, the Third-Party Defendant Hampshire 
Holdings, LLC, made, executed, and delivered to The Bank, that certain Deed of 
Trust executed on November 21, 2008, and attached hereto as Exhibit "E". Said 
Deed of Trust is incorporated herein as though set forth in full covering the 
following described real property situated in Bonneville County, Idaho: 
TRACT I 
Beginning at a point that is South 89°55'28" West along the 
Section line 1326.98 feet from the NOlih 114 Corner of Section 10, 
Township 1 North, Range 38 East of the Boise Meridian; running 
thence South 89°55'28" West along said Section line 1236.12 feet 
to the South Right-of-Way line of 65 th South; thence along said 
South Right-of-Way line of65 th South and the East Right-of-Way 
line of 25 th East the following three (3) courses; South 00°12'54" 
East 28.10 feet to a point of curve with a radius of 69.34 feet and 
a chord bearing South 44°18'28" West 98.29 feet; thence to the left 
along said curt 109.24 feet through a central angle of 90°16'00"; 
thence South 89°10'28" West 28.71 feet to the West line of said 
Section 1 0; thence South 00° 19'04" East 1216.86 feet to the South 
line of the North 12 of the NOlihwest 114 of said Section 10, thence 
North 89°54'09" East along said South line 1327.87 feet; thence 
North 00°03'13" West 1312.06 feet to the POINT OF 
BEGINNING. 
That portion thereof conveyed to the State of Idaho by that deed 
recorded on May 8, 1950 in Book 70 of Deeds at Page 287 of 
Official Records of Bonneville County, Idaho. 
TRACT II: 
Lot 11 in Block 3 of Canterbury Park, Division No.2, to the City 
of Idaho Falls, Idaho according to the official plat thereof, 
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recorded October 19,1992 as Instrument No. 837954 filed In 
Official Records of Bonneville County, Idaho 
("Real Property Collateral" herein) 
5. Default and Acceleration. The Bank is the owner and holder of said Notes and 
the beneficiary of said Deeds of Trust. The Crossdefendant Yost is in default due to his failure 
to make timely payment under said Promissory Notes and the other default provisions of said 
Promissory Notes, and The Bank declares all sums owing under said Notes, Deeds of Trust, and 
any related security documents, due and payable in full. In addition, the Bank has incurred 
expense for a title report preliminary to foreclosure, the full amount of which is presently 
unknown, but which The Bank is entitled to recover. 
COUNT I 
BREACH OF PROMISSORY NOTE 
6. The Bank realleges the allegations contained in paragraphs 1-5 as though fully 
set forth herein and incorporates the same by reference. 
7. As of July 13, 2009, there was due and owing to the Bank the unpaid principal 
and interest amount of approximately $2,285,415.45 plus additional pre judgment interest at the 
rate of approximately 5.5% per annum resulting in a per diem of approximately $339.06448 
together with costs and attorney's fees accruing thereon. 
8. Yost is in default of his payment obligation to the Bank, and the Bank has 
declared and does hereby declare all sums owing and immediately due and payable in full. The 
Bank has made demand upon the Defendant at least ten (10) days prior to filing suit in this 
matter but Yost has failed and/or refused to make any payments to the Bank. 
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9. The Bank is therefore entitled to judgment against Yost in the sum of 
approximately $2,285,415.45 together with accruing interest thereon from July l3, 2009 at the 
per diem rate of approximately $339.06448 until the date of judgment, plus accruing costs and 
attorney's fees. 
COUNT II 
BREACH OF GUARANTY AGREEMENT 
10. The Bank realleges the allegations contained in paragraphs 1-9 as though fully 
set forth herein and incorporates the same by reference. 
11. The Crossdefendants Duane Yost and Lori Yost and the Third-Party Defendant 
Hampshire Holdings, LLC, personally guaranteed up to $1,000,000 of the obligations of Duane 
Yost described above. A copy of said guarantees are attached hereto as Exhibit "F". 
12. The Crossdefendant Duane Yost has defaulted on the obligations as described 
above. 
13. The Bank has made demand on the Crossdefendant Duane Yost for payment but 
Duane Yost has failed to pay as required by the Promissory Notes. 
14. The Bank has made demand on the Crossdefendants Duane Yost and Lori Yost 
and the Third-Party Defendant Hampshire Holdings, LLC, for payment based upon the guaranty 
but each of them has refused and continues to refuse to pay the Bank. 
15. As the Guarantor, the Crossdefendants Duane Yost and Lori Yost and the 
Third-Party Defendant Hampshire Holdings, LLC, are obhgated to the Bank in the principal 
amount of $1,000,000 plus additional pre judgment interest at the rate of approximately 5.5% 
per annum resulting in a per diem of $150.68493 together with costs and attorney's fees 
accruing thereon. 
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COUNT III 
FORECLOSURE OF DEEDS OF TRUST 
16. The Bank: realleges the allegations contained in paragraphs 1-15 as though fully 
set forth herein and incorporates the same by reference. 
17. The Deeds of Trust described above grant to the Bank a valid lien and security 
interest in and to all of the real property, improvements, fixtures, irrigation equipment, or water 
rights, or other property described therein. Said Deeds of Trust have never been satisfied or 
discharged and no other suit or action has been commenced to foreclose upon said Deeds of 
Trust or to collect the amounts owed on the aforesaid Promissory Notes. 
18. By the telms of said Deeds of Trust, the real property, and any fixtures, 
improvements, irrigation equipment or water rights, should be declared as pari of the Deeds of 
Trust and should be included in this foreclosure and in any sale hereinafter to be ordered as part 
of the security for the repayment of this loan. 
19. Use of Premises. Said Real Property Collateral, as described in each separate 
tract, has at all times heretofore been used together as one lot or parcel for each tract and every 
part thereof is necessary for the best use and enjoyment of said Real Property Collateral and 
each tract cannot be sold in separate parcels without material injury to the parties thereto. 
20. Reasonable Value. The Bank intends to determine the reasonable value of the 
property prior to entry of decree herein and to introduce evidence supporting such value. In the 
event that said reasonable value should be less than the amount of the judgment requested, plus 
accruing interest, costs, and fees, the Bank intends to apply to the Court for the entry of a 
deficiency jUdgment against Crossdefendants Yost, for any deficiency remaining after 
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application of the foreclosure sale proceeds to payment of the judgment herein, plus accruing 
interest, costs, and fees herein. 
21. No Other Action. The Bank has no plain, speedy, or adequate remedy at law, and 
no other proceeding at law or equity has been commenced or is pending to collect said notes or 
any portion thereof or to foreclose these Deeds of Trust. That all conditions precedent to the 
initiation and prosecution of this suit on said Notes and the foreclosure of said Deeds of Trust 
have been satisfied. 
22. Attorney's Fees. Under each and every count, the Bank has been forced to 
employ counsel to represent it in this action and has become obligated to pay its reasonable 
attorney's fees and costs for such service. The Bank is entitled to recover reasonable attorney's 
fees from the Crossdefendants by virtue of the attorney's fees provision contained in the 
Promissory Notes, Deeds of Trust, and other security documents herein above described as well 
as pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120 and §12-121. The Bank alleges that $5,000.00 is a 
reasonable sum to be allowed as attorney's fees if this action is uncontested, plus such additional 
sums as the Court may adjudge as reasonable attorney's fees in the event of a contest, trial or 
appeal. 
COUNT IV 
BREACH OF CONTRACT/THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY 
23. The Bank realleges the allegations contained in paragraphs 1-22 as though fully 
set forth herein and incorporates the same by reference. 
24. The Han-ises agreed to sell the subject 40 acres to the Yosts. 
25. The Bank was a known and intended third-party beneficiary of this agreement 
between the HalTises and the Y osts. 
AMENDED ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM, CROSS CLAIM AND THIRD-PARTY CLAIM -14 
f'" I' 
.... :~: ,) 
26. The Harrises are claiming that they did not transfer the said 40 acres to the Y osts. 
27. To the extent the Court finds that the Harrises did not transfer the 40 acres to the 
Y osts, then the Harrises breached their agreement to transfer the 40 acres to the Y osts. 
28. As a result, the Bank, as a third party to the agreement, has been damaged. 
29. The Bank seeks damages in an amount to be proven at trial and/or for specific 
performance of the Harrises' agreement to transfer the 40 acres to the Y osts. 
COUNTY 
FRAUD/MISREPRESENTATION 
30. The Bank realleges the allegations contained in paragraphs 1-29 as though fully 
set forth herein and incorporates the same by reference. 
31. In order for Duane Yost to use Tract I of the Real Property Collateral, ("Tract I") 
as collateral for his renewal loan with the Bank, Darryl Harris executed a QuitClaim Deed on 
November 25, 2010 that purported to transfer Tract I to the Duane L. Yost Trust. 
32. However, in order for the title company to issue title insurance for Tract I, a 
Corrected QuitClaim Deed was prepared which included a signature line for Christine Harris 
in addition to the signature line for Darryl HalTis. 
33. Without authority from his wife, Darryl Harris signed Christine Harris' name to 
the Corrected QuitClaim Deed on or about December 1,2008. 
34. Darryl Harris remained silent about the fact that he had signed Christine Harris' 
name to the Corrected Quitclaim Deed without her consent and his silence was a representation. 
35. Therefore, Darryl Harris represented that Christine Harris signed the Corrected 
QuitClaim Deed. 
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36. Implied in this representation was the statement and/or representation that 
Christine HalTis had consented to the transfer of Tract I to Duane Yost and Lori Yost pursuant 
to the COlTected QuitClaim Deed. 
37. Such representation was false as Christine Harris had not signed the QuitClaim 
Deed nor had she authorized Darryl HalTis to sign her name on the Corrected QuitClaim Deed. 
38. This representation was material because Tract I was owned by Darryl Harris and 
Christine Harris as community property and the consent of both Darryl Harris and Christine 
Harris was necessary to transfer Tract I to Duane Yost and Lori Yost. 
39. Darryl Harris knew that Christine Harris had not signed the Corrected QuitClaim 
Deed. Moreover, Darryl Harris knew he had signed Christine Harris' name on the Corrected 
QuitClaim Deed without first getting her authorization and therefore, he knew that his 
representation was false. 
40. DalTyl Harris intended that Crandall, the Yosts, the title company and the Bank 
would rely on his forgery of his wife's signature on the Corrected QuitClaim Deed. 
41. In addition, Darryl Harris intended that the Yosts, the title company and the Bank 
would rely on his silent representation that Christine Harris had consented to the transfer of 
Tract I to the Y osts. 
42. FU11hel1l10re, Darryl Harris knew that the Corrected QuitClaim Deed would be 
recorded with Bonneville County and that his forgery of his wife's signature would be relied on 
by the general public. 
43. Duane Yost, Lori Yost, the title company and the Bank are members of the 
general public. 
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44. At no time during 2008, did Crandall, the Y osts, the title company or the Bank 
know that DanyI Hanis had forged his wife's name on the Conected QuitClaim Deed. 
45. In fact, the Bank did not know about said forgery until it received Plaintiffs' 5 th 
Supplmentary Response to the Defendants, the Bank of Commerce First Set of Intenogatories 
and Requests for Production of Documents on or about November 1, 2010. 
46. Crandall, the Y osts, the title company and the Bank all relied on Darryl Hanis' 
forgery of his wife's signature on the Conected QuitClaim Deed. 
A. Specifically, Crandall relied on said forgery when he notarized the 
Conected QuitClaim Deed because he believed that Christine Harris had 
actually signed said deed. 
B. Specifically, Duane and Lori Yost relied on said forgery as they believed 
that Tract I had been deeded and transfened to them and they believed 
that they could therefore use Tract I as collateral for various loans 
obtained by Duane Yost from the Bank. 
e. Specifically, the title company relied on said forgery as it issued title 
insurance to the Bank. 
D. Specifically, the Bank relied on said forgery as it renewed various loans 
to Duane Yost on the belief that Darryl Hanis and Christine Harris had 
actually transfened Tract I to Duane Yost and Lori Yost and on the belief 
that the Yosts could provide Tract I as security for the renewal loans. 
47. The Bank's reliance on the forgery was justifiable as neither Darryl Hanis nor 
Christine Hanis, despite their knowledge of the forgery, informed the Bank of the forgery until 
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on or about November 1,2010. 
48. In addition, the Bank's reliance on the forgery was justifiable because the Bank 
had a long business relationship with Darryl Harris and was not aware of any prior instance of 
Darryl Harris' dishonesty and therefore had no reason to suspect that Darryl Harris would ever 
forge his wife's signature. 
49. If the COUli declares the Con-ected QuitClaim Deed to be invalid, then as a result 
of DalTyl Harris' fraud and forgery the Bank has suffered injury because it gave value to Duane 
Yost by renewing his loans and extending the tem1S of his loans believing that its Deeds of Trust 
had secured Tract I as collateral for the renewal loans. 
50. Specifically, the Bank's injury is the value of Tract I, plus other amounts to be 
proven at trial of this matter. 
51. In addition, if the Court declares the Corrected QuitClaim Deed to be invalid, then 
as a result of Darryl Harris' fraud and forgery the Bank has suffered injury because rather than 
enter into the renewal loans with Duane Yost, the Bank could have used moneys on deposit with 
the Bank during the latter end of 2008 that were in accounts owned or controlled by Duane Yost 
as a setoff but because of the fraud and forgery, the Bank did not exercise its right to said setoff. 
COUNT VI 
CIVIL LIABILITY OF NOTARY PUBLIC AND EMPLOYER 
52. The Bank realleges the allegations contained in paragraphs 1-51 as though fully 
set forth herein and incorporates the same by reference. 
53. Crandall, individually and as an employee of Family Asset Protection, notarized 
the Corrected Quitclaim Deed which contains Darryl Harris' forgery of Christine Harris' 
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signature, despite the fact that Christine Harris did not appear before him and that she did not 
sign the Corrected Quitclaim Deed. 
54. As a notary public, Crandall failed to require Christine Harris and Darryl Harris 
to personally appear before him prior to or at the time he notarized the Corrected Quitclaim 
Deed. 
55. As a notary public, Crandall's failure to exercise the required degree of care in 
identifying the person who actually signed Christine Harris' name on the Corrected Quitclaim 
Deed constitutes official misconduct pursuant to Idaho Code § 51-112. 
56. As a notary public, Crandall's failure to exercise the required degree of care in 
verifying who signed Christine Harris' name to the Corrected Quitclaim Deed at or before the 
time he notarized the COITected Quitclaim Deed constitutes official misconduct pursuant to 
Idaho Code § 51-112. 
57. As a notary public, Crandall should be held liable for all damages proximately 
caused by his official misconduct as set forth herein. 
58. Pursuant to Idaho Code §51-118, Family Asset Protection, as Crandall's 
employer, should be jointly and severally liable with Crandall for all damages proximately 
caused by the official misconduct of Crandall, because Crandall was acting as a notary public 
within the scope of his employment when he notarized the Corrected Quitclaim Deed and 
because Family Asset Protection had actual knowledge of, or reasonably should have known 
of, Crandall's official misconduct. 
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COUNT VII 
PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL 
59. The Bank realleges the allegations contained in paragraphs 1-58 as though fully 
set forth herein and incorporates the same by reference. 
60. By signing the COlTected Quitclaim Deed, Defendant Darryl Harris made the 
specific promise that he and his wife, Christine Harris, were transferring Tract I to Duane Yost 
in order for the Bank to obtain security in Tract I and to renew Duane Yost's loans with the 
Bank. 
61. The Bank was a known third-party beneficiary to Darryl Harris' promIse to 
transfer Tract I to Duane Yost. 
62. The Bank relied on Darryl Harris' promise to transfer Tract I to Duane Yost. 
63. To the extent the Corrected Quitclaim Deed is deemed void because of Darryl 
Harris' forgery of his wife's name on said deed, Darryl Harris breached his promise to transfer 
Tract I to Duane Yost. 
64. The Bank has suffered substantial economIC loss as a result of its reliance on 
Darry I Harris' promise to transfer Tract I to Duane Yost. 
65. The Bank's loss was or should have been foreseeable by Darryl Harris when he 
forged his wife's name on the Corrected Quitclaim Deed. 
66. It was reasonable for the Bank to rely on Darryl Harris' promise to transfer Tract 
I to Duane Yost as well as on his forgery of Christine Harris' name on the Corrected Quitclaim 
Deed. 
67. As a result, the Bank has been damaged in an amount to be proven at trial. 
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COUNT VIII 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
68. The Bank realleges the allegations contained in paragraphs 1-67 as though fully 
set forth herein and incorporates the same by reference. 
69. Defendant Darryl Harris' decision to forge Christine Harris' name on the 
Corrected Quitclaim Deed, without her written consent and in reckless disregard of the 
consequences to the Bank and to other third parties, was oppressive, malicious, outrageous, 
reckless and fraudulent. The Bank is entitled to an award of punitive damages against 
Defendant Darryl Harris, pursuant to I.e. § 6-1604. 
REQUEST FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, the Bank prays for judgment as follows: 
A. That the Bank have judgment against Yost 111 the sum of approximately 
$2,285,415.45 together with interest at the rate of approximately 5.5% per annum after July 13, 
2009 at the per diem interest accrual of approximately $339.06448 for any sums advanced by 
the Bank or which the Bank becomes obligated or elects to advance for the payment of taxes, 
assessments, insurance premiums, mortgage insurance premiums, water charges, and other 
governmental charges, fines, assessed or charged against the property during the pendency of 
this action, including interest on such advance from the date of the advance; for the sum of 
$5,000.00 for attorney's fees if this action is uncontested, plus such additional sums as the Court 
may adjudge as reasonable in the event of contest, trial, or appeal; for the Bank's taxable costs 
and disbursements herein; and for interest on the entire amount of said judgment at the 
maximum rate allowed by law. 
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B. That the Barile's Deeds of Trust herein described be adjudged first and prior liens 
upon the Real Property Collateral superior to any right, title, claim, lien, or interest on the part 
of the named Counterdefendants, Crossclaimants, Third-Party Claimaint or any persons 
claiming by, through, or under said Counterdefendants, Crossclaimants or Third-Party 
Claimaint, except for Tract II upon which Counterdefendants Darryl Harris and Christine Harris, 
husband and wife, may have a first lien priority based upon the deed of trust described in 
paragraph 2.A. of this Counterclaim, Cross Claim and Third-Party Claim. 
C. That the Court, in the decree, establish the reasonable value of the Real Property 
Collateral herein described according to proof. 
D. That the Bank's Deeds of Trust described herein be foreclosed and said Real 
Property Collateral, together with improvements and water rights, however evidenced, be sold 
in one parcel in accordance with and in the manner provided by law; that the Bank be permitted 
to be a purchaser at the sale; that the net proceeds of said sale be applied first toward the 
payment of the costs of said sale and then toward the payment of the Bank's judgment; that the 
Bank have and retain a deficiency judgment against the Cross Defendants and Third-Party 
Defendant, in the event that the bid at the sale is less than the sum of the Bank's entire 
judgment, plus costs of sale. 
E. That the decree provide that after the sale of said Real Property Collateral, all 
right, title, claim, lien, or interest in the above-named Counterdefendants, Crossdefendants, 
Third-Party Defendants, and every person claiming by, through; or under said 
Counterdefendants, Crossdefendants and Third-Party Defendants in or to said property, 
including the light of possession thereof from and after said sale, be forever barred and 
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foreclosed and that the purchaser at said sale be entitled to immediate possession of the premises 
as allowed by law subject only to such statutory right of redemption as the Counterdefendants, 
Crossdefendants and Third-Party Defendants may have by law. 
F. In the event that the Bank is the purchaser at sale and possession of said premises 
is not surrendered to the Bank, that the Court issue a Writ of Assistance directed to the sheriff 
of Bonneville County, Idaho, to deliver possession of said premises to the Bank. 
G. That the Bank be granted a judgment against Defendants Darryl Harris and 
Christine Harris for damages in an amount to be proven at trial and/or for specific perfOlmance 
of their agreement to sell the subject 40 acres to the Yosts. 
H. That the Bank be granted a judgment against Defendant Robert Parkinson 
Crandall, an individual, and Family Asset Protection Legal Services, P.L.L.C., in an amount to 
be proven at trial. 
I. That punitive damages be entered against Defendant Darryl Harris and in favor 
of the Bank. 
J. That the Bank may have such other and further relief as the Court deems just and 
equitable. 
Dated this __ day _~-""--"=~_' 2011. 
NELSON HALL PARRY TUCKER, P.A. 
By: 
* This is an attempt to collect a debt, any infOlmation obtained will be used for that purpose. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby that I served a true copy of the foregoing document upon the following 
this -----<==- day of 2011, by hand delivery, mailing with the necessary postage 
affixed thereto, facsimile, or ovemight mail. 
Kipp L. Manwaring 
MANW ARING LAW OFFICE 
381 Shoup Avenue, Suite 210 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
[ ] Mailing 
[ Lt-yiiand Delivery 
[ ] Fax: 523-9109 
[ ] Ovemight Mail 
Brian T. Tucker 
L:\DRN\0260.491\Answer & Counterclaim - Amended - Revised.wpd 
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Exhibit "A" 
DUANE YOST 
P.O. BOX 2095 
IDAHO FAllS, ID 83403 
BORROWER'S NAME AND ADDRESS 
-)''' includes each borrower above, jointly and severally. 
'( OF COMMERCE·ADMINISTRATION 
ITH 25TH EAST, P.O. 1887 
,llS, 10 83403 
LENDER'S NAME AND ADDRESS 
"You" means the lender, its successors and assigns. 
Loan Amount $ 2 000 000 00 
Renewal Of 
PROCESSOR MICHELLE WALKER 
For value received, I promise to pay to you, or your order, at your address listed above the PRINCIPAL sum of TWO MillION AND NOIlQO 
_______________________________ Dollars $2,000000.00 
o Single Advance: , will receive all of this principal sum on . No additional advances are contemplated under this note, 
00 Multiple Advance: The principal sum shown above is the maximum amount of principal I can borrow under this note. On u04ot:,J·1LL6"'·2"'0'lJOolJB"-_____ _ 
_______ 1 will receive the amount of $ and future principal advances are contemplated. 
Conditions: The conditions for future advances are UPON REOUEST OF CUSTOMER AND APPROVAl OF I DAN OFFICER 
00 Open End Credit: You and I agree that I may borroW up to the maximum amount of principal more than one time. This feature is subject t'o 
all other conditions and expires on JJO"'4"'·1uDJ.;.·L20110119"-_____________ _ 
o Closed End Credit: You and I agree that I may borrow up to the maximum only one time (and subject to all other conditions). 
INTEREST: I agree to pay interest on the outstanding principal balance from04·16·2008 at the rate of 5 75Q % 
per year until ~O~4·~j17~·2~O~O~B _______________________________________ __ 
00 Variable Rate: This rate may then change as stated below. 
!XI Index Rate: The future rate will be 0500 PERCENT ABOVE 
RATE SEE "lIMITATIONS' BElOW 
the following index rate: HIGHEST PIIBIISHFO WAil STREET .JOIIRNAI PRIME 
THE RESUI T OE THIS CAl CIII AriON Will BE BOIINOEO TO THE NEAREST 0 001 
o No Index: The future rate will not be subject to any internal or external index. It will be entirely in your control. 
lXI Frequency and Timing: The rate on this note may change as often as .. E.x.VEL.JRL1.YUlD"AY ...... B"-E,,,Gu:INuNuluN"'G .... 0"'4::..·ju7c:.-"ZO"'0"'B"-_____________ _ 
A change in the interest rate will take effect OLlllN...JTuHHE_,."S,.All1MuE...JO"'A"YL-_______________________________ _ 
[XJ Limitations:: During the term of this loan, the applicable annual interest rate will not be more than _______ J.l"'B~OtiO""O % or less than 
_______ --"5~5u.O"'D 'Yo. The rate may not change more than % each ______________ _ 
Effect of Variable Rate: A change in the interest rate will have the following effect on the payments: 
D The amount of each scheduled payment will change. [Xl The amount of the final payment will change. 
D 
ACCRUAL METHOD: Interest will be calculated on a ,.A ... CT.LUIJ,.Aiul .... 3u65.L... ______________ basis. 
POST MATURITY RATE: I agree to pay interest on the unpaid balance of this note owing after maturity, and until paid in full, as stated below: 
00 on the same fixed or variable rate basis in effect before maturity (as indicated above). 
D at a rate equal to ____________________________________________________ _ 
D LATE CHARGE: If a payment is made more than _______ days after it is due, I agree to pay a late charge of _____________ _ 
00 ADDITIONAL CHARGES: In addition to interest, I agree to pay the following charges which 0 are !Xl are not included in the principal amount 
above: I DAN DOC FEE $1 000 00 PAID IN CASH 
PAYMENTS: I agree to pay this note as follows: 
ON DEMAND, BUT IF NO DEMAND IS MADE THEN INTEREST ON THE AMOUNT OF CREDIT OUTSTANDING DUE AT MATURITY AND PRINCIPAL DUE ON 04·16·2009. 
ADDITIONAL TERMS: 
!Xl SECURITY: This note is separately secured by (describe separate 
document by type and date): 
STATEMENTlOAN 
{This G9ction is fot your internal use:, Failure to list a separate sQcurny document does not mean the 
agreement will n01secura this nQta.' 
THOMAS J. ROMR,9K. PR SIDENT 
UNIVERSAL NOTE 
~M @19B4., 1991 Bankers Systems, Inc.., St, Cloud, MN Form UN-ID 3/4/2002 
PURPOSE: The purpose of this loan is BUSINESS' INVESTMENT 
PIIRPOSES 
SIGNATURES: I AGREE TO THE TERMS OF THIS NOTE {INCLUDING 
THOSE ON PAGE 21. I have received a copy on today's date_ 
~?rk=CC~~ 
DUANE YOST 
(page T 012J 
ver.illl J lVI'.I..JI. ,-,.;;. U;;.<;;o ............ p .... \::1 .... " '""-'" ••• ~~ •• - ~ •• _ ~_. 
this loan. "'," "me" f')r "my" means each Borrower who signs this note 
and each other i or legal entity (including guarantors, endorsers, 
and sureties) :es to pay this note {together referred to as "us"). 
"You" or the Lender and its successors and assigns. 
law of the state in which you are located will 
of this note which is: cnntrRry to <'Ipp{icable 
unless the law permits you and me to agree to 
such a variation. If any provision of this agreement cannot be enforced 
according to its terms, this fact win not affect the enforceability of the 
remainder of this agreement. No modification of this agreement may be 
made without your express written consent. Time is of the essence in 
this agreement. 
COMMISSIONS OR OTHER REMUNERATION: I understand and agree that 
any insurance premiums paid to insurance companies as part of this note 
will involve money retained by you or paid back to you as commissions or 
other remuneration. 
In addition, I understand and agree that some other payments to third 
parties as part of this note may also involve money retained by you or 
paid back to you as commissions or other remuneration. 
PAYMENTS: Each payment I make on this note will first reduce the 
amount lowe you for charges which are neither interest nor principal. 
The remainder of each payment wilt then reduce accrued unpaid interest, 
and then unpaid principal. If you and I agree to a different application of 
payments, we will describe our agreement on this note. I may prepay a 
part of, or the entire balance of this loan without penalty, unless we 
specify to the contrary on this note. Any partial prepayment will not 
excuse or reduce any later scheduled payment until this note is paid in full 
lunless, when I make the prepayment, you and I agree in writing to the 
contrary). 
INTEREST: Interest accrues on the principal remaining unpaid from time 
to time, until paid in full. If I receive the principal in more than one 
advance, each advance wilt start to earn interest only when I receive the 
advance. The interest rate in effect on this note at any given time will 
apply to the entire principal advanced at that time. Notwithstanding 
anything to the contrary, I do not agree to pay and you do not intend to 
charge any rate of interest that is higher than the maximum rate of 
interest you could charge under applicable law for the extension of credit 
that is agreed to here leither before or alter maturity). If any notice of 
interest accrual is sent and is in error, we mutually agree to correct it, 
and if you actually collect more interest than allowed by law and this 
agreement, you agree to refund it to me. 
INDEX RATE: The index will SerVe only as a device for setting the rate on 
this note. You do not guarantee by selecting this index. or the margin, 
that the rate on this note will be the same rate you charge on any other 
loans or class of loans to me or other borrowers. 
ACCRUAL METHOD: The amount of interest that I will pay on this loan 
will be calculated using the interest rate and accrual method stated on 
page 1 of this note. For the purpose of interest calculation, the accrual 
method will determine the number of days in a "year." If no accrual 
method is stated, then you may use any reasonable accrual method for 
calculating interest. 
POST MATURITY RATE: For purposes of deciding when the "Post 
Maturity Rate" (shown on page 1) applies, the term "maturity" means the 
date of the last scheduled payment indicated on page 1 of this note or 
the date you accelerate payment on the note, whichever is earlier. 
SINGLE ADVANCE LOANS: If this is a single advance loan, you and I 
expect that you will make only one advance of principal. However, you 
may add other amounts to the principal if you make any payments 
described in the "PAYMENTS BY LENDER" paragraph below. 
MULTIPLE ADVANCE LOANS: If this is a multiple advance loan, you and I 
expect that you will make more than one advance of principal. If this is 
closed end credit, repaying a part of the principal will not entitle me to 
additional credit. 
PAYMENTS BY LENDER: If you are authorized to pay, on my behalf, 
charges ( am obligated to pay (such as property insurance premiums), 
then you may treat those payments made by you as advances and add 
them to the unpaid principal under this note, or you may demand 
immediate payment of the charges. 
SET -OFF: I agree that you may set off any amount due and payable under 
this note against any right I have to receive money from you. 
"Right to receive money from you" means: 
11) any deposit account balance I have with you; 
{ll any money owed to me on an item presented to you or in your 
possession for collection or exchange; and 
13) any repurchase agreement or other nondeposit obligation. 
.. Any amount due and payable under this note" means the total 
amount of which you are entitled to demand payment under the terms of 
this note at the time you set off. This total includes any balance the due 
date for which you properly accelerate under this note. 
If my right to receive money from you is also owned by someone who 
has not agreed to pay this note, your right of set-off will apply to my 
interest in the obligation and to any other amounls I could withdraw on 
my sote request or endorsement. Your right of set-off does not apply to 
an account or other obligation where my rights are only as a 
representative. It also does not apply to any Individual Retirement 
Account or other tax-deferred retirement account. 
You will not be liable for the dishonor of any check when the dishonor 
occurs because you set off this debt against any of my accounts. I agree 
DATE OF PRINCIPAL BORROWER'S PRINCIPAL 
TRANSACTION ADVANCE INITIALS PAYMENTS 
(not required) 
$ $ 
$ $ 
$ $ 
$ $ 
$ $ 
$ $ 
$ $ 
$ $ 
$ $ 
$ $ 
$ $ 
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exercise 'of your right of set-off. 
, . TE OR RESIDENCE SECURITY: If this note is secured bV r 
:esidence that is personal property, the existence of a deb 
~medies for such a default will be determined by applical 
,e terms of any separate instrument creating the secur 
d. to the extent not prohibited bV law and not contrary \0 1 
terms of the separate security instrument, by the .. Default" a 
"Remedies" paragraphs herein. 
DEFAUL T: I will be in default if anyone or more of the following occur: (" 
fail to make a payment on time or in the amount due; (2) I fail to keep i 
property insured, if required; (3) I fail to pay, or keep any promise, on a 
debt or agreement I have with you; (4) any other creditor of mine attempts 
collect any debt lowe him through court proceedings; 15) I die, am declar 
incompetent. make an assignment for the benefit of creditors. or becor 
insolvent (either because my liabilities exceed my assets or I am unable 
p.ay my debts as they become due); (6) I make any written statement 
provide any financial information that is untrue or inaccurate at the time it w 
provided; 17) I do or fail 10 do something which caUSeS you to believe that y 
will have difficulty collecting the amount lowe you; fB) any collateral securi 
this note is used in a manner or for a purpose which threatens confiscation 
a legal authority; IS} I change my name or assume an additional oar 
without first notifying you before making such a change; (10) I fail to pIal 
cultivate and harvest crops in due seaSon if I am a producer of crops; (11) a 
loan proceeds are used for a purpose that will contribute to excessive eros! 
of highly erodible land or to the conversion of wetlands to produce 
agricultural commodity, as further explained in 7 C.F.R. Part 1940. Subp; 
G. Exhibit M. 
REMEDIES: If I am in default on this note you have, but are not limited' 
the following remedies: 
(1) You may demand immediate payment of all lowe you under tf 
note (principal, accrued unpaid interest and other accrued charge! 
12) You may set off this debt against any right I have to the paym€ 
of money from you, subject to the terms of the "Set~OI 
paragraph herein. 
(3) You may demand security, additional security, or additional parti 
to be obligated to pay this note as a condition for not using a 
other remedy. 
14) You may refuse to make advances to me or allow purchases 
credit by me. 
15} You may use any remedy you have under state or federal law. 
By selecting anyone or more of these remedies you do not give up yo 
right to later use any other remedy. By waiving your right to declare 
event to be a default, you do not waive your right to later consider tl 
event as a default if it continues or happens again. 
COLLECTION COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES: I agree to pay all costs 
collection, replevin or any other or similar type of cost if I am in defau 
In addition, if you hire an attorney to collect this note, I also agree to p 
any fee you incur with such attorney plus court costs (except whe 
prohibited by law). To the extent permitted by the United Stat, 
Bankruptcy Code, I also agree to pay the reasonable attorney's fees a! 
costs you incur to collect this debt as awarded by any court exercisil 
jurisdiction under the Bankruptcy Code. 
WAIVER: I give up my rights to require you to do certain things, I will n 
require you to: 
11) demand payment of amounts due Ipresentment); 
12) obtain official certification of nonpayment Iprotest); or 
13) give notice that amounts due have not been paid (notice 
dishonor). 
I waive any defenses I have based on suretyship or impairment 
collateral. 
OBLIGATIONS INDEPENDENT: I understand that I must pay this no 
even if someone else has also agreed to pay it (by, for example, signH 
this form or a separate guarantee or endorsement). You may sue n 
alone, or anyone else who is obligated on this note, or any number of I 
together; to collect this note. You may do so without any notice that 
has not been paid (notice of dishonor). You may without notice relea! 
any party to this agreement without releasing any other party. If you gil 
up any of your rights, With or without notice, it will not affect my duty 
pay this note. Any extension of new credit to any of us, or renewal 
this note by all or less than all of Us will not release me from my duty 
pay it. (Of course, you are entitled to only one payment in fulL) I agr~ 
that you may at your option extend this note or the debt represented t 
this note, or any portion of the note or debt, from time to time witho 
limit or notice and for any term without affecting my liability for paymel 
of the note. I will not assign my obligation under this agreement witho' 
your prior written approval. 
FINANCIAL INFORMATION: I agree to provide you. upon request. ar 
financial statement or information you may deem necessary. I warral 
that the financial statements and information I provide to you are or w 
be accurate, correct and complete. 
NOTICE: Unless otherwise required by law, any notice to me shall t 
given by delivering rt or by mailing it by first class mail addressed to IT 
at my last known address. My current address is on page 1. I agree 
inform you in writing of any change in my address. I will give any noti< 
to you by mailing it first class to your address stated on page 1 of th 
agreement, or to any other address that you have designated. 
PAYMENT BY CHECK: If any payment on this note is made with a chec 
that is dishonored, I agree to pay you a $20.00 fee. 
PRINCIPAL INTEREST 
BALANCE RATE 
$ 0/0 $ 
$ % $ 
$ % $ 
$ % $ 
$ % $ 
$ % $ 
$ % $ 
$ % $ 
$ % $ 
$ % $ 
$ % $ 
DUANE YOST 
P.O. BGX 2095 
IDAHO FALLS,ID 83403 
BORROWER'S NAME AND ADDRESS 
"'I" includes each borrower above, jointly and severally. 
You have extended to me a line of credit in the 
AMOUNT of TWO MILLION AND NO/l00 
JK OF COMMERCE·ADMINISTRATION 
OUTH 25TH EAST, P.O. 1887 
FALLS, 10 83403 
LENDER'S NAME AND ADDRESS 
"You" means the lender, its successors and assigns. 
$ 2,000,000.00 
You will make loans to me from time to time until 5:00 --.E.m, on 04·16·2009 , Although the line of credit 
expires on that date. ! will remain obligated to perform all my duties under this agreement so long as lowe you any money advanced according to the 
terms of this agreement, as evidenced by any note or notes i have signed promising to repay these amounts. 
This line of credit is an agreement between you and me. It is not intended that any third party receive any benefit from this agreement, whether by 
direct payment, reliance for future payment or in any other manner. This agreement is not a letter of credit. 
1. AMOUNT: This line of credit is: 
[XI OBLIGATORY: You may not refuse to make a loan to me under this line of credit unless one of the following occurs: 
a. I have borrowed the maximum amount available to me; 
b. This hne of credit has expired; 
c. I have defaulted on the note {or notes} which show my indebtedness under this line of credit; 
d. I have violated any term of this line of credit or any note or other agreement entered into in connection with this line of credit; 
e. I HAVE FILED BANKRUPTCY, 
D DISCRETIONARY: You may refuse to make a loan to me under this line of credit once the aggregate outstanding advances equal or exceed 
Subject to the obligatory or discretionary limitations above, this line of credit is: 
[Xl OPEN-END IBusiness or Agricultural only): I may borrow up to the maximum amount of principal more than one time. 
D CLOSED· END: I ";ay borrow up to the maximum only one time. 
l. PROMISSORY NOTE: I will repay any advances made according to this line of credit agreement as set out in the promissory note, I signed on 
04· 16·2008 , or any note(s) I sign at a later time which represent advances under this agreement. The notels) set(s) out 
the terms relating to maturity, interest rate, repayment and advances. If indicated on the promissory note, the advances will be made as follows: 
UPON REOUEST OF CUSTOMER AND APPROVAL OF LOAN OFFICER. 
3. RELATED DOCUMENTS: I have signed the following documents in connection with this line of credit and note(s) entered into in accordance with 
this line of credit: 
D security agreement dated 0 ________________________ _ 
D mortgage dated 0 ________________________ _ 
D guaranty dated 0 ________________________ _ 
4. REMEDIES: If I am in default on the note!s) you may: 
a. take any action as provided in the related documents; 
b. without notice to me, terminate this line of credit. 
By selecting any of these remedies you do not give up your right to later use any other remedy. By deciding not to use any remedy should I 
default, you do not waive your right to later consider the event a default, if it happens again. 
5, COSTS AND FEES: If you hire an attorney to enforce this agreement I will pay your reasonable attorney's fees, where permitted by law. I will also 
pay your court costs and costs of collection, where permitted by law, 
6~ COVENANTS: For as long as this [jne of credit is in effect or lowe you money for advances made in accordance with the line of credit, 1 will do the 
following: 
a. maintain books and records of my operations relating to the need for this line of credit; 
b. permit you or any of your representatives to inspect and/or copy these records; 
c. provide to you any documentation requested by you which support the reason for making any advance under this line of credit; 
d. permit you to make any advance payable to the seller (or seller and me) of any items being purchased with that advance; 
e. 
7. NOTICES: All notices or other cprrespondence with me should be sent to my address stated above. The notice or correspondence shall be effective 
when deposited in the mail, first class. or delivered to me in person. 
S. MISCELLANEOUS: This line of credit may not be changed except by a written agreement signed by you and me. The law of the state in which you 
are located will govern this agreement. Any term oLthis agreement which is contrary to applicable law will not be effective, unless the law per-
mits you and me -agree to such a variation. 
FOR THE LE / 
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Exhibit "B" 
DUANE YUST 
3777 HAMPSHIRE CT. 
IDAHO FAllS, ID 83404 
. OF COMMERCE·ADMINISTRATION 
fH 25TH EAST, P.O. 1887 
10 83403 
Renewal Of ____________________ __ 
BORROWER'S NAME AND ADDRESS LENDER'S NAME AND ADDRESS PROCESSOR SUMMER SORENSON 
''I''' includes each borrower above, jointly Bnd severally_ "You" means the lender, its successors and assigns. 
For value received, I promise to pay to you, or your order, at your address listed above the PRINCIPAL sum of ONE Mil lION AND NDIlOO 
_______________________________ Dollars $ 100000000 
[Xl Single Advance: I will receive all of this principal sum on 11·21·2008 . No additional advances are contemplated under this note. 
o Multiple Advance: The principal sum shown above is the maximum amount of principal I can borrow under this note. On ____________________ __ 
___________ 1 will receive the amount of $ and future principal advances are contemplated. 
Conditions: The conditions for future advances are ________________________________________________________________________ _ 
o Open End Credit: You and I agree that I may borrow up to the maximum principal sum more than one time. This feature is subject to all other 
condiiions and expires on ___________________________________ _ 
o Closed End Credit: You and I agree that I may borrow, (subject to all other conditions) up to the maximum principal sum only one time. 
INTEREST: I agree to pay interest on the outstanding principal balance from ]]·Zl·Z008 . at the rate of 5500% 
per year until .... 1 .... 1,,2..(,2;.,·Z"'0"'0"'8'--_______________________________ _ 
[XI Variable Rate: This rate may then change as stated below. 
[Xl Index Rale: The future rate will be 0500 PERCENT ABOVE 
RATE 
the following index rate: HIGtlEST PlJBLISHED WAI L STREET JOURNAl PRIME 
THE RESULT OF THIS CAl CUI ATION Will BE ROI/NOED TO THE NEAREST ° 001 
D No Index: The future rate will not be subject to any internal or external index. It will be entirely in your control. 
[Xl Frequency and TIming: The rate on this note may change as often as ... E.LV .. ERu.Y ....... O"'A.1.y .... B ... E .... GJ.lIN"'N"'I .. N .... G-J1u1"'·Z ... Z"'·"-ZO"'O"'B"--______________________ _ 
A change in the interest rate will take effect uO"'N~T'-'HJ.lE~Su.A""'Mll.E-JncuA .. y'_ ________________________________________________________ _ 
1XJ limitations: During the term of this loan, the applicable annual interest rate will not be more than _______________ 1...,8"'-"0"'00% or less than 
______________ -"5 ... 5"'0"'0 %. The rate may not change more than % each ____ ~ ______________________ _ 
Effect of Variable Rate: A change in the interest rate will have the following effect on the payments: 
o The amount of each scheduled payment will change. 00 The amount of the final payment will change. 
D 
ACCRUAL METHOD: Interest will be calculated on a ACTIIAI1365 basis. 
POST MATURITY RATE: I agree to pay interest on the unpaid balance of this note owing after maturity, and until paid in full, as stated below: 
[Xl on the same lixed or variable rate basis in effect before maturity las indicated above}. 
[] at a rate equal to ______________________________________________________________________________________________ __ 
o LATE CHARGE: If a payment is made more than ___ days after it is due, I agree to pay a late charge 01 ____________________________ __ 
00 ADDITIONAL CHARGES; in addition to interest. I agree to pay the following charges which 0 are [X) are not included in the principal amount 
above: OFFICIAl S S 117 00· TrUE POliCY $3669 DO' UCC $ 1 00 00·1 DAN DOC FEE $450 00· LOAN ORIGINATION FEE $ 1550 00 PAlO IN CASH 
PAYMENTS: I agree to pay this note as follows: 
1 PAYMENT OF $1,055,000.00 ON 11·21·2009. THIS IS A VARIABLE RATElOAN AND THE FINAL PAYMEr-iT AMOUNT MAY CHANGE. 
PURPOSE: The purpose of this loan is oBull.,.SlwNu:E.,S.,Sr'· RwEClE:JJINllI.AaNuu.CEu:.E"XI",Sw.T.llINl!lG.1.J.JI QL.LAwNIll-______________ ~---------------------------
ADDITIONAL TERMS: 
UNIVERSAL NOTE AND SECURITY AGREEMENT (page 1 or 31 
~ © 1994, 1991 BankofS Systom&, Inc., St. Cloud, MN Form UNS·\AZ·ID 2/9/2001 
J 
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interest, now or ;~ i-he future. wherever the Property is or will be located, and all oroceeds and products of the Property. "Property" mcludes a 
parts# ~pairs. replacements, improvements, and accessions to thr perty; any original evidence of title or ownership; and c 
obligations Jort the payment or performance of the Property. includes anything acquired upon the sale, lease, iicens€ 
exchange, sposition of the Property; any rights and claims arising Jroperty; and any collections and distributions on account ( 
the 
IX) Accounts and Other Hights to' payment: Aii rights to paymeflt. \.vl,dh~f or I by pedorm;Jncc, including, but not limited to, pavmpnt if 
property or services sold, leased, rented, licensed, or assigned. This includes any rights and interests (including all liens} which ~ have by law c 
agreement against any account debtor or obligor. 
IX! Inventory: All inventory held for ultimate sale or lease, or which has been or will be supplied unqer contracts of service, or which are ra' 
materi.als~ work in process, or materials used or consumed in my business. 
00 Equipment: All equipment including, bu~ not limited to, machinery, vehicles, furniture, fixtures, manufacturing equipment, farm machinery an 
equipment, shop equipment, office and r.eeord keeping equipment. parts, and tools. The Property includes any equipment described in a list ( 
schedule f give to you, but such a list is not necessary to create a valid security interest in all of my equipment. 
IX] fnstrumen1s and ChaHel Paper: All instruments, including negotiable instruments and promissory notes and any other writings or records thi 
evidence the right to payment of a monetary obligation, and tangible and electronic chattel paper. 
00 General Intangibles: All general intangibles including, but not limited to, tax refunds, patents and applications for patents. copyright! 
trademarks, trade secrets, goodwill, trade names, cu~tomer lists, permits and franchises, payment intangibles, computer programs and a 
supporting information provided in connection with a transaction relating to computer programs, and the right to use my name, 
(X] Documents: All documents of title including, but not limited to. bills of lading. dock warrants and receipts, and warehouse receipts, 
{Xl Farm Products and Supplias: All farm products including, but not limited to, all poultry and livestock and their young, along with their produc, 
products, and replacements; all crops, annual or perennial. and all products of the crops; and all feed. seed, fertilizer, medicines, and oth{ 
supplies used or produced in my farming operations. 
IX! Government Payments and Programs: All payments, accounts, general intangibles, and benefits including, but not limited to, payments in kinr 
deficiency payments, letters of entitlement, warehouse receipts, storage payments, emergency assistance and diversion payments, productio 
flexibility contracts. and conservation reserve payments under any preexisting, current. or future federal or state government program. 
00 Investment Property: All investment property including, but not limited to, certificated securities, uncertificated securities, securitie 
entitlements, securities accounts, commodity contracts, commodity accounts, and financial assets. 
00 Deposit Accounts: All deposit accounts inclUding, but not Ii~ited to, demand, timer savings, passbook, and similar accounts. 
{Xl Specific Property Description: The Property includes, but is not limited by, the following: 
2006 CARVER 46 VOYAGER GRANO SALON SNU CDRC4049B606 
VDLVO 06 EVe, 370 HP, DIESEL 
VOLVO 06 Eve, 370 HP, DIESEL 
ONAN 13.5 KW, DIESEL 
PERSONAL AND ENTITY GUARANTEES DATED 1112112008 AND DEEDS OF TRUST DATED 1112112006 
If applicable, enter real estate description and record owner information: lOr 111N BLOCK 3 Of CANTERBURY PARK DIVISION NO Z TO THE CITY DE !OAHI 
FALLS IDAHO ACCORDING TO THE OfFICIAL PLAT THEREOF. RECORDED OCTOBER 19 1992 AS INSTRUMENT NO 837954 FILED IN OFFICIAL RECORDS OF 
BONNEVILLE COUNTI. IDAHO AND SEE EXHIBIT' A' WHICH IS ATTACHED HERETO AND MADE A PARI HEREOf 
The Property will be used for a o personal {Xl business 0 agricultur al 0 purpos€ 
Borrower/Owner State of organizationJregistration (if applicable) ulD~ _______________________________ _ 
ADDITIONAL TERMS OF THE SECURITY AGREEMENT 
GENERALLY - This agreement secures this note and any other debt I have 
with you, now or later. However, it will not secure other debts if you fail 
with respect to such other debts, to make any required disclosure about 
this security agreement or if you fail to Qfve any required notice of the 
right of rescission. If property described In this agreement is located in 
another state, this agreement may also, in some circumstances, be 
governed by the law of the state in which the Property is located. 
NAME AND LOCATION - My name indicated on page 1 is my exact legal 
name. If I am an individual, my address is my principal residence. If I am 
not an individual. my address is the location of my chief executive offices 
or sole place of business. If I am an entity organized and registered under 
state law, my address is locate~ in the state in which I am registered, 
unless otherwise indicated on page 2. I will provide verification of 
registration and location upon your request. I will provide you with at 
least 30 days notice prior to any change in my name, address, or state of 
organization or registration. 
OWNERSHIP AND DUTIES TOWARD PROPERTY - I represent that I own 
an of the Property, or to the extent this is a purchase money security 
interest I will acquire ownership of the Property with the proceeds of the 
loan. I will defend it against any other claim. Your claim to the Property is 
ahead of the claims of any other creditor. I agree to do whatever you 
require to protect your security interest and to keep your claim in the 
Property ahead of the claims of other creditors. I will not do anything to 
harm your position. I will not use the Property for a purpose that will 
violate any laws or subject the Property to forfeiture or seizure. 
I will keep books, records and accounts about the Property and my 
business in general. I will let you examine these recordi at any reasonable 
time. I will prepare any report or accounting you request, which deals 
with the Property. 
I will keep the Property in my possession and will keep it in good 
repair and use it only for the purpose(s) described on page 1 of this 
agreement. I will not change this specified use without your express 
written permission. I represent that I am the original owner of the 
Property and, if I am not, that I have provided you with a list of prior 
owners of the PTOperty. 
I will keep the Property at my address listed on page 1 of this 
agreement, unless we agree I may keep it at another location. If the 
Property is to be used in another state, I will give you a list of those 
states. I will not try to sell the Property unless it is inventory or I receive 
your written permission to do so. If I sell the Property I will have the 
payment made payable to the order of you and me. 
You may demand immediate payment of the debtls) if the debtor is 
not a natural person and without your prior written consent; 11) a 
beneficial interest in the debtor is sold or transferred; or (2) there is a 
change in either the identity or number of members of a partnership, or 
(3) there is a change in ownership of more than 25 percent of the voting 
stock of a corporation. 
I will pay all taxes and charges on the Property as they become due. 
You have the right of reasonable access in order to inspect the Property. I 
will immediately inform you of any loss or damage to the Property. 
If I fail to perform any of my duties under this security agreement, or 
any mortgage, deed of trust, lien or other security interest, you may 
without notice to me perform the duties or cause them to be performed. 
Your ri(lht to perform for me shall not create an obligation to perform and 
your faIlure to perform will not preclude you from exercising any of your 
other rights under the Jawor this security agreement. 
~ @1994, 1991 Bankers Systems, loc., St. Cloud _ .. ~ Form UNS·LAZ·ID 2/9/2001 
PURCHASE MONEY SECURITY INTEREST . For the sole purpose ( 
determining the extent of a purchase money security interest arisin 
under this security agreement: (a) payments on any nonpurchase mone 
loan also secured by this agreement will not be deemed to apply to th 
Purchase Money Loan, and (b) payments on the Purchase Money Loa 
will be deemed to apply first to the nonpurchase money portion of th 
loan. if any, and then to the purchase money obligations in the order i 
which the items of collateral were acquired or if acquired at the sam 
time, in the order selected by you. No security interest will be terminate 
by application of this formula. "Purchase Money Loan" means any loa 
the proceeds of which, in whole or in part, are used to acquire an 
collateral securing the loan and all extenstons, renewals, consolidation 
and refinancing of such loan. 
PAYMENTS BY LENDER - You are authorized to pay, on my behal 
charges I am or may become obligated to pay to preserve Of protect th 
secured property (such as property insurance premiums). You may tree 
those payments as advances and add them to the unpaid principaJ undE 
the note secured by this agreement or you may demand immediat 
payment of the amount advanced. 
INSURANCE - I agree to buy insurance on the Property against the risk 
and for the amounts you require and to furnish you continuing proof ( 
coverage. I will have the insurance company name you as toss payee 0 
any such policy. You may require added security if you agree thi: 
insurance proceeds may be used to repair or replace the Property. I wi 
buy insurance from a firm licensed to do business in the state of Idahc 
The firm will be reasonably acceptable to you. The insurance will la!' 
until the Property is released from this agreement. If I fail to buy ( 
maintain the insurance (or fail to name you as loss payee) you rna 
purchase it yourself. 
WARRANTIES AND REPRESENTATIONS . If this agreement include 
accounts, I will not settle any account for less than its full value withol 
your written permission. I will collect all accounts until you tell m 
otherwise. I will keep the proceeds from all the accounts and any 900d 
which are returned to me or which I take back in trust for you. I WIll nc 
mix them with any other property of mine. I will deliver them to you c 
your request. If you ask me to pay you the full price on 'any returne 
items or items retaken by myself, I will do so. You may exercise m 
rights with respect to obligations of any account debtors, or oth~ 
persons obligated on the Property, to payor perform, and you rna 
enforce any security interest that secures such obligations. 
If this agreement covers inventory, I wi!! not dispose of it except in m 
ordinary course of business at the fair market value for the Property, or ;: 
a minimum price established between you and me. 
Any person who signs within this box does so to give you a securit) 
interest in the Property described on this page. This person does no' 
promise to pay the note, ''I'' as used in this security agreement wil 
include the borrower and any person who signs within this box. 
Oate ____________________ __ 
Signed ______________________________________________ __ 
{page;; of 
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agents to or through whom I may sell my f., ,,, .product addition to 
those parties named on thiS written 115t. J authorize tify at your 
sole dIscretion any additional parties regarding your r interest in 
my farm products. I remain subject to all applrcabl~ s for selling 
mv farm products in violation of my agreement wIth th.e Food 
Security Act. In this paragraph the terms tarm pr. !1uyers, 
commission merchants and s~lImg agents have the meanings given to 
them in the Federal Foo<;l Security Act of 1985. . .. 
If this agreement covers chattel paper or Instruments, either as onglnal 
collateral or proceeds of the Property, I will note your interest on the face 
of the chattel paper or instruments. . . ' 
REMEDIES - I will be in default on this security agreement If I am In 
default on any note this agreement secures or if I fail to keep any promIse 
contained in the terms of this agreement. If I default. you have all ~f the 
rights and remedies provided in the note and under the Uniform 
Commercial Code. You may require me to make the secured property 
available to you at a place which is reasonably convenie.nt. You may take 
possession of the secured property and sell It as provided by law. The 
proceeds will be applied first to your expenses and then to the deb~. I 
agree that 10 days written notice sent to my last known address by first 
class mail will be reasonable notice under the Uniform Commercial Code. 
~E~~~gTr6NdgFe~sE~Uo~rtY~NiEREST - I authorize you to file a financing 
statement covering the Property. ! wi!! comply with, facilitate, and 
otherwise assist you in connection with obtaining possession of or 
control over the Property for purposes of perfecting your security interest 
under the Uniform Commercial Code. 
ADDITIONAL TERMS OF THE NOTE 
DEFINITIONS - As used on pages 1 and 2, "Ill" means the terms that 
apply to this loan. "I," "me' or "my" means ~ach. Borro.wer who signs 
this note and each other person or legal entity !Including guarantors, 
endorsers, and sureties) who agrees to pay this note (together referred to 
as "us"), "You" or "your" means the Lender and its successors and 
~St~~r~ABlE LAW - The law of the state of Idaho will govern this 
agreement. Any term of this agreement which is contrary to applicable 
law will not be effective, unless the law permits you and me to agree to 
such a variation. If any provision of this agreement cannot be enforced 
according to its terms, this fact will not affect the enforceability of the 
remainder of this agreement. No modification of this agreement may be 
made without your express written consent. Time is of the essence in 
~'ttyIt,fEN;'Se~\aCh payment I make on this note will first reduce the 
amount lowe you for charges which are neither interest nor principal. 
The remainder of each payment will then reduce accrued unpaid interest, 
and then unpaid principal. If you and I agree to a different application of 
payments. we Will describe our agreement on this note. I may prepay a 
part of, or the entire balance of this loan without penalty, unless we 
specify to the contrary on this note. Any partial prepayment will not 
excuse or reduce any later scheduled payment until this note is paid in full 
{unless .. when I make the prepayment, you and I agree in writing to the 
contrary). 
INTEREST - Interest accrues on the principal remaining unpaid from time 
to time, until paid in full. If I receive the principal in more than one 
advance, each advance will start to earn interest only when I receive the 
advance. The interest rate in effect on this note at any given time will 
apply to the entire principal sum outstanding at that time. 
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary, I do not agree to pay and you 
do not intend to charge any rate of interest that is higher than the 
maximum rate of interest you could charge under applicable law for the 
extension of credit that is agreed to in this note (either before or after 
maturity). If any notice of interest accrual is sent and is in error, we 
mutually agree to correct it, and if you actually collect more interest than 
allowed by law and this agreement, you agree to refund it to me. 
INDEX RATE - The index will serve only as a device for setting the 
interest rate on this note. You do not guarantee by' selecting this index, or 
the margin, that the interest rate on this note Will be the same rate you 
charge on any other loans or class of loans you make to me or other 
borrowers. 
POST MATURITY RATE - For furposes of deciding when the "Post 
Maturity Rate" {shown on page 1 applies, the term "maturity" means the 
date of the last scheduled payment indicated on page 1 of this note or 
the date you accelerate payment on the note, whichever is earlier. 
SINGLE ADVANCE LOANS - If this is a single advance loan, you and I 
expect that you will make only one advance of principal. However, you 
may add other amounts to the principal if you make any payments 
described in the "PAYMENTS BY LENDER" paragraph on page 2. 
MULTIPLE ADVANCE LOANS - If this is a multiple advance loan, you and 
J expect that you will make more than one advance of principal. If this is 
closed end credit, repaying a part of the principal will not entitle me to 
additional credit. 
SET-OFF - I agree that you may set off any amount due and payable 
under this note against any right I have to receive money from you. 
"Right to receive money from you" means: 
( 1 ) any deposit account balance I have with you; 
(Z) any money owed to me on an item presented to you or in your 
possession for collection or exchange; and 
(3) any repurchase agreement or other nondeposit obligation. 
amo~~'{ or~hi~i'; y~~ ~n{;tl~d-t~ d~~~nd p~vment under the terms of 
this note at the time y. _ set off. ThiS total In .,s any balance the due 
date for which you properly accelerate )te. 
If my right to receive money from Nned by someone who 
has not agreed to pay this note, your et-off will apply to my 
interest in the obligation and to any oth "ts I could withdraw on 
my soie request 01 eIlJuISt:lllt!nt. '(our righ e~-off docs not ;JPP!Y to 
an account or other obligation where my rights .. are only. as a 
representative. It also does not apply to any IndiVIdual Retlfement 
Account or other tax-deferred retirement account. 
You will not be liable for the dishonor of any check when the dishonor 
occurs because you set off this debt against any of my accounts. ! agree 
to hold you harmless from any such claims arising as a result of your 
exercise of your right to set-off. . 
DEFAULT - I will be in default if anyone or more of the follOWing oc.cur: 
t 1) I fail to make a payment on time or in the a.mount due; (2) I fat! to 
keep the Property insured, if required; (31. I fall to pay, or keep anI' 
promise, on any debt or agreement I have With you; 141 any other creditor 
of mine attempts to collect any debt lowe him thr?ugh court 
proceedings; (5) I die, am declared incompeten!. make an asslgn~e~t. Jor 
the benefit of creditors, or become insolvent (either because my liabIlities 
exceed my assets or I am unable to pay, my debt.s as ~he'y becon:-e duel: 
(5) I make any written statement or provide any fmanclal Infor matl.on that 
is untrue or inaccurate at the time it was provided; (7) I do or fall to do 
something which causes you to believe you will have difficulty collecting 
the amount lowe you; (8) any collateral securing this note IS used i~ a 
manner or for a purpose which threatens confis<?ation by a legal authOrity; 
19) I change my name or assume an additIOnal ~ame without. first 
notifying you before making such a change; 1101 I fail to plant, cultivate 
and harvest crops in due season; (11) any loan proceeds are used for a 
purpose that will contribute to excessive erosion of highly erodible I,and or 
to the conversion of wetlands to produce an agriCUltural commodity, as 
further explained in 7 C.F.R. Part 1940, Subpart G, Exhibit M. 
REMEDIES - If I am in default on this note you have, but are not limited 
to, the following remedies: . 
111 You may demand immediate payment of all lowe you under thiS 
note (prmcipal, accrued unpaid Interest and other accrued unpaid 
charges). 
(2) You may set off this debt against any right I have to the payment 
of money from you, subject to the terms of the "SETHOFF" 
paragraph herein. 
(3) You may demand security. additional security, or additional parties 
to be obligated to pay this note as a condition for not using any 
(4) y~:r ~~~~~r~se to make advances to me or allow purchases on 
credit by me. 
(5) You may use any remedy you have under state or federal law. 
(6) You may make use of any remedy given to you in any agreement 
securing this note. 
By selecting anyone or more of these remedies you do not give up 
your right to use later any other remedy. By waiving your right to declare 
an event to be a default, you do not waive your right to consider later the 
event a default if it continues or happens again. 
COLLECTION COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES - I agree to pay all costs 
of collection, replevin or any other or similar type of cost If I am in 
default. In addition, if you hire an attorney to collect this note, I also 
agree to pay any fee JOu incur with such attorney plus court costs 
(except where prohibite by lawi. To the extent permitted by the United 
States Bankruptcy Code, I also agree to pay the reasonable attorney's 
fees and costs you incur to collect this debt as awarded by any court 
exercising /'urisdiction under the Bankruptcy Code. 
WAIVER - give up my rights to require you to do certain things. I vvill not 
require you to: 
(1) demand payment of amounts due (presentment); 
(2) obtain offiCial certification of nonpayment {protest}; or 
(3) give notice that amounts due have not been paid {notice of 
dishonorl. 
I waive any defenses I have based 0':1 suretyship or impairment of 
collateral. 
OBLIGATIONS INDEPENDENT - I under stand that I must pay this note 
even if someone else has also agreed to pay it {by. for example, signing 
this form or a separate guarantee or endorsement}. You may sue rne 
alone, or anyone else who is obligated on this note. or any number of us 
together, to collect this note. You may without notice release any party 
to this agreement wi~hout releasing any other party. If you give up any ~f 
your rights, with or without notice, it will not affect my duty to pay thiS 
note. Any extension of new credit to any of us, or renewal of this note by 
all or Jess than all of us will not release me from my duty to pay it. IOf 
course, you are entitled to only one payment in full.) I agree that you may 
at your option extend this note or the debt represented by. this note, or 
any portion of the note or debt. from time to tIme without limit or notice 
and for any term without affecting my liability for payment of the note. I 
will not assign my obligation under this agreement without your prior 
R~~~C1Af'INF6RMATION - I·agree to provide you, upon request, any 
:h~~n~~:' fi~~~eciajns\a~~~n:~~::~~in¥~rum~i:n ~e;rr;;vid~c~~s~~~. ~rew:rrr!t7!i 
be accurate, correct and complete. 
PAYMENT BY CHECK ~ If any payment on this note is made with a check 
that is dishonored, I agree to pay you a $20.00 fee. 
SIGNATURES: I AGREE TO THE TERMS OF THIS NOTE !INCLUDING THOSE ON PAGES 1 AND 21. I have received a copy on today's date. 
DUANE YOST 
SIGNATUREFORLENDER: ______ ~~~~~~~~~~--------------------------------------------______________ ___ 
THOMAS J. ROMR 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT: STATE OF IDAHO, __________________ County ss: 
On this _____ day of _______________ before me __________________ , a Notary Public in and for said 
county and state, personally appeared ____________________________________ , known or identified 
to me (or proved on the oath of ). to be the person{s) who executed this instrument, and 
acknowledged to me that executed the same. 
In VVitness whereof I have set my hand and affixeD my seal the day and year first above written, 
Notary Public residing at: 
(The Borrower's signature should be notarized when a secured interest is lak:en in a motor vehicle.) 
~ ©1984. 1991 Bankert Systems, Inc .• 51. ClOud, MN Form VNS·LAZ~ID 2/9/2001 (p3ge .3 of 3} 
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TRACT I: 
LEGAL DESCRIPTION 
EXHIBIT 'A' 
Beginning at a point that is South 89°55'28" West along the Section line 1326.98 feet from the 
North ~ Corner of Section 10, Township 1 North, Range 38 East of the Boise Meridian; running 
thence South 89°55'28" West along said Section line 1236.12 feet to the South Right-of-Way line of 
65tb South; thence along said South Right-of-Way line of 65th South and the East Right-of-Way line 
of 25th East the following three (3) courses; South 00°12'54" East 28.10 feet to a point of curve with 
a radius of 69.34 feet and a chord bearing South 44°18'28" West 98.29 feet; thence to the left along 
said curve 109.24 feet through a central angle of 90°16'00"; thence South 89°10'28" West 28.71 feet 
to the West line of said Section 10; thence South 00°19'04" East 1213.86 feet to the South line of the 
North Yz of the Northwest ~ of said Section 10, thence North 89°54'09" East along said South line 
1327.87 feet; thence North 00°03'13" West 1312.06 feet to the POINT OF BEGINNING. 
That portion thereof conveyed to the State of Idaho by that deed recorded on March 8, 1950 in 
Book 70 of Deeds at Page 287 of Official Records of Bonneville County, Idaho. 
Exhibit "C" 
Req,,,,,,,Gd By: 
m:;1l/lItt1lf~'~1'l!llI 
m~ SW1li 2i11l BST.P £.1&51 IM!$fAU.<. JO-e:J4V3 
RIrtUffi To; 
THflWJ, Df ~JrllCIl 
1113sntml15TlH,tSr.p1l.IelrJ 
IMlla:fi<!LB.IO ~ 
Prep"".a By: 
T!l£ ~~ Ilf C!JJ!I!fRtHllOl'lSlSTAA11U:!I 
ln~!i!ll1lJlisl1l£.UT.f.o, 1887 
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EXHIBIT 
2. COllNEYAIIl(;E. For good and valuable consideration, !he receipt and sufficiency of which 
is acknowla<:!ged, and to secure the Secured Debt (hereaftfll' oofinsdj, Gramor irr",vocably 
grants, bargains, salls ~ conv!!tVs to T rus:too, in trust fIJr the b<lf"l'Ofit at Lend"f, with 
power of sale. tha following described pfop;my: 
SEE EXHlBlT '/\' WH1CilIS It TfACltED KERETU Al\!O MllOE A PART HEREOF. 
The property is locatad in ..!:1l!l=NIl&=I"'lL""E ___ ---.ICi':O<Il\="'::r) _______ "t _____ _ 
iM&mi 
"'11Wl=.:;:.O.:.:fAll=S'-----;,=-: _____ , Idaho ..!:834M=::.....;;e-;=.--__ 
ratYl IZq> Co,,") 
Togatller with all rights, easemerru., appurtenances, royalties, mineral rights, oil and gas 
righl:$, cropa, timber, all diversion pnyments< or third party payments made to crop 
prodLICM", ;,nd all existing < 3I'ld furur~ ir?provemants, structures, fixtures, and 
replacements that may now, Of at any time 10 tOO future, be part of the real .... tate 
de:seriOOd aboVe (all r&f6lToo to as "Property"), The term ?ropeny also includes, but is not 
runited to, arty and all water wells, watef, ditches, fSservoirs, reservoir sites and dams 
located on the rell! 1lst<!1:e and all riparian and wafs< rights associated with the Property, 
however established. 
3. lIIlAXD\IIUM QBUGATIOlI! U1IIUT. The total principal amount of tim Secured Debt lherelrlter 
dsfin.ed) s~ad by this Deed of Trust at any OM time shall not exceed 
~ l,!l1lO,llOO.OO . This limitation of amount d()es not include interest, loan 
chargos, cOmmitm0nt t""", bro!<srags commissions, attorneys' fees and othsr charges 
valM:lly mada purSU<llnt to mil; Deed of Trust and doos: not apply to advances 1<>1" <interest 
accrutld on such advaoc!!s} marle 1Jnder the terms of this D<eed 01 Trust to protect 
Lender's secqrity and to perform any of the covenant:r contai[)!Kj in this Deed oi Trust. 
Future advanCes are c;opwmplatad and, along with other future obliglnions, are sectJ(ed 
by this Dead of Trust even though an or pIlrt may not yet be advanced. Nothing in this 
Deed of Trust, howev"" shall constitute a commitment 10< make additional or futute Ioa.n:s 
Of advances :in any amount. Arry such commitment would < need to be ~reed to in a 
lJepllr/rte writing. < 
4. SECOOED DEBT DEflL'!ED. The term ~~ured DOOt" includes. but is not limited to, tha: 
following: . < 
A. The promissory note/s} , contract,s), guaranty(ies) or other svidence of dabt 
de$criOOd below and all s"tensions, ... ,.",waI5, modificati.:.ns or st.Ibstitutions 
IEvidence of Debt) (e.g., borrf)wef's name. OOt8 amounr. interest Tale. matan·tv < 
ckste): 
~TE UA TED 1112 tmlOll FOR OUAllE YO Sf iii TIlE AMOtmT OF * I.DOO.IIOO.Ou. LOAPI WlU M.8. T!Jilf ON 
UJZ1J2Dtl9. 
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B. All f<.lture advancas from Land<>t to Grantor o.r othe;" futu>e ooligations of Grantor to 
Lander under any promissory note, contract, guaranty, or other evidence of ooot 
exir;tin{! now or executed after this Dee"; of Trust whether or not this Deed of Trust 
is sp!!Cif=Uy referroo to in the evk\ance of ~t. 
C. AfI·obligations Gram<;>r owes to lendar, which MW exist or may later ari""" to ths 
exter.t not prDhibitGd by law. including, but: 001 limitoo to, liabilities far overdratts 
relatir-.g to any deposit account ;;grooment hatw~n Grant(}f and Lender. 
D. All additional .:>1Jm!< advancad and expanses mcurred by LaMer for insuring, 
preserving Dr othGrwisa protecting the Property and its vs.lue and any otlwr sums 
advancGd and expenses: incUrred by Lender under the terms of this DeEX:! of Trust, 
plus: interest at the highest rata in effect, from time to time, as provk!ed in the 
Evid~nc<> of Debt. 
E. Grarit(}f's perfOfll1a~ un~r the renns of any instrument evioonCing a dOOt by 
Grantor to Lender and any Dead of Trust securirog, guaran1YirIg, or otherwise 
relating to the debt. 
tf mora than 000 p<lrson signs this DM<! of Trust as Grantor, each Grantor agrees that 
this Deed Of Trust will !lacUfe all future advances and future obligations OOS1::ribed above 
that Bfe given to or IncLli1'ed by any ooe Of more 'Grantor, or anyone Of more Grantor al'ld 
othsrs. This Deed of Trust will nat secure any other ckilit if Lender f<>ils, with r~t to 
such other debt, to make any required disclosure about this Deed of Trust 01' if Lender 
fails to give any r&quir~ IlOtice of the right of resci~lon. 
5. PAYUmTS. Grantor agre&S to mai:e aH payments on the Secured Debt WMn due ·and in 
accordancO with the terms of the Evidence of D&bt or this Dead of Trust If any note 
oviclelicing the Securod Debt contains a Itam.~ rate feature. Grantor aci:nowfedges that 
the interest rate, p!!yment terms, or balance due on the loan may he indexed, adjusted, 
renewed or renegotiated. 
6. WARRANTY Of TITlE. GrantOl COVerulfll:S th:lt Grantor is lawfully wi;:ed of the estate 
conveyed. by this De~d of Trust and has the right to irrevoCably I1rant, cOfIvey and sell to 
Trustee, In trust, with power 01 sale, the Property and warrants !:hat the Prop&rty is 
uneneumbared, except lor encumbrances of racl>rd. 
7. CLAlIlIIS AGAINST TInE. Grantor will pay air taXes, aswssmerrts, I;"ns, encumOranc<1s, 
lease payments, ground rents, utilities, and other charges relating to ~ Property wh&n 
due. lenrlaa' may require Grantor to provide to Lender copies of aU ootiee. that such 
amoUJ'fts aie due and the rac:eipts evidencing Grantor's payment. Grantor will OOfend title 
to the Property it{jaiOllt any· cll<ims that would impair the lien of this Deed of Trust. 
Grantor agree.s tn a~gn to lender, as raqu&Sted by lender, any righu, claims or 
dfliemes :-vhich Grantor may have against parties who supply labor Of materials to 
improve or: m8intain the Pro?".rty. 
8. PRKlR SECURITY tNfB:IESTS. Wrth rt'llard to any ott- mortgage, .deil'd of tr=t. sacurity 
agrasmertt Of other lien document !hat "r~ad a prior ","curity imerm Of encumbraOC<! on 
the Property 8nd th.rt rr.ay have priority ovef this Deed 0. f T rurt, Grantor agrees: 
A. To make all payments when due md to p"rlorm or comply with an covarmnta. 
B. To prompt/v deliveno Lemlar any ooticas that Grantor recaives from the halder. 
C. ,",ot.tn ma!:e Of permit any madiiication or extenSion of, and !'lOt to request Clf 
acc>:pt any tutur" advances ~ any. no.te or agreement secured by, tM other 
mortgage, dMd of trUSt or sacunty agreemlmt ~ .Lander coossntS in writing. 
9. DUE ON SAlE OR ENClJf;.'iBRAlIICE. Lender may, at rts option, declare the anurs balance 
of the S<3cured {)(,bt tn !Nt immediately due and payable upon the craation of any lien, 
encumbrance, transfer, or sale, or contract for any· of these on the Property. However it 
the Propatty includes Grantor's resiOOnce, this :;eCtic>n shaH ~ sub~ to the restrictiC:ns 
imposed by fed3ral law 02 C.F.R. 591', asapplicahle. For the puTpOSe:l of this section 
the Tarm "?Topert)'o !llstl includes any interest to all or 'my part at the Property. ~ 
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COV'6rlant shaU fUn with '1he Property and shall fe.'"TI<\in in effect until tOO Secured Debt is 
p3id in full and this Desci of Trust is rele~. 
10.IRAIIlSfER OF AN !NTEREST IN THE GAAMfOR. Lander may dflmooci imma4iata payment 
of tOO debt(:ol if Grantor is (lOt a narural person and fails to obtain lender' $" prior wriw!f\ 
col'l5ent before organf.cing, merging into. or =iidsting with an Im.tity; acquiring all. or 
substantially ,,11 of W assets of another; m<ltarially chmging tOO legal strl.!CtJJre, 
man"9'>,:nant, ow~p Of iinancial condhion; of eftecting Crt entoring into a 
domestication, coovEirsion or intJmlst exchanga. 
11. ENTITY WAERAI'fllES AM> REPRES8llTATIONS. If Grantor is an entity other than a 
natural pefson (such as a corporn~. Of other organization), Granter mar.es to lender tOO 
following watTarmes arod r~rasentatiOl1!l Which shall be continuing as long as tho) Sscurlld 
Debt ,emain~ OIJ1stand"mg: 
A. Grantor is an Mtitt. which is duly orgaoiz&d and valiclly existing in th" Grantor's 
state of ir\COrporation {or organization}. Grantor is in good standing in all states in 
which Grantor uansaets business. Grantor has the power and a~ .to own the 
Pro!isrty and t<> =tV on its businSl>S as now being cooducted and, as applk:abla, is 
Qualif~d to do w in each state in Which Grantor operates. 
B. The Ilxecution, defrvery and periDrm<>nc:e of this Desd of Trust by Grantor arod the 
obligation evi<hnced by thll EvidllOCElo of Dabt are within the power of Gtentor. have 
be!)n duly authorited, hav/! receivoo all MCe!lSllry governmental approval, liM will 
not violate any prCJYision of law. or ordfilr of court or gove:nm=tal agency. 
C. Other than di3clO'S'ed in writing Grantor has not changed its name within the las1: 
ten ·years and M$ not us&<:! any othar tradq or ficliti,,~name. Without Lender'" 
poor written CQ\'l5ent, Grantor C!O<>S not and will no-t USa any othar nama and will 
preserve its existihg nama, tradA IUJl7leS and ir~s until th3 Seeurod Debt is 
satiSfied. . 
12.. i"ROPERTY CONDITION. ALTERATlOlIIS AND INSPECTION. Grantor will teep the 
Propllrty in good condition and make all relX'irs that aTO reasonably necessary. Grnntuf 
wiR givE> Lender prompt notice of an,! lOss Of damage to the Property. Grantor will ke.ep 
toa Property tree of M)(iaUS weeds and grasses. Grantor will· not initiJOO, join in or 
c:on:sent to any change in any private fOlStrictiv" covenant. zoning O{dinance or other 
pubflC or private restriction limiting or defining the Ill!8S which may be made of the 
Property or any part of the Propsrty. without Lend"r's prior writtan COO3ent. Grnntor will 
notify . Lender of all demands. pr~dings. clhim:s.,. and aoclio"" !:gains! Grantor or any 
othar owner made under law or regul"tiOll regarding U~, t>wnll~hipand occUpancy of 
the Property, Grantor will compiy with all 1eQl!l1 requirsmenta ... nd rsstricti<m:s., whether 
public or private, with respect to the IJll& of the Pre>p<my. Grantor also agrees that 1M 
natUre of the 0CC1.lpancy S11d uaa will root changa without l6rldar's prior wntten co=ent. 
No PQflion of 1M f>mparty will be remwed, demolished or matmially ~lterod witOOut 
LGndor's prior written consent e~capt th.t>t Gr.mtor has 1M right to remove items of 
p6f$01'1al property comprising a part of tha Property that OOeame worn nr ob:s.cl..te, 
provided that such poo;onal .propsrty is replae&d with other p<Jrsonal PH>peny at 1",1IS1: 
equal in value to 1M replaO!:d perSt:rnal property, fr.w from any ~ retention dovjce, 
~"urity ..gr6$1'nef11; or other encumbrance. Such lepll:l~rn .. nt of f>91"3(mal proparty will be 
deemed sUbject to the security interest crsated by this Dood of TOJrt. Grantor shall not 
partition or subdivide the Property without L9nder's prior written cOMllnt. Lc.nder Of 
Lender's agents may. at l..endflf·~ option, enter the Propetrty at any reaSOMbie time tor 
the purpose of inspm;ting the Property. Any inspection of tho Prop:.rty shall ~ entirely for 
Lender's benefit and GraotDr will jn no way rely on l"oder'~ in~. 
13.Al1THOi!ITY TO PERFORM. If Grantor fails to perfocm any of Grantor's dutiw under this 
DalJd of Trust, or any other mortgage. deed of trl.l!rt. eecurity agreement .or other lien 
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document" that has priority 'w .... this D-cl of Trust. L~ m'ay, without nati=, perform 
the duties ,or causa th«n to 00 pert<»mad, Grantor appoints lender as attorney in fact to 
sign Grantor's "name or pay any amount necasw'Y for performance. If any cDnstruction 
on tl"w Property is discootinuOO o:r not car;iarl on In a .reasonable manner, Lender '!"ay do 
wi1atevl'lf 1$ ~ to protect Lender s secumy" mterest II"i the Property. This may 
include completing the constnJction. " 
Lender'S right to perform for Grantor shall 001 create an oblil}ation to perfonn. and 
Lendar's failure to perform will {""lOt pntclttde Lender from exercising any of Landal"s othar 
tights under tha law or thi:l; Dead of Trust. Any amounts paid by Lenda\" for insuting, 
pressrvin>:!· or otherwise protecting the Property and Lender's security interest will be due 
on demand and will !>sar ,nt .... est from tha date of the payment W"ltil paid in full at the 
interest rata ;n effect from time to time according to the terms of the Evidence of Debt. 
14.ASSIGfil!\iiENT OF LEASES Aim RENTS. Grantor absolutely, unconditionally. irreYo<:aOly 
and immediately assig"", grants, bargains and conveys to L900..r aU the right, titla ard 
interest in the follOwing (Property), 
A. Existing or future leases, suble_s," licenses, {}uaranties" and any oth<lr writt"n or 
verl;ial agreements for the usa 21M oc~ncy oi 1M Propllrty, includil"\lj but rot 
limited to, "any Ilxtensions, rlID6wals, modifications or f~cBments ILeues). 
B. Rents, issues and profits, including but not lilTlited to, security deposits, minimum 
rentS, pero~ rente, addit;iQna1 mot:!;, common area maintenance chaT~, 
parl'ing charges, l13al estate taxes, othar applicable taxes," insurance premium 
coniiibutions, liquidated damage's following default. can<::ellation premiUms, ·1= of 
rents· ;Mun .... C&, guest receipt:<. revar'll.J6S", royalties. proceeds, bonuses, accounu, 
cootract rigtIts, general intangible6, and all rights aM cl2;im~ which Grantor may 
have that in any way pertBin to or are on account of the we Of occupar.cy of the 
whole or any part 01 the Property (Rents}. 
In the avant any itllm I~Gd /lS"Leases or Rents is detarmiOi'Kl to be petwnal Pfoperty, this 
Assignmant will 11/.$0 00 regarded as a security ogreemerrt. 
Grantor will promptly provi~ Lender with COp'BS of the Leases ard will certify the:se 
Leas"s are true- and cOrrect copm. The existing Lfll'.IS9l> wiH b'3 provitk,xj on execution of 
the A~nment( and all futute lee""'5 and Bny other iniormation with re:sp!X:t to these 
Leases win be ptpvidod immediately after they ara axecutoo. Let>der g ... ntS Grantor a 
ravocab~ IiCMSe to collect, receive, enjoy and = the Rents <tS long as Grantor is not in 
default. Grantor's default automatically and Iml'l'looiately revokes this license. Grantor wi!! 
not collect in advance any REln~ due in future !ea.se periods, unless Grant<)/" fir>rt oi:>tains 
Lander's written consent. Amounts collected will ba applied at Lender'lI di3cretion to the. 
Secured Debts, the costs of managing, prof{<Cting and preserving the Property, and other 
necessary ,expenses. Upoo default. Grantor will mceive any Rents in trust f<>l" Land6r and 
Grantor will' not corrifllingle the Rents wim any other ful"llls, Whsn Lander so dire;::ts, 
Grantor will endorse and d&/iYar "frY p"yme~ of ,Rtmts from trn. Property to Lender. 
Grantor agrees that LendGr will not be considered to be a mortgagf.'le-in-possession by 
executirtg :this Security InstrUment or by collecting or receiving paymatrts on trn. s.r.cUleO 
Debts, but only may l:>ecome a mC>rtyagll<H~~lon aftar Grantor's lie"""", to collect 
receive, enjoy and, usa the Rents is revolced by Lander or autometicRlly revol::ad 0; 
Grantor's defaUlt, and lander takes acrual possession of the Property, Corn;equant/y, until 
L~ar t1J:I{ss ~l pt>!l8ession of th<: ~, Larder is ""!t obligatad to pe.riotm or 
dlllcherga ,any obhgatlon of Grantor under '1M Leaes, appear In or defend any a.ct>on or 
proc:oodjng relating to the Rents, tOO La.a8eS or the Prwerty. or be liab«; in any way for 
any injury or damage to any parson or property susti:tiried in or aixx.Jt ths Property. 
Grantor ag~ milt this Security Instrument is immediately effective between Grantor and 
Lender at>d effective as to third paTties on the recording ,of this ~gnment. 
As long as this Assignment is in effect, Grantor warrants Md represents tMt no dMault 
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eKist!. under the Lease:., and the partj<os subject to the ~ tBve not violated any 
applicabl-e law on laases, rlCanSaS and land1<Jrds and tenants. Granto!. at its sola cost and 
allpen!M>, will kaep, obsarva and pcrlonn, and reqcire all other partWs to the Leases to' 
comply \'\1M the Lea'seg and any applicable lew. If Grantor or any party to th9 Laasa 
dciaultll or folls to obslmIe any applicable law, Grantor will promptly notify L"nd9f. If 
Grantor neglects or leMes to enforce compliance with 1119 mom 01 the leases, than 
lendar may, at Lender't opljon, enforce compliance. 
Grantor , ... ,," not subi<rt, modify, extend, cancel, or otherwise aiter too Leases, or ~t 
the surrender. af tha Property covered by tlw Leases tunl.ess the ~ l>O require) 
without lender's COf'L';el1t. Grantor will not assign, compromise, !iubordi~ or enc;pmber 
tM Leases and Rent:! without Laruler's prior written consent .. Landsf does. not al!S'.Jme or 
become liable ·for the Property's mai~ne..;, depreci&tion, or othar foss<,s or d1llrrlllgss 
when iArI<fuf ~ts to mansga, protect or preServe the Propel'1Y, exCGpt for losses and 
damages doo to Lender's gross neglia9!l!Cs or intentional torts. Otherwisa, Grantor will 
indemnify Lendef and hold Lender harmless for an liability, loss or damaga that Lent!£,r 
may incur when Lander opts to exercise any of its remedies against any party obligated 
underthe~. 
15. COI'IDoMI:N.iUMS: ~ UMT DEVElOPMENTS. If the Property includM a unit in a 
condominhlm or It planned unit dsvGlopmoot, Grantor will' perform all of Grantor'" dt.rties 
under the c'ovenants, by-1aws, Of regulations of tho Condominium or pIa.....m unat 
developrm.nt. 
16. DEFAOLT. Gruntor will 00 in default if any of the followir.goccu,! 
A. Any party obllg;itad on the Secursd Debt fails to make payment when dua; 
B. A bl13ilC/1 of arr; term or covenant in this Deed of Trus1., any prior mortgage or any 
construction loan a)Jrooment, security· lI9regmant or any other document 
evidencing, guarantying, ~u(jng 01 o1harwiM MlatiniJ to the Securoo Debt; 
c. The ma/dng or furnishing of any vet'bal .or .written rapresantBtion, ~ment 0' 
warrant)' to Lander thlIt is false or incorrect in 00'1' material r\lS~t by Grantor or 
any parSon or &otiry obligated on the Secured Dabt; 
D. Tho death, dIssolution, or iO$Olvency of, app-t>intment of a racaivar for, Of 
applicati'on of any debtor relief law to, Grantor or any parson or entity obf.gatad on 
the SecUred Dabt; 
E. A good' faith baliBf by Le!1OOr at aery time that Lander is insecure with respect to 
any pen.on or 'llnUty obf'1'latoo on the Secured Debt or that the prospect of any 
payment- is impaired or the value of the ~ is impaired; 
F. A m,,1mia1 Mvilra" chnnga in Grnnror's husi ..... SlI including ownership, maMg~, 
and finaincial cvndi1ioll3. which Lwnder in its opinion be~vas Impairs the value of 
til" property or ropayrrK1nt of the Secured Dabt; or 
G. Any 'Ioan proceeds ara used for a pulp9S3 that will contribute to excessive efl>sion 
of highlY ~Jodible land or to the =nvetSion ()f wWaOOs to ~rodUCQ an ~ricultu .... 1 
commod"rty, (f)$ fl.lrtfler explai03d in 7 C,F.R. PM '940, Subpart G, ExhibltM. 
17. RSJlEDIES ON OEFAUL T. In 50me instances., federal and .state h.w will requite L~ to 
provide Grantor with notice of tho right to ctI1B. msOlation notices or othel' notice!r and 
. may ~blish 'time BChadUl93 fOf foreclosure actions. Subject to tfws& limitations:, if any, 
Lender rrnry acceleratE> tho SaCurad Debt and forec\osG this Dood of Trust in a manrwr 
proVided by law if this GrantOr is in det!lult. 
At the opticm 9f Lender. all or any part of the agreed fees and chargag, acerood il'lterel:t 
I>!1d principal shall become immediately d ..... and payable, attar giving notice if mquirsd by 
ll;w, upon th6. oce~ of a dafeult or aI'Iytima thereafter. In .addition. Lend& shall be 
antitled to all the rematf~s provided by law, the Evidel'lCG'of Debt,. otJw.r evider.=s of 
debt, u,;s De«! of Trust and any rel2ltsd documents, including without limitation, tho 
powe, to S&I! tha Property. 
~5'13I2a¢B 
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If th<>re is a default, Trustee shlclt. in addition to any othar permitted ~em~, at the 
raquest of L.mdar, advertisl;> and sell the Property as a whole or in separate parcels at 
p<Jblic auction to ilia high= bidder to-r cash and convey sbsohlre title tie€! and clear of 2>11 
right, title and interest of GrnntO( at such time and place as Trustee deaig~. Trustee 
shall give notice of sale including the time, tarms. and place of sala and a description of 
the property to be sold as required by t:I"I& appllC<lbkt taw in effect at me time of lha 
proposed sale. 
Upon sale of the Property and to t!lt? extent not prohibited by law, Trustee :smP make and 
derNer a ~ed to the Property sold which conveys absolute titla to ~ purchaser, and 
afta{ first paying aU fees, ehAr~ and =, $hall pay tD lender all moneys adv"nceQ for 
repairs, taXes, insurar.ce, liens, essessments and poor encumbrnnce5 and intereSt 
thereon, and the principal and Interest on the Secured Debt, paying the surplus, IT any, to 
Grantor. lander may purchase the Property. The recitals in an\, deed of conveyance shall 
be prima facie evidence of tOO fact:: ~at forth tMrain. 
AM r~medies are distil'lCt,. ~umlJlAtive and flOt exclusiva, and Lender is entitled "In all 
remedies provided at law or equity, whether expressly set forth or not. The acceptance 
by Lender of any sum in payment Of partial payment on tM Secured Debt aftar the 
balance is: due or is accelerated or after !oreolosUle proceedings are filed shal! not 
constitute a waiver allender's right to require full and complete cure of any existing 
default. By not exercising any remedv on Grantor's defoolt, lender does not waive 
Lander's right to later c:orntider the ellent a default if it continues Of happens agam. 
1S.EXf'9lSES; ADVANCES ON COVEHAI'ITS; AlTOftREYS' FEES; COLLECTION COSTS. 
Except when prohibiwd by law, Grantor agrees to pay aU at lender's expensas if Grantor 
t>reachss any covenant in this Deed of Trust. Grantor will also pay on demanrl all of 
Lender's expenses incurred in collectil'lg. insuring, pr<'lserving Of protecting the Property or 
in any inv.entoriot, audim, inspections or other axllmimrtJon by Lendar in fQspsct to the 
PropertY. Grantor flflrae:s to pay all costs and OXpen5<>S incurred by Landa. in enforcin{} Q(" 
protecting Lender's rights and renl!xlies under thill' Deed of Tn.l5t, including, but· not 
limited to, a~n8ys' fe~, court costs, and other legal elCp¢l'l!IaS. Ones the Se>Cl.lfed Debt 
is fully and finally paid, L<mdei agr<>es to release this Dee<! of TrlASt and Grantor agrees to 
pay for any recordation costs. All such amounts: are dUG on demand and will hear illtero:n 
from ths time of the advance at 'the highest rate in effect, from time to time, 8S provided 
in the Evidence of !}cbt and as permitted by law. . 
'9.~A1. LAWS AND HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES. As wed in this section, III 
"Etwironmef1tal Law· means, without limitation. ilis Comp,,~l'lene;j'le Environmental 
Response, Compensation and liability Act (CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. 9601 at seq.), all other 
fsd&al, state and 1C>Cal lilws, r&gulations. ordlnallCe!:. court orders, at"tamay gener;:;! 
opinions or interpretive Iettere cOllC&rl'ling the puhlic health, wety, welfare, .envirOll11lallt 
or a hazaflioUll swmnce; and (2) "Hazardous: Sllhstance" means any to)<ic, radioactive 
or hazardous materml, waste, pollutant or contaminant which has characteristics: which 
render the submnce dangeorous or potentially dangaoos to the public health, safety, 
welfare or. aIlvirQliment. TIl3 term includes, without limitation, any substances thtfiood a.s 
"hazardoui material.~ "toxic ~c;es,. "hazardCJUS waste" 0( °hazardous substance" 
untk>r ;my. Environmental Law. Grantor repre.wnts, warrantS and agrees that, except as 
previously disclosed and ac:i:.nowl&dged in writing: 
A. No : Hazardolll1 Subl>Ulnce 1= been, is, or will btl· located, transportDd, 
manufactured. treated, refined, or handl¢d by any person on, under or about the 
Property, excsp1 in the, ordinary course Qf busmess and in strict compliar.ce wr.h all 
applicable Enviwnmental Law. 
B. GraritDr has ClQt and wi" not cause, contribute to, or parmit the re!ea!le of !lny 
Hazardous Subl:tance on the Property. 
£g ¥ f%·i&&!!f, ... 6@ f +st 
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C. Grantor will immcdiatoolv notify Lenrler if (1) a re!Gas<> Of threatened release bf 
Hazardous SubGtDn':.e occurs an, under or i?ibo<.rt '\he Property or m~ br 
tnre;atEmS to migrate from. nearby property; or (2) thareo is 1) ~.... of ahy 
i:(wtrOflffiental Law conce!T1lng tl1e Property. In such an WGm, Grantor will T.alce an 
~ry ralMdial action in ae=rda~ with· Environmental law. 
D. Grantor has no knowk:dglJ of or reason to believe there is any pending or 
threatened inv~ation, claim, or pr~mg of any kind relating to (1) any 
Hazaidooo Sr.Jbstanca located on. urnler Of alxlut the Property; Of !21 any violation 
by Gran!:<!< or any tenant of any Environmental Law. GrantOf will immediately notify 
Lender in writing as soon as Grantor has reas;on to OOliave tllare is any such 
pending or thrMtetl<ld investigation, claim, or proc!>edil'lg. In =h an avent. Lenrler 
has the right, I:>ut not the obligation. to participat~ in any such pr-oceOOing inc/t.'(iing 
the riilht 'to receiv& copias of arry documents ralming to ~h.pr~iogs. 
E. Grantor and BVI!:S¥ tenant Oav<l been •. ara and shall rem'''n 10 fuji compliance with 
any aj:IpIiC<1b1e Environm.mta/ law, 
F. ThaN!i 13!'a no unGerground stornge tanks, private dumps or open wells located on Of 
under: the ?Tapait'( and 00 such tanl:.. dump or wall will 00 added llr!!a:m lender 
first cornrents in writing. 
G. Gt>.!ntOr will rGgu!:lrly. inSp<>ct the ProJWrtY, monitnf the activitiss and Of><fr!\ti0n9 <in 
the PToparty, ;md confirm that all permits, liceNeS' Of app<QValS required by any 
apprKiable Erivironmental law ara obtainGd end comp!;ed with. 
H, GrantOr will permit. or caUSe arry tailant to. P4JflTiit, Lander Of l6l'><.!er~1l Elli"nt 10 
anil!r : and inspect the Property and review all recon:Is at any reaoorsbla tima 10 
datarrnina {11 the <lxistet1ce, Ioci'it«>n and nature of any HazarnousSuimanc<o 0;'1, 
under: or about the Prop<my; {21 the Gxistsnce, location. n&tufa, and magniwik t>f 
any Ha~us Substnr.ca thet has belan raloa.ad on, undM or 1l>00ut the Pr-oJertv; 
or {31 whether or not Grantor nnd arry tenant are in cQlTJpliance with appiibble 
Enviroomental Law. : 
I. Uptm: Lend",r's re-quQst and at any tim", Grantor "gr",!!,;, at Gramor':! expens:e. to 
engage & .qualifllJd environmental engineer to prepare an Gnvironmemal audit of the 
Propafty and to submit the results of such audit to Lender. Th9 choice of the 
I>nvironmantal anginaar who will parform weh audit is subject to Lenclef's approval. 
J. Lendaf f,alI the right, but not the obligation. to periorm any of Gmntor'& ohli{jations 
under· this :;acticm at Grantor's axp6n$!'i, 
K. As a consequence at any bl'\!ilach af any representation, warranty Qr promise made-
in this section, {~l Gl'antor will indemnify and hold LBf1{ler and Lend&r'~ successor:; 
or asSIgns harmless ~rom and against all 108118&, claims, dsmands, 1iabiliti<K, 
damages, cbanup, tasponse· Iknd remediation . costs, penaltle:r and expemres, 
including without limitation all costs of litigation and atto~ys' ioos, whiCh LendBr 
and lenOOr's ~rs at assigru tru!>y sustain; at>:! 121 at Lnnda.-'s cftset.mon, 
Lender may rGl9aS8 this Dee<! of :r rust ilnt! in return Gt-arTtor will pl"C'il'iOO l:endsr 
with OOIllrtarnl of at ~ &Qtml vakle to tha Proparty secured by this Dood of Trust 
withoUt prejudice to any of Lendar's ri{frIts under this n-d of Trust. 
L ~nding any at th<!> languaqe containad in 1M: .~ of Trust to the 
contniry, the terms of mit section shall survive. any foreoloaura Of satisfaction of 
this Dood of Trost regardless of 3l1Y. ~ of, title to Lern:ler or any disI=i'iion by 
Lender of any or all of tt.e Pt<>r>erty. Arr{ claims al'd daflmS!)S to the contrary are 
hsr$by waived. 
20.CONDSIilIMATlON. Grantor will giVe Lender prompt notica of any action, rsal ar 
threatel19d . by private or public antitl~ to t>UrcOO$e or mite any or all of the Proparty, i~ ~nY 8i!3OOlent3, 1hroUgh condemnation. eminent demilin. or any ~r means. 
Grantor fu~t agroos to notify Lenoor of any ptOC;!ledingz imtituted for the establishment 
~~~~o 
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of arty sewer, water, conservation, ditch, dmil13g&, or om", district .relati."1fl to or binding 
upon the Property Of any par.: of n. Grantor autlwrizes Lander to intervene in Grantor's 
name in anlt of the abov& described actions or claims. and to collect and receive all sums 
resultil1\l fr~T1l tOO action or claim .. Grantc:>r 83j)igns. to Lan.1M ~ proceeds of :any award 
or claim fOf damages Ce>nn<l"Cted With a condemns non or other ~ku-.g of a!l or any part of 
the Proparty. Such proceeds shan be COrtSidM<>d payments and will 00 aPfJliad as proviOOd 
in this Deed of Trust. This assignmem 01 proceOOs i,.: subjact to the tanns of any prior 
mortg"ge, dead of i:ru5t, S3curity ag ...... m"nt Of othar lien document. 
21.Irn;URANCE. Grantor .. grees to maintain ir>1iurance as follows: 
A. Grantor shall I:~p 1fu; Property insured .against. loss by fira, than and other hazards 
and risl::.s reasonably associated with the Pro~ due to its typa and location. 
Other hazards and risks may include, for eXI:!mp!f3, coverage agairurt: loss due to 
floods or flooding, Thi(; in'1Ur,,,,ce :<hall be- mairm.inad in ~ amounts and for the 
pt>rioda that Lendef requires. What LeMar requires pursuant to the preceding thi"ee 
sentences can chaflQ1! during the term of the Se<;ured Debt. Tho i."1Sutaf}C8 carrier 
providing the irrsurance shall be cho36n by Grantor subject to lender' 3 approval, 
which shaU not be, unreasonably withheld. If Grantor fail~ to maintain the covar"{le 
deS'Cribei:l above, u.nder may, at Lander's option, obtain coverage to protect 
Lender'.s righh> in the Prop&rty acco,ding to the t<>rms of this Deed of Trust, 
All ireUf2lnce policies and r,""",wals shaH be acceptable to Lender and shall include a 
standard "moctgalJe clause" and, whore applicabla. "lendar loss payee ciatJ<><>.· 
Granter shall immediately notify Ler-.der of cancellation or termination of the 
insurance. Lender :shall have the right to hold the policies and renewals. If LendtJr 
requires, Grantor shall immediatGly give to Lender all receipts of paid premiums and 
renewal notice9. Upon loss, Grantor :mall give immediate notice to the insurance 
C3m..r and Lend.:.,. lander may make p'oof of (om; if not made immediately by 
Grantor. 
Unless Lender and GrantOt otharwiss agree in writing, insurance proceGds s"",,, be 
applied to re!rtDfation or repair of the Proparty damaged if Iha restoration or repaif 
is economically fea!1ible and lender's security is nat lessened. If the restDration or 
repair is I"IOt economically f .... "iQ\<! ·01 Lsndar'!1 lleJCUrity would ba iaMrmed, 'the 
insurance procOOds shall be applied to the Secured Dab!, whether or not then due, 
with any exCa"" paid to Grantor. If Grantor abllndons the Property, or does rot 
"nswar within 30 days a notice from Lender that the insurance c:srrier has offefed 
to sl>t!Je a claim. then L~r may collect the insurance prOCli>.xls, LendQf may uoo 
tha proceeds to fltpair or restore the Proi>srtv or to pay 1ha Secured Debt whether 
or not thMl doo. The 3Cklay period wilJ begin when the notice is given. 
Unless Lender and Grantor otherwis<; agree in writing, any application of p'oceed 
to principal shaH not extend or I»"tpon<! the dUB dA~ of schodulBd p"ymoow or 
change the amounto! tile payman~. If the Property iI; acquired by lander, 
Grantor's right to any insu:-ance polic:ies and proceeds resulting from damage to the 
Propartv before the acquisition shall pass to Lendef to tlw extent of the Secured 
Debt immgdiately bafoH! the acqui:sition, 
B. Grantor agrees to maintain <XIrnprehensive general liability instIfal'lC<> naming Lender 
as an additional insured in an amount acceptable to Lender. insuring against claims 
arising from any aCcident or occurrence in or on !be Propartv. 
C. Grantor agrse3 ~o maintain rental loss or business interruption insurance, as 
'''quired by lender, in an amount equal to at least <XIverage of tm& year's debt 
service, and required escrow account deposits (if "weed to separately in writing), 
under a form of policy acceptable to Lendar. 
~ity~~D 
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22. WO ESCIIDW FQR T~ AND ~RA!<c£. UnJ=:s othenrJisG provided in a ~ 
"!J""'ITI&nt, Grantor wIll nor be rsqu>roo to pay to Lermr funds for =es and mnl1!'anCJa in 
escrow. 
23. ANA.~C!AL ~S AND Jl.OQITlOruAt OOCUMEm'S. Gramor will provide to lenctar 
upon r&qiJS<St, wy finam:ial s,tat(}f();;ci or imo",:,aUon lander may ~ ~ry. 
Grantor Wamlm., that cll fmanclal statemerrl.s .and im~ Gmntor proviOOs to L~ 
are, Of wfll ba. accuratB. correct,. and complete. Gran~or agr~$ tD si\il':. deliver. and fila as 
Lander may reasormbfy requal;t any additional document3 or ~rti:ficati<>ns that lander 
may coMider l'l<lCeS$ary to perfect, cOntinue, and p:-eseNe Grantor'sohli~ under 
this Dood of Tru.rt ar.d LercQer's lien ~tatus on the Proparty. If Granttir fails to do so, 
Lender may sign. deliver. and file such documents or C1)rtificataz in Grant.".' s nama and 
Grantor hereby lrrevOC!ilily appoints Lend<;( or Lender's agent as attorney in fact to do the 
lhings necBSSary to comply with this section. 
24.JOlNT AND Il'WMtIUAL UA'BlUTY: CO-SIGNffiS; SUCCESSORS AND ASSIGNS 
OOUJIID. All duties under this Dood of Trust .are ioint and individual. If GrantN "igns this 
Daeri of Trust but does not sign the Evidence of Debt. Grantor doos so only to mortgage 
Grantor's intafast in the p,.~ to secure payment of the Secured D<lbt and Grant", 
does not Il9"OO to w personally liable, on the Sacure<:\ Delrt. Grantor agre¢S thet Lander-
and any party to this Deed of Trust may Qlctend, modify nr ,rna!:. .. ar.y change in the tenns 
of tiltS Deud of Trust or the Evidance of Debt without Grantor's consent. SUch a chang'" 
will not re~ Grantor from the terms of this 'OGad fA Trust. The duOOs and banafits of 
this ~ of Trurt shaH bind <ind bGrwfit the sucowsots and assigns of Grantor and 
Lander. . 
If this ~ of Trust secures a guaranty bety/een Lender and Grantor and ,does not 
directly S<l(;UI'a tOO obligatior> which is guarantied, Grantor agrees to waive any rights that 
may prevent Lender from bringing any action or claim' ugainst Grantor Of any party 
ir.debtod urni&r the obligation including, but not Iimimd to, anti-dclicieftcy or ona-action 
laws. . 
2S.APPUCA.BLE LAW; SE1lEflABIUTY; II\fTEm'RETATlOf4. Tres- Dead of Trust is governed by 
tOO laws of tha jurisdiction in which Lencl;;r is located, axc<>pt to tOO extant ot/wrwi"" 
TlIQuifed by the lows of the jurisdiction wher!!! t:h<t Property i. !ocatad. This D~ of Trust 
is comp\ata ~ fully intGQl'at.<d. This D" .. d of Tnl!rt may oot bG amended or mOOifi",d by 
oral agreement. Any section or clause in this O$ed of Trust. attachm{)'nts, or any 
3{jraement related to the SeCUfed Debt that conflicts with applicable law will =t b& 
GfiectNr:. unIeS1> that law eKpressly or impliedly pennits the variations by written 
agreement.. If any ooction ,Of clause of "this Deed of Trust cannot bet enforced according to 
it:s tel11'\S, that !le(:UO(o Of claUse will ba severed and will r:ot affect the enforceability of 
the r6lTlainder of this Deed of T run. Wheoover uslXi, the singular shall includs tha plural 
and the plural the singul3l'. Thecap1iOO$ and haadif19s <1 tha sections .of this Dood of 
Tn/l;t are for COIW!1ni~ Oftty and are not to be UIll'ld to Interpret or define the terms of 
this D€l&I of Trust. Time is of tha essence in this DMrl of Trust. 
26. SUCCESSOR musm. Lendar, at Lendef's option, may from time to time remove 
Trustw ond appoint a SUQe9S\;Of ~ by an inttrumemt recorded in the CQumv in which 
this 09;ld of T IWt is recorded. TOO successor t.rus1:ae. with:>ut conveyan= of ttl<! 
Pr0p8rty. shall succwd to IlIn the title, power and duties contorred upon the Trustoo by 
this Deed of Trust and applicable law. . 
27. NOTICE. U~ oths<>twi3jj roquired by law ( any nobee smft b~ given by delivering it at by 
mailing it by first oIasa mail to the appropriate party's address on pago 1 of mis Deed of 
Trust, at 10 art{ tl'!tm addreSs designated in writing. Notice to one grantor will be de$med 
to be notica ~o all grantonl. 
28. WmE1!l$, Exce?t to the 6lCtBot prl)hib~ by I .. !\ov, Grantor waives. &11 rights to h:>mastead 
exemption, IlIppratse>ment or 1hs marshalhng of Iiefls and DlW!'tts relating to the Property. 
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29. DECLARATIO!\!. Grantor ooclaras that the Pr.oP"rty is eitl= located within all incorporated 
city Of village or that the Properry Ie nat mora than forty {401 acres in ar0a regardless of 
its use or locatio..... or not more than eighty (SO) acres in :nea and not principally use<! for 
the agricuhutal production of crops, livestocJ:, dairy or ~c goods. 
30. U.C.C. PROV1StOI'-IS. if checl1.ed, the following ara aw\icsble to, but do not limit, this 
Dead of T= 
o C~ Loon. This Deed of Trust secures an ohligation incurrOO for thG 
cor.str'uction 01 an improvement on tM Proparty. 
o Fixture ftilrig. Grantor grants to Lender a """,urity iot!'Jrest in all 9000$ that Grantor 
owns nov< or ill the future and that ars or will become fixtures related to thG 
Pr~rty. 
o C«:pa; 11m00t-; ~ ~. \t<$W$' mid Proots:. Grantor wanw to LllriOOr a 
00C<Jrity it:tGre1rt in all crop1l, tim~r al1<:i mil:ara\!; Iocated.~ the f'rop<>rty as well as 
all rents, IS:AAI!> al'ld profits of th<>In meruchng. but not limited to, all Coruwrvation 
Remml6 P,ogram (CRP) and Payment in Kind II"iK} paymerrts and similar 
governm(Jntal programs (all of which shall aU;o tre included in 1'00 bmn ·Property-'. 
o ~ Pr~rty. Grantor {I"Ints to LendQI a security inters!>t in ail ~! 
pr0p6rty ~ on or coJ'\OOCtlld with the Proparty. Thn lroCuOty interost ·includes 
all farm products, inventory, equipment. a<;oOI.lI'ltS. documentll, instruments. chattal 
pap9f, g.eneralintangib!es, and an other items of personal property Grantor owns 
now or in 1:hG future and that are llS8d or useful in the consttu<;:tum. OWl'l'.'rshlp, 
operation. rnanagsment. or maintenallCll of the i'rop"l1Y. The term • parnonal 
property" ap<!tcifk:ally Bxd1.ldes that propel1Y described as "household {JOdd,,' 
oocUl'Sd in OOf1OOC:tlon with a 'consumer" Ioan.as th<rn> tOOl1S are defined in 
appflCable fedllnll regulations gQveminy unfair and deceptive cre<frt pmctices. 
o F1f1rtg As ~ Sta:temoot. Grantor agrMs and :,clcnowledg1is lhat thU: Dwd of 
Trust also suffices as a finanolng statement and "" such,. may be filed of r<iCord ll:S 
a financing rttrtement for purpores of Article 9 of thij Uniform .commarcial Cod<!. A 
carbon, photcgraphic, image or ot:!wr reproduction 01 this Dol.'d of Trust is 
sufficient as a final"lCir.g ~atement. 
31. OTHER TERMS. if chacl:ed, the following are "p?~cabla to this Doed of Trust: 
o !.i.rI0 of Crndit. The $&cured Debt includes '" revol\ling lim> of credit prov.=n. 
AlthoUgh the Sacur&d Debt may he reduced tc " z .... c balanc0, this ~ 01 Trust 
will fsmain in effect until released. 
o SepotaW ~. The Grantor has executed or will execute a separate 
assignrrient of ba= and rents. If ths ssparate assignme.nt cf li>aS<lS and rents is 
properly BXe<:uted and recorded, than the saparata assignm"nt will SUp<>~ this 
Security IrW..nJm9nt'g "Assignment of u.....as and A.mt5" section. 
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SIGNATURES: By signing' b<llow, Grantor agree.'! to the terms and C<>YefI>lnts contained in this 
Deed Trust attschments. Grantor also acknowled{les receipt of 11 =py of this Deed of 
Trurt on thadate stated above on ?age 1. 
[j Actual autho£ity Was granted to th9 panias signing below by rElSOlution ~igned Dnd 
dated _________ _ 
Enti~Name: _______________ __ 
IData} 
o Refs( to tOO AddGndum which is attach~ and incorporated herein 'for additional 
-Grantors, siQrnltuTes and ac~nowledgments. 
jig*, 
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STATE OF ___________ • COUNTY Of: _______ } &s. 
"""'- On this day of , oofora rna, 
:;::-....::;,..,. a Not2lry Public, personally app<:!ared __________________ _ 
monl) , known 0( idantified to me 
(or proved to ma on ths oath of j, to 
be the parsOn(,,' whose. name is subscribed to the within instrument, and 
acknowledged to "'" that she!helthey c::ecuted the Silime. 
My commission expire,,: 
-----_._- '-" 
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TO TRUSTEE: 
RBlUEST FOR ru:cO!'NEYAMCE 
iNat to ~ completed until paid in full) 
The undersigMd is tha holder of 1M note or nctes: sacl,ll"Gd by t!-ois Deed of Trust. Said note 
0( notas, ~ with all other indebtedness oocured by this Daed of Trust, ha-va been paid 
in full. You ate hereby directed to csncel ilis Dead of Trust, whlc:h is delivered '-shy, and 
to reeohVey, without warranty. all tha estate now hald by you undar this: DlMd of TI'Us1: to 
the pef'BOtl or persons legally errtitlad~r6to. . 
1319093 
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TRACCI; 
LEGAL DESCRIPTION 
EXHIBIT 'A' 
~ at 3; puint iliat m S<luth 89"55'23" West ruong ~ ~n ilne 1326..!)8 f;:et from the 
NDrth ~ CIlmt:r ofStdii>n 10, To'l'l1lshlp 1 Nf.lrfD., Rlmge 38 East of the &lse M~ i'lml1lh!g 
thence &mtb ~ West !dong z:Pd Sect!oD !In£ 1236.12 feet tn the &>0& Right..of.W"1 Hne (Ii 
6sO South; thence riIoDf said South Rlght-of..Way li!.re of ~ Sollt.!i and the Ea5t Rl;ht-of-Way !me 
01 ~ E2st the- foRolYing ~ (.l) ~ SoIItlt·OO"l1'S4" East 28.10 feet til a paint o( ~ wM1 
" .r-adilm f1f 69.34 fed: nn:d a cfmrd beer!ng Sootb 44"1fl':Z8" West 9a.2!1 feet; ih=e ro tM Mt ~ 
.md CIITVI': 1!l9..24 feet ~ ~ =rtral ~ or.~lQ'OO"'; thme:!: Sollfil ~lO'28" We>t 28.71 feet 
ro the Wert Ilnt: of mUd &ctioll 10; fusee SlJuth 00'1~ E>mt lZ13.3U ~ to &e &ufu line of tbe 
NlJrth % of~ Nortimest !4.lif &aId S«&n lO.·~ Nortla 89"S4W' ~ ~:tdd 50mb IiJ,:,e 
1327.87 feet; th:=nce North 00"03'13" Wert 13U.e6 lfeet to fue POINT OF BEG!NN1NG. 
. ~~~~ ~~f ~ to file St!r.te ufldl!ho by that dooi nocrded cn MIlrcl! g, 195{1 hi 
Book 7lI ofDeew at l'afie 2trl of Offidal Rec1>rds of Briru;:::ville Ccuoty, Idruw. 
r'l) ..... tt__ ,h/A ....vc/0~ ~~ 
._--_ ... --------- ----
~!.~ , 
V "~,I [-1 
1319093 
Exhibit "D" 
(~" ,~-
,,:~. '''') 
Recording Requested By: 
TIlE ~K Of c(oo:!ER££.f\DMIl'llSTRA TIOllI 
3113 SOUTIl25TH EAST, ?JL 1887 IDAHll FALLS. 10 SWJ3 
Return To: 
THE !WIt( [If CIlWoIERC£'AOMIl'<!!S1l'lA 1101i 
3113 SOUTIl25TH EAST, P.O. 1 B87 
10AH0 FAllS. I\) 83403 
Prepared By: 
THE BAlUK Of ~-I\llMlftIi-sTllAnrm 
3m SOUTH 25TH EAST, P.O. tEll7 
lliAIID FAllS. 10 B34ro 
~~ ____ S~ of Ikho _____ Space Above Thiis Une For ~ Oau -----
REAL ESTATE DEED OF TRUST 
(With Future Advance Claus"'1 
1. DATE AND PARTIES_ The elate ,,1 this Deed "j Trust !Security Instrument) is 
12.24-2O!l8 . The parties and their addresses are: 
GRANTOR: 
DUANE YOST ANn lOllI YOST, HllSMI;IO Afill \'11Ft 
Tl71 HAMPSHIRE cr. 
IMHO FAllS, 10 l\3llil4 
o Rafer to the Ac!dandum which is attached and incorporatoo herein for "dditional 
Grantors. 
TRUSTEE:: 
A\.UIIII££ TmE AIJO ESCROW COR!'. 
UI7D ilMRWAU DR. STE. 1110 
I!JAIII) FAllS, ID B3MlZ 
LENDER: 
THE BlNlOF CIJill5ERC£-ADM1NlS1RA110J1 
:1113 snurn 2511l EAST, P.lI. 1887 
IDAIID FAllS. In R3403 
" 
w, 
Aiiiance His &. E,;cn;;i.') C:;rp. 
'IQ70 Riv(~N:a!k Dr., St6. 100 
P.O. Box 50642. 
tdaho Fails, lD 8'340S·0642 
IDAHO 
of Pages: 15 
-IDAHO FA 
Fee:45.00 
RAVERY 
EXHIBIT 
IB 
1 
I 
2. CONVEY AJIlCE. For good and valuable corrsideralion, the receipt and sufficiency of which 
is acknowledg&d, and. to "e<;tJr~ the S«CtJrad Deb~ (heraahar defined), ~rantor Jrtel/~Iy 
grants, bargain., sell" B.nd cOfiV~ys to Trust"", JJ1 trust for the benefIt of Lender, WIth 
pewer of sak>, the followlOg desCribed property; 
sEE ATIA~H£D EXHlB!T "t;O ViH!CH IS ATIACHED HERETO AND MADE A PART flEREOf. 
The property is located in ..!:i!lm=tlC!!E"V"'Il""lE'--__ --;r;;;;= _______ lIt _____ _ 
''''''''lYI 
TBD BJlREfiHOUIJD 
.!!IU"'A'-"HO"-'F"'A==LL=-S_-m~-----, Idaho .>:8J.ID4='--rr:::r;;-x;r--
- [D1V1 0:", co:aol 
T ogethB< with all rights, Qasomants, appurtenances, royalties, mineral riglWi, oil and gas 
rights, CfOPS, timber, ali diversion payments Of third party payments made to crop 
producers, and all existing and future improvementa, structures, fixtures, and 
replacements that may now, or at any time in tha future, be part of the real estate 
Oesc!ibed above (aU referred to as 'Property",. The t&rm Property also includes, but is oot 
limited to, any and all water walls, water, ditches, roservoirs, reservoir sites and dams 
located on the real estate and all riparian and waror rights associated with'!ha Property, 
however est2>blished. 
3. MAXI!\IIUM OBLIGATION lIMIT. The total principal amount of the Secured Debt !hereaftar 
defined) secured by this Deed' of Trust at anyone time shall not exc~ed 
~ 2.000.1JOO.llD • This limitation of amount does not inclUde interest, 102;1) 
charges, commitment Tees, brokerage commissions. attorneys' fees and oth.sr charges 
validly made pursuant to this Deed of Trust al'ld does not apply to advances lor interest 
accrued on such advances) made under the terms. of this Deed of Trust to protect 
Lander's s&curity "nd to perform any of the c[)va~nts cnntained in this Dsed of Trust. 
Future advances are contemp!arod and, along with other future obligations, are secured 
by this D~d of Trust ev .. n though an O( part may not yet be advanced. Nothing jn thls 
Deed of Trust, howev"" shall constitute a commitment to make <lddh:ional or Turore loans 
or advances in any am<>unt. Any such c()ITImitment would need to be agreed to in a 
separate writing. . . 
4. SECUHEDDEBT DEfiNED. The term 'Secured Debt' includes, but is not limited to, the 
following: 
A. The promissory note(s), =ntract(s), gusnmty(ies) Dr other .evidern:e of debt 
described below and all extensions, renewals, modifications or substitutions 
(Evidence of Debl) (e.g., borrower's Mme, note amount, interest rate, TmJlUrity 
dBte), 
NOTE DAlED 04/f6{Gll FIlR nlIANE YOST IN THE AMOIJIiT Of $2.000.001).00. lOAN WJU MATUi\E (.111 
04l16Jll9. 
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B. All future advances from Lender to GrantOf or crth..r futur0 obligations of Gr<Yltor to 
Lander under any promissDry note, contract. guaranty, or other eviden<:" of ooot 
existing now or executed after this Deed of Trust wheth1.r or not this Dwd of Trust 
i5 spe<;mcally referred to in the evidence of 96bt.. . 
C. AU obligations Grantor .owes "II? Le<'I~er, which no,!" .exlSt or .m~y: ,later anse, to the 
extent oot prohibited by law, mcludlng, but not hmrted to, liabIlities for overdrafts 
relating to BrP{ deposit aCei:lUIit Ilgreement between Grantor and Leqrler. 
D. An additional sums advanceD and e:xpenses incurred by Lender for insuring, 
preserving Dr otherwise protecting the Property and its value and any othM sums 
advanced and expenses il'\Curred by Lender under the terms of this Deed of Trust, 
plus intereost at the highG$1 rate in effect, from time to time. as provided in the 
Evidence of Debt. 
E. Gramer's performance under the terms of any instrument evidencing a debt by 
Grantor to Lendsr and any Dead of Tf1J$t sacuring, guarantying, or otherwise 
relating to the debt. 
If more· than ona parson signs this Dm of Trust as Grantor, soch Grantor agmos that 
this Deed of Trust will .... cure aU future advances and luture obIi(}"tions described above 
that are given to or ineurrad by any one or more Grantor, 0< "ny one ~r moce GrAntor and 
others. This D<red of Tru:rt will not sacure any other debt if Lander fails, with respect to 
.such othar debt. to ma):.e any required disclosure about this D~ of TnlSt or if lendsr 
fails to give any reqUited notice of the right of resclssion. 
6. PAYMENTS. Gnlntof "'IJT69S to make aU payments on the Secured Delrt when due and in 
accardsnce with the terms of the EvidenClt of Debt or this Deed of Trust. If any note 
svidencing the S(!cUH~d Dsbtcontains a variable rate f&ature, Grantor acknow~ that 
the interest rata, payment terms, Of balance due on the loan may ~ indexed. a.djusted. 
renewed or renegotiated. 
13. WAAAANTY OF filE. Grantor covenants that Grantor is lawfully seized of the astat(> 
conveyed by this Deed of Trust and has thl'> right to irrevoc<lbly grant, comey and sell to 
T rU'Stee, in trust, with ptlwer of S>;Ile. tha Propeny and Wl'Il'rllnt!! !:hat the Property is 
urn1l'>CUmbered, e>lcapt for encumbrances of record. 
7. CLAIl\!IS AGAmST 1TT1.E. Grantor will pay aM taxes, assassmants. liens, encumbrsnces. 
lease payments, grOtJOd rants, utilitie3, and other charges re!"ting to the Prop.=rty when 
due. Lender may require Grantor 1;() provide to Lender copies of all notices that such 
l!lfTlountll :lire dllB and the l"I!!C<Jipts evid<mcing Gramer's> payment. Grantor will d&fettd titju 
to the Proparty against any claims that would impair the lien of this Deed of Trust. 
GrantCH allrHS to ,."..;go to lend..... as requested by Lende!:, arry rights, claims or 
ckYIense-s which Grantor may have ~n,;t parties who l:t.Jpp1y labor or materi:lils to 
improve or. maintain the Property. 
8. PRIOR SECURrrY Il\ITEflES'TS. With regard to any other mortgage, df<ed of trust, security 
agreement or ather lien document that cre",ted II prior ","cur<ty interest or <meumi>rbl"1ce on 
the Property atJrl that may have priority oller this Deed of Trust, Grantor agrees: 
A. To ma!l:e all payments when due and to perform or comply with all covenants. 
B. To promptly de~\fer to Lender any notices that Grantor receives from the holder. 
C. Not to malce or permit any modification or elrtension of, and IWt to request or 
accept any futur'l advances under IIrry I\Ot" or agreement oocurad by, the other 
mortgage, deed of lIUst or security lIWoomant unlesS Lender consents in writing. 
9. DUE 0111 sALE OR El\!CUMBRANCE. Lender may, at its option, dll<.:larii/ the entire balance 
of the Secured Dept to btl immediately due and payable upon the creation of /Jny fI~n, 
encumbtance, transfer, or sale. or contract fC>l' any of th.."SI!l on the Property. However if 
the Property includes Grantor's residance, this section shall be subje<:t to> til<!! restric1i~ns 
im~d by f~1 law (12 C.F.R. 5911, as applicable. For tha PUI'f>O~ of this section 
the term "Property- al$O inclLJd;.s any interest to all or any part of the Property. Thi~ 
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COVMlant shan run with the Property and ~hall remain in effect until the Secure<! Debt is 
paid in full ,,00 this De"'" of TrU!<t is releal'6cl. 
10. TR:AJ\!SFER OF AN IPffEREST IN THE GRANTOR. Lender may demand immediate payment 
of the debt(s) if Grantor is not a nztl.ll'ill person and 'fails to obtain Lender's prior written 
COl'l5ent. before organizing, merging into, or conso~ting with an e!'lOty; acquiring aU oc 
substantially ali of the assfl1:s. of another; . '!"'tenally cha~'!'lg tha legal utructure, 
management, ownership or financial condmon; Of effecnng Dr antenng .nto a 
domestication, conversion or int<lrest exchang8. . 
11. ElIITfTY WAFmAtfTlES AND REPRESENT ATIO NS. II Grantor is an entity other than a 
natural p;irllon (such 11$ a C()rporati~ or o~r organization).. Gr!"ntor makes to Lender the 
following warranties and represen1&tlons which shaH 00 continuing as long as tim Secured 
Debt remains outstandirJlj: 
A. GrantOr i. an entity which is duly organized and validly existing in the Grantor's 
state 01 incOrp¢~tl<>n I\>r <>rganizati,ml. Grantor is in got>d standing in all states in 
which Grantor traMacts business. Grantor has the powel and authority to own the 
Property and to =rry on its business "$ !lOW being conducted and, as applicable, is 
qualified to do so in each state in whicl) Grantor operates. 
B. The fOlx9cution, delivery and pltrformancs of mis O;;od of Trust by Grantor and the 
obligati<>n evidenced by the Evidence of Debt aru within tha power of Grantor, have 
been duly authorized. haYti receive{j all necessary governmental approval, and will 
not viJ>iate any prc>visicl\ of law, or order of court or governmental agency. 
c. Other than disclosed in writing .Grantor has not changed its name within the last 
ten years and has not used any omar trsde or fictitious name, Without. Lender's 
priOi written con""nt, Gramor does not and will not USe any other name and will 
preseNe its existing name. trade names and franchises until tim Secured Debt is 
satisfied. 
l2.PROPERTY CONDfTION, ALTERATIONS AND U\ISPECTJON. Grantor will keep tlw 
Pro~rty in good condition and maka all rapairs that are reasonably [lCC(ISSary. Grantor 
will give lender prompt notice of /lOy loss or damage to the Pro~rty. Grantor will keep 
the Property iroo of r.oJ(ious weeds and grasses. Grantor will not initiate, join in or 
consent to any change in any privata tesi:rictive covenant, zoning ordinance 0( othElr 
public or private restriction limiting or defining the ~ which may be made of the 
Property or any part of the Property, without Lende,s prior wrirten consent. Grantor wiU 
notify Lender of all demands, proceedings, claims, and actions against Grnntor or any 
other owner made under. law or regUlation regarding US<:!, I>Wnarship and occupancy of 
the Property. Grantor will comply with all legal raQuiremoots and f!lstric:tions, whether 
public 01 private, with respect to the: usa of the Property. Grantor alsa agrees that the 
nature of the occupar.cy and use will not change without Lender's prior written consent. 
No portiOh of the Prop;:rty will 00 ramoved. demolished or materially altered without 
lender'$ prior written c\>ll3ent except that Grantor has the right to remove item" of 
personal property comprising a part nf tha Property thst ba<:ome worn or obsnict&, 
provided that "llCh p<>ftOnal property is tep!ac9d with other persoMI property at least 
..qual in valoo to the replaced personal property, free from any title rebJntion device. 
security agreemen1 or other encumbrance. Such replacement of personal pr0p9rty will be 
deemed subject to tha security irnerest created by !hi:!; Deed of Trust. Grantor shall not 
partition or !!lubdivide the Property withl>ut Lander'" prior written co~nt. Lender or 
Lender's agents may, at Lender's optioll. enter ~ . Property at any Jeilsonable time ·for 
the purpose of inspecting the Prop&rty. Any inspection of the Property shall IHl entirely fOf 
Lender.'s benefit and Grantor will in no way rely on Lender's inspection. 
13. AUTHORITY TO PERFORM. If Grantor fails tD pariorm al'!)' of Grantor's duties undar this 
Dead of Trust, or any other mortgage, dE>ed 01 trust, security "greement or other lien 
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document that has priorit'{ over this Deed of Trust, landar may, without I1Otica, ~o<m 
tna dutias or causa them to be p-enOfTlled, Grantor appoints Lender as attorney in fact to 
sign Grantor's name or pay any amount ~ary for performance. If any construction 
on the Property ;$ discontinued or not carried on in a raas;:mabla manner, lender may do 
whatever is nacasS<lry to protect Lander's seCurity interest in the Property. This moy 
inc!ll<k completing th2 coli!rtruCtion. . . 
lender's right to perform for Grantor shall not creata an ohll{latlOn to perfoon, and 
Lender's failure to perform will not preclude Lender from €\xercising any of Lender's otf= 
rights under tOO law or this Deed of Trust. Any amounts paid by Lander for insuring, 
prB5«rving or o\h&Wise pr~tecting the Property and lender's :;tecurity. int~~ wilt be du~ 
on demand and will bear Jnt!;fest from the dam of the payment unnl paid II") full at the 
interes't rata in effect from tima to time according to the terms of the EviOOnca of Debt. 
14. ASSIGNMENT OF LEASES Al\ID RmTS. Grantof absolutely, unconditiornllly, irrevocably 
and immediately assigll3, grants, bargains and conveys- to Lender all the right, litIa and 
interest in the following (Property~,. . 
A. Existing or fut:ur-a 1" ...... 8, suble~s, licenses, guaranties and any oth€f" written or 
verbal ;ogroomants for the usa and occupancy of the Propefty, including. but not 
limited to, any extensions, renewals, modiffCi3tions Qf replacgmants iLeasesl. 
B. IWnts, issoos aOd prof"ru:, including but not limited to, security deposits, minimum 
rents, percentage rents, additional romb, common area maint~ charges!, 
parl:il'lg charges, foal e!ltate taxes, otlwr :app!icab~ taxes, insurance promii.tm 
contributiot1s, liquidated damages following default, cancetiation premiums, "103!! of 
rents" iMurance, gUllet receipts, revenues, roya!:ties, pTOC&i'ld3, bonuses, accounts, 
contract rights, genllfal intangibles, and aU riufrts and cl<aims which GlO!Irtor may 
haVIl' that in any way pertain te or are on acCOunt of the usa or occupancy of the 
whole or any part of the Property fRents). 
In the event any item listad as Leases 01" Rents is deterrnirretl to 00 personal propertY, tlli::> 
Assignm6flt will· aoo b6 regarded as a securily !>grOOms!)t. 
Grantor will promp:tly proVide lender with copi"" of the Lea~g al"ld will certify thesa 
L"a~ ;lre true and correct copies. Tn.:. existing Leases wiU be providocl on execution of 
the Assignment, and 1111 future Leasa" and any other in10rmation with rB$pect to tn..S% 
lea3eS will 00 provided immediately aft .. r they ara «<ccutoo. Lender 91aClts Grantor a 
reVocable license to coliect, receive, el"ljoy and use the Rems as' long as Grantor is not in 
cl<tfault. Grantor's def"ult automatically and immMilttefy revolte" this license. Grantor will 
nat collect in advance any Renu due in future len3B p-erioda, unless Gruntor fim obtains 
lE>nClar' G written consent, Amounts collOC<ted willba applied at Lender's discretion to th" 
Seeunod DeMl;, the cnstl> of managing, proteeting and preserving me Property, and other 
~ expenses. Upon dsiault, Grantor will rec<Jive any Rents in trust for Lender and 
Grantor will nat commingls the Rents with any other funds. When leJlOOr so directs, 
Grantor will endorse and deliver any payments of Rents from the Property to LonOOr. 
Grantor agroo$ that lend~r will not be considered to ~ a mortgagee-in-pos=k>n by 
!lxecuting this Se<:urity InstrlJ!rient or by collecting Of receiving payments on the Secured 
Debts, but only may become a mortgagee·in-poss..ssion after Grantor'$ license to collect, 
receive, enjoy and usa tha Rents is revoked by Lender or automat:ic:aiy revol;ed on 
Grantor's cM"ult, and Lemler tak~ actual possession of the Propsrty. Consaquootly, until 
Landar tal:e5 actual ~ion of the Proparty, Lender is not obligated to perform or 
di$Charge any obligation 01 Grantor tJl1der the leases, ilpptsaf in or defend any action or 
proceeding relatil19 to tOO Rents, the Lea= or me Property, or be liable in any way for 
any injury or dam&ge to any p-er.son· or propertY sustained ih or about the ProPerty. 
Grantor a.grees that thi!: Security lr.stnJment is immediately effeetivlJ between Gr"ntor 2lnd 
Lafltler aM effective as to third parties on the rooDl'ding of thi~ Assignment. 
As long 85 this Assignment it; in "ffeet, Gf~ntor warrants. and reprewms that no default 
~ I~I! . Scll' 
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exists under the Leases, and the parties sUbject to. the Leases have not violated any 
applicable law on !eases, licenses and landlords and ymants. Granb"! at its sole cost: and 
axpehSe, w·,1! keep, observe 2>nct perfo':l" and requlfB aU other parties to th<! Lease-.s to 
comply with the Leases and any applicable law. If Grantor or any party to the Lease 
def2>ults or fails to observe any applicable lliW, Grantor will promptly notify LendeL If 
Grantor negleCts or refuses to enforcs· compliance wim [he terms of the. Leases, then 
Lender may, at Lender's option. enforce compliance. 
Gr2>ntor will flOt subl-et, modify, eJuend, cancel, or Qtherwise alter the Laases, 0{" =pt 
the surrender of the !'roperty covered by the Leases {uniass; tha Lsase" so requirel 
without Lender's conSent. Grantor will not a~sign, compromise, subordinate or encumber 
the Leas"" and Rents without Lender's prior writti:n Cbnsent. Lender dc>es not aSSUme or 
become liable for the PropertY's mai'ntsnance. depreciation. or other losses or damages 
when Lender ",,15 to manage, protect or preserve the Property,excapt fO<" lo=s and 
damages due to Lender's gross negligence or intentional torts. Otherwise, Grantor will 
indemnify Lender and hold Lender harmless lor all liability. loss or damage that Lender 
may incur when Lender opts £0 exercise any of its remedies against any party obligated 
under the leases. . 
15. CONOOMII\IIUMS; PLANNED UNIT DEVELOPMENTS. If thG Property indudes a unit in a 
condominium or a plenned unit development, Grantor will periorm all of Grantor's duties 
under the covenants. by-law". or regulations of the condominium or plaM9d unit 
ci<>velopment. 
16. DEFAULT. Grantor will be in default if any of the follOWing occur: 
A. Any party obligatad on the Secured Debt tails to make payment When due; 
B. A breach of any term or covenant in thi:J Deed of Trust. any prior mortgage or any 
construction lo:an ngraement, security agreement or any Qthsr .dQcumem 
evidElncing, gUllrl'ntying, &GCuring or otherwise relating to the Secured Debt; 
C. Too making or furnishing of any verbal or written repr"'-Sentation, 51:ati>ment or 
warranty to Landar that is false or incorrect in any material respect by Grantor or 
any person or entity obligated on the Secured Debt; 
D. The death. dissolution. or insolvency of, appointment of a receiver for. or 
applicatiOh of any debtor relief law to, Grantor or any parson or entity oblig<ned on 
th9 Secured Debt; 
E. A good faith betief by Lender <1t any time th&t Lender is inSecure with respect to 
any person or entity obligated on the Secured Debt or thet 1111: prospect of ~r.y 
p.ayment ia impaired or the 1I1l1ue of tha Prt>p&rty is impaired:· . 
F. A marerilll advI"';.e change in Grantor's busine$$ including ownership. managoment. 
and financial conditions, which Lender in its opinion believes impairs the value of 
the PropMty or repaym~t of thE! Secured Debt; or 
G. Any loan proceeds are used for a purposa thllt win contribute to excessive erosion 
of highlV erodible land Of to ths conversion 'of wetlands to produce an agt1cuttural 
commodity. as flJfthar 6lo:plained in 7 C.F.R. Part 1940. Subpart G, EJ(hibh: M. 
t 7. REMEDIES ON OEFAUL T. In &Orne instances, federal and t;tata law will r<>quire Lender to 
provide Grantor with notice of tM right to eure, mediation notices or other notices and 
may establish time schedules for 1orsclosure actions. Subjact to these limitations. if any, 
Lender may accelerate the Secured Debt and foreclose this Deed oj Trust in B manner 
provided by law if this Grantor is in defllull, 
At the option of Lender, all oi any part of the agreed fees and charges, accrued inwr~ 
and principal shall become immediately due and payable, after giving notice if requiroo by 
law, upon the Oel!urrenee of a default or &nytime thereafter. In addition. Lertder shall be 
entitled to all the remedies providaii by law. the Evidence of Debt, other· evidences of 
debt. this Deed of Trust and any related documents. inclUding without limitation. the 
power to sell the Property. 
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if tiwrf! is a default, Trusts<;! shall, in addition to any oths, j><!rmrttOO remedy, at too 
request of Lender, advertise and sell the Property as a whole or in separzte paTceis "t 
public aucticn to the highest bidder ·for cash ana convey absolute title free and clear of an 
right, title and intQrest; of Grantor at such tim;; and pIa~ as T NStee c:k!slgMtfiS. T ruswe 
shall give notice of sale includil'9 the time, terms and place of &ale and a cl&scription of 
the property to be sold as required by the applicable law in Iiliectat tna time of the 
propossd sale. 
Upon sare of tha Proparty and to the sl;tent not prohibited by Jaw. T rustoo shell make and 
deliver a deed to the Pro~ wld which comeys absoluta title to the pUifcha~ar, "nd 
after first paying allf,*,I;, charges and costs, shall pay to Lender all mOf\$Ys advanced for 
repairs, taxes, iosuranca, lians, assessments and prior. encumbrances and intefe$t 
thereon, and the principal and imerest Or) the Secured Debt. !l<'ying the surplus, if any, to 
Grantor. Lender may purchase the Property. The recitals in any deed of conveyance shaH 
be prima facie evidence of the faCts gat forth tMrein. . 
All remedies are di!rl:inct. cumulative and not exclusive, and Lendar is entitled to all 
remedies provided at law .. or equity, whethe4- Bxpressly set folih Of not. The acceptance 
by Lemler of any sum in payment or partial payment on the Secured Debt after the 
balance is; doo Of is <roeelerated Dr after foreclosure pr~g" are filed shaa not 
con:rtitute a waiver of Lender's right to require full al1d complete cure of any existing 
default. By not exercising any remedy on Grantor's default. Lender doe!'; not waive 
Lender's right to latar consicktr the e\t&rlt III default if it cantlnuas or happens again. 
tg.E){PEII!SES: ADVANCES ON COV9.!AHTSi ATTOR1i!EYS' FEES; COUEC~ COSTS. 
Excapt whan prohibited by law, Grantor ~roos to pay all of Lender's 8l<p4!ns<><t if Grantc4' 
breaches any covenant in thi$ Deed of TruSt. Grantor will "Iso pay on demand all of 
Land"r'" expenses incurred in collecting. insuring. pr&serving or .protacting the PrOp6rty .Dr 
in any inventories. audits. ill5p&ctions or oilia( IlIxamil'llltion by Lender in r69p«;t to the 
Property. Grantor agrees to pay all costs and e"panses incurred by L~ in enforcing or 
prot1>Cting Lender'& rights and remedies under 1:hb Deed of Trust, including. but not 
limit&<! to. atlom<>ys' f""s. court costs, and othar 1"931 ex:p9l)S<1S. O~ the Secured Doht 
is fvlly and finally paid, Lender agree:J to relea:re- this Deed of lru&t and Grant",. agree,. to 
Jl&Y for any recordation costs. All such amounts ate due on demand and will b.=ar imerest 
from ths time of the a<lvance at the highest rate in effect, from time to time, as provided 
in tim Evidence of Debt and as pMnitted by lsw. 
19.EfNIROM\lIENTAL LAWS AND HAlAfiD(>US SUSSTANCES. As tl.'lOd in this section. (l) 
"Environmental law· meall!l, without (imitation. the Gomp!eh.ensive Environment:&1 
Respo""", Compensation ood .Liabilfty Act (CERCLA,. 42 U.S.C. 000·1 et seq.l. all r;ltMf 
federal, state ahd local laws, regulations, ordinance'S, court orders. llttomey general 
opinions or interpretive Iaf:te(s concerning tOO pubflC health, safety. welfare, environment 
or a hazardous &ubstat1CS; and (21 "H6Z<IIrdous Substa\1lc9" maam arty toxic, ra1iinactive 
or hazardoUs mllteria!, waste. pollutant or contaminant which has ctllllr.;cteris:tics which 
render the substance dangcrou:o or potentially ~rous to the publlc hsa~, safety, 
welt"re or elWil'onmont. The: term includes, withoUt limitation, a.w substances detfined as 
·hazan:\ou.!i material,' 'toxic substar.ces: 'hazardous war;ta' Of 'hazardoU$ substance" 
under any Erwironmelltal taw. Grantor represents, warrants lind &gr&l!ll that, a>!Capt as 
previously disclosed and ac:i:.nowledged in writing: . 
A. No . HllZardOU$ Substance has been, i!. or will 00 located. tJransported. 
manclactured, tre>rtad, refined, or handled by any p6rson on, unds1- or about the 
Property. e):~t in the ~dinary COUTS3 of business and in strict compliance with all 
appliCable Environmenml Law. 
B. Grantor has not and will not caUS(!, contribute to. or permit the re/ea;q of any 
Hazardous Substance on ~ Property. 
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C. GrantOf will immediately notify Lendar if (1 f a release or threatened release of 
Hazardous: Subotanc" occur" cn, undGr or about the Property or migrates or 
thre>atens to migrate from nearby property; or (2) thare is a violation of any 
Erwironrnerrtal Law concerning the Property. In such an event, Grantor wm talte all 
nec~ssary remed~ action in accordance with Environmental Law. 
D. Grantor has ro knowledge of or reason to balieve thare is aony pending or 
threatened investigation, claim, or proceeding of any kind relating to (1) any 
Hazardous Subst3nce located on, under or about the Property; r>( (21 any vlolaoon 
by Grantor or any tenant of any Environmental Law. Grantof will imme~iately notify 
Lender in writing as· woo as Gr;.ntor has reason to believe there 13 any such 
pendil'1\l or threatened il'westi.gati.on, claim, ?I'. pr~ding. In such an ":,,oot, Len?er 
has the right, but not the obhganon, to parucrpate 10 any such proceeding mcludlng 
the right to receive copies of any documents relating to ruch proc&ading~. 
E. Grantor and every tenant have bean, are and ahall remain in full compliance with 
any applicable Er.virOl'l!'n$l'\tal Law. . 
F. There ale no underground sttlrage tanit!;, pnvste dump~ or open WGlIs located on Of 
under the Prop0rty and no such tan!::, dump or wen will b~ added Unless Lander 
first consents in writing, . 
G. Gramor will regularly inspect the Property, monitor the activities and operations on 
the Property, and confirm that all pMmrts, licenses or approvals requir<i>d by any 
applicable Environmental Law ara obtained and complied with. 
H. Grantor will permit., or cause any te.rumt to permit, Lander or Landar's agent to 
enter and inspect thil Property and review all records at any reasonable time to 
determine (1) the existenca, location and nature of any Hazardous Substance on, 
under or about the· Property; 12) the el(,il,tence, location, nattHs, and mugnitude of 
any Hazardous Subatanc8 that has bEten relea5ed on, under or about tha Property; 
Dr (3) whether or not Grantor and any tenant are in compiiance with applicable 
Envirtmmentaf law. 
I. Upcln Lender's req~st and at ;my time, Grantor <lgrees, at Grantor's ex~nse •. to 
engage II Qualified environmental enginG&r to prepare an environmental audit of the 
Propany and to submit. the resufts of ~ch sudit to Lender. The choice of the 
environmental engineer who will perform sllch audit is subject to Lender's approval. 
J. Lender ha .. too right, .!rut not the obliglltion, to p<lrform any of Grantor'" obligations 
undaf' this section at Grantor's a;(pel"lge. 
K. As a consequence of any breach of any r&prassntation, warranty or promi"e made 
in this section, 111 Grantor will indemnify and hold Lender and Lander's successors 
or assigns harmless' from and against all losses, claims, demands, liabilities, 
dam .. gos, cleanup, response and remedi(ltion costs, penalties and Bl::pen"es, 
including without limitation aU costa of litigation and anorneys' fees, which Lender 
and lSf\oor's successors or assigns may sustain; and (2) Ilt lender's discretion, 
Lender may release this Deed DI Trust and in return Grantor wifl prDvide lender 
with collateral of at leli:at equal value to the Property secured by this Deed of Trust 
without prejudice to any of Lender',. r:ighb: und",r this Dead of Trust. 
L. NotWithstanding any of to.. language conta;nl'd in this Deed of Tru~t to' the 
contrary, the tenns of this section shall swvive any foreclosure (){ sati~ilction of 
this Deed of Trust regardless of any passage of tirle to Lender or any dispOsition by 
Lender of any or all of the PropertY, Any claims and defenses 10 the contrary ace 
®reby waived. 
20. CO~.JDEMNATION. Grantor will give Lllnder prompt n"tic<! of any action, real or 
threatened, by privata. or public ""titi",. to purchase or ta~e any or all of the Property, 
including any easements, through cond!lmnation, eminent domain, or any otMT means. 
Grantor further agrees to notify lender of any proceedings instituted tor the establishment 
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Df any sewer, water, ccmsarvation, ditch, drainage, or other district relating to or binding 
upon the PTOp<lrty Of arty part of it, Grantor sutOOrizBS Lander to intervene in Grantor's 
name in any of the abqve d""",ribed actions or claims and to cofiect and' receive all sums 
resulting from the action or claim, Grantor assigns to Lender ~ proems of any award 
or claim lor damages connected with a ccmdemnation or other taking of all or any part of 
the Propsrty. Such proceeds shall be conr>ioorad payments and will be applied as provided 
in this Deed of Trust, This assifVl'l1ent of proceeds- is subject to the terms of llIny prior 
mortgage, deed of trust, security ngrnement or oth<>r lien do<::ument. 
21. msI.!'RANCE. Grantor agrees to maintain insurance as follows: 
A. Granto< shall koop the Ploperty insured against loss by fin>, theft and ~ hazards 
and risks fS3S9nably associated with the Property doo to ·its type and location. 
athetr hazards and risks may lncJud<!, for example, cove>age agoinst loss due to 
floods or flooding. This im:uranc& shall be maintained in the amounts and for the 
periods that Lender requires. What Lend<lr requires pursuant to the prawding three 
sen:tances C;IO changs during tha term of t1w Secured Debt. The insuran<;e carrier 
providing the insurance shall 00 chosen by Gr~ntor subject to Lender':/ apptw~, 
which shall oot be unreasonably withheld. If Grantor fails to maintain trn coverage 
described above., Lendar may, at lI~nder' s optiOn, obtain coverage to Pfotact 
Lender's rights in the PropertY acCording to the tBrms of this Dood of Trust. 
All insurance policies and renewals shall be acceptabie to Lender and shall include a 
standard "mortjJage clause" and, where applicable, .Je.;d6r loss payes claW!e." 
Grantor shaH immediately notify Lender of csnc~Uatioll 0(' teTmi!la1lon of the 
insurance. Lander shall have the right to hold the policies and renewals. If Lender 
f&qUira:J. Grantor shallimmedlately give to Lender all receipTS of paid prmniums and 
rena-wei notics~. Upon loss. Grantor shall give immediate notice to trut insurance 
camar and LendEtr. Lender may make proof of loss if oot made immediately by 
Grantor. 
Un10l8& Lenoor and Grantor otherwise agree in writing, insurance proe&<Kls shall be 
applied to restoration ar repair of the Property d2111ayad if the restoration or repair 
is economically fea>lib\e and Lerufur' 8 security is not 1e!S&ened. If the restoration or 
repair is rwt economically feasible or Lender's =urity would 00 lossen8d, the 
insuraoca proc~ds shall be applied to the Secumd Debt, whether or not than due, 
with any excess paid to Grantor. H Grantor abandons the .Pt01lCrty, or ooea flOt 
answer within 30 days a notice from Lender that the insurance carrier hil!!l oHafed 
to seUl .. a claim, then Lender may colloct the insurance pr~eds. Lender may uro 
1M I*oeeeds tt> repair or re-stt>re the Property or to pay the Secured Debt woomer 
<>r nat then dUQ. The 30-day period will ooGit\ when the notice is given. 
Unless lemder and Grantor otherwise agree ill writing. any application of procned 
to principal shall not extend or postpone 1hs dU!! date ofschedulad paymentS or 
c~ngl! the amount of tfJQ, paymerits:. If tOO Property is acquireo by Lender, 
Grantor'" right ~Q any inswallC8 'policm and proceOOa resulting from dOlma96 to tm. 
Property Mfore the acquisition shall pass to L""der to tne anent of the Secured 
Debt immediately before the acquisition. 
B. Grantor agrees to mairrtain cornpreh&ru<iva general liability inliurnnce naming Lend"r 
a. an additional insUfed in an amount acceptable to Lender, insuring against claim: 
arising from allY accident or occurrence in or on the Property. 
C. Grantor "'111""$ to maintain rental loSs or busineSs intarruptioll insurance, as 
required by Lenaar, in an amount ,equal to lIt I"est coven'ge of 0 ..... y.,,,r' 8 debt 
service, and require.cl ascrowllccount deposits lif agreed to ssparataly in writing), 
under II form of policy a~ptallle to Lend ... , 
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n,NO ESCROW FoR TAXES AND INSURANCE. Unless otherwise proviped in a separate 
:>groomant, Grantor will not b<> required to pay to L<:Inder funds for taxes and II'lSUranc6 In 
23.. ~=CIAL REPORTS AM> AnOlTlONAL DOCUMENTs. Grarrtor will provide to Lender 
upon request. any financial Irtatem.nt Of infofr!1ation ~ender may deem l'l3C«SSary. 
Grantor warrants that all finanl!ial ststements and mformatlon Granter pwvides to Lender 
are or will be, accurate, correct. and complete. Grantor :;g(,*,s to sign, deliver, and file as 
Le~der may reaStltl8bly requ,;.t any additional documents or certifICations that Lender 
may consider necessary to parfect, continua, and preserve Grantor's obligations under 
this Deed of Trust and lender's li<l!1'I status on the Property. If .Granro.. failS to do so, 
Lender may sign, d6/iver, and fi'le such documents or c:artificates in Grantor's name and 
Grantor hereby irr",vocably aj:JP<)ints Lander or Lender's agent as attotney in fact to do the 
things necessary to comply with this section. 
24. JOINT ANi:> INDIVIDUAL UA8IltTY; CO-'SIGNERS; SUCCESSORS MlO ASSIGNS 
BOUND. AU duties under this Deed of Trust lire joint arod indivKlua[. If Grantor signs this 
Deed of Trust. but does nat sign the Evidence af Dilbt, Grantor does 50 only to mortgage 
Grantor's intEl(est in the PrOperty to secure payment of the Sectlred Debt arod Grantor 
does not agree to be perSOhally liable on the Secured Debt. Grantor agrees th3t' Lender 
and any party to this O""d ot Trust may extend, modify or make any change in tt;;, terms 
of thilS Deed of Trust or Ih<:! Ev'idaflCQ of Debt without Grantor's consent. Such a change 
will not release Grantor from the tBrms of this Deed of T fllSt. The dutias and befl$fits of 
this Deed of Trust. 51-.a11 bind and benefit the successors and assigns of Grantor and 
Lender. 
If this Dead of Trust secures a guaranty between Lender and Grantor and Coos not 
directly ser=-e the obligation which is glJartlntled, Grantor agrees to waive any rights that 
may prevent Lender from bringing any action' or claim a!}ainst Grantor or any party 
indebted und"r the obligation including, but not limited to, anti-deficillltCy or one:action 
laws, 
25.APPlICABLE LA~; .SEYERA~UTY:. INTER~ATION. This ~oo of Trust is govemOO by 
the laws of tha JunsdlctJon In which lander Is located, except TO the extent otherwise 
required by th" l"ws o.f the jurisdiction wher" the PrDpQrty is located. This D<>ad of Trust 
is complete and fully integrated. This Deed of Trust may not b<> amended or modified by 
oral agree(TJ9nt. Any ... ction or clau"" in this Deed of Trust, attachments, or any 
agreement related to the Secured Debt that conflicts with applicable law will not be 
affectlve, unless that law expressly or impliedly permits t..M variations by written 
ag...,..,marrt. If any saction or clause of this Deed of TrtI&t C'annct be enforced ZiCCQrding to 
tts terms, that section or clause will be severed al'ld wilf not aHect the enforceability of 
the remainder of this Deed of TrusL Wherwvar used, the singulllr shall include the plural 
and the plural the singular. Thl'! captions and headings of the sections of thi~ Deed of 
Tr-U&t are for conveniel'C!l only and are not to ~ Us6d to interpret or define the terms of 
this Do~ of Trust. Time is of the essence in this Om of Tr.ust. 
26. SUCCESSOR TRUSTEE. Lender, at lender's optiOn., muy from time to time remC>lla 
T rllStea and appoint a succ&ss:Qr trustee by an instrumsnt record ad in the county in Which 
this Deed of Trullt is recorded. The succe:!sOr UllStae. without cClnveya~ of the 
Property, shall Bucceed to all the title, power anti dutie!ol conferred upon the Trustee by 
this Deed of TrUst and applicable law. 
27. NOTICE. Unless othetwrae requir&d by law, any notice shall be given by delivering it or by 
mailing it by first class mail to the appropriate parry's address on page 1 of this Deed of 
Trust, or to any ~r address designated in writing. Notice to one grantor win be doomed 
to be notice to I>U grantors. 
28. WAIVERS. Except to tha axtent prohibit,;d by law, Grantor waiv9S all rights to homestead 
e)(!>mptio-n, appraisement or ths.marshalling of lieM and ilSSets relating to tha Property. 
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29.IDECLAMTIO". Grantor declares tfurt the Property is either located within an irll::o.-poratad 
city or viJ!I>9S or 1hat fua PropaJ:tY is not more than forty (40) acres in area re-ga,,:lJ.ess of 
its WI> or location. or net mOTe than eighty (80) acr.as in area and not ~rindp2l1y w.ad for 
th& agricultural production of Crops, livestock, dairy of aq~tic gooos. 
30. U.C.C. PROVIStOl\lS. If checked, tPe foNowing are applicable to, but do IWt limit, this 
DI'!<2d of Trust: 
o Con;;trucmm 1J:>an. This Deed 01 Trust ~cures an obli~tion incurred for t:lw 
col"lStrll::tion of all improvement on the- Proparty. 
o FtXtu;e Filing. Grantor grants to Landar a s<;l<;:urity interest il"l aH goods that Gtc!ntof 
owns now or in the future and that are or will become fixture" related to the 
Property. 
o CropIS; Timber; l\IIinera.I..,; Renls, lszue" ~ p",fii,;. Grantor grants to Landar a 
security interast in &II crops. timber and mioor2>ls located 00 the Proparty atS' well as 
.1) rents, issue" ;snd profits of thGm including, but not limited to, all Conservation 
Reserve Program (CRPI and Paymoot in Kind tPlK) p"ymerrts and similar 
governmental programs (all of which shall also be included In the term ·Property"). 
o !'erwnal. Property. Grantor grants to Lendar a security' intarGSt in all personal 
property located 00 or connected with the Property. This security interest in¢lud8$ 
all farm products, inventMy, e.quiprnant, aGCOU:'lts, document::, iristrumarrts, chana! 
paper, gomerai intal'l$libles, and aU other items of per80naJ property Grantor owns 
now or in. the futUre and that a~e use4 Of useful in the oomtrtJCtjon, ownar~ip, 
operalion, management, or mamtenanca of the Property. The term ·psrsonal 
property" speCifically ~xcludes that property described as 'l1oul;ehold ~s' 
l:eCUfOO in connection with a 'consumer" loan as tho"", !arms ar.,. d .. fined in 
applicabl& federal regulations governing urrfair and deceptive credit practices. 
o Fi!iintJ As FlI'mncing Stllwmem. Grantor agroes and acJmow~es that this Deed of 
T rust also suffir::es as a financing statement and as such, may be filed of record as 
a financing statem<mt for purposes of Article 9 of the. Uniform Commercial Code. A 
carbon, photoqraphic, image or other reproduction of this Dead of T n.tS1: is 
sufficient as a fInancing S'l:atement. 
31. OTHER TERMS. If chechd, the following are applicabla to' this Deed at Trust: 
o i..ing ()If CrOOit. The Secured Debt includes a revolving JiM of credit provision. 
Although the Secured Debt may be redw::ed to a zero bau .. ",e, this Deed of Trust 
will remain in affect until released. 
o Sej>!l(Irte As~t. . The Grantor has executed or will execute a separate 
assignment Clf Ie.!!~l< a.nd rents. If th& $lOp_rate assignment of leases and rents is 
proparly executed uoo f&corded, than the separate assignment will supsrsecle this 
Security Instrumnm:'s - AllSignment of Leases and Rants" ~ctilln. 
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2 $'I5i¥± 
SIGNATURES: By signing below, Grantor agr&Qs to til<! terms and covenants contained in !:his 
Deed Trust a:ttachments. Grantor also aclmowledg(Js receipt of a copy of !:hill £Me<:! of 
Trust on the date stated above on Page 1. 
o Actual authority waS granted to the partie" Bi9ning below by resolution signed "nq 
d"md 
Entity Nama: ______ _ 
o Refer to the Addendum which is attached and incorpcr.llted krein for additional 
Grantors:, signs!1.lres and acl;nowledgments. 
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ACL'CW<NJLEJ{lMENT: 
STATE OF IIlAHll , COlJNTY OF -'{\?;v?:..«~ U:"'- } ss. 
On this 14TH day of DCCB!lBfll,2lJillj , befOfe me, 
,~ a Notary Public, paroonally apPE>arOO OlJAUE YOST; Will rosr, HUSll!JIIJ AWl W1f£ 
and 
STATE 
.... ~ On this 
~ " Notary-:c-:-~---.,,--
COUNTY OF } ss. 
__________________ , befora mG, 
"""" 
________________________ , known or _iOOmified to me 
{OJ proved tD me or. the oath of I, to 
be t11& person(sl whose nama is subscribed to the within iMtrument. and 
acknowledged tD me that she/he/they executed thl!J same. 
My commis&~ expires: 
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TO TRUSTEE: 
REQUEST FOR: RECOi'NEYANCE 
(Not lD 00 completed until paid in tuff) 
The undersigl'l<ld is the holder of th~ note or flQtes S&cured Cy tl!is D..oo of Trust. Said nota 
or notes, t01lether wrth all other indebtedness secured by this D..oo of Trust, have bBen paid 
in iull. You ara hereby diret:ted TO CAncel this Deed of Trust, which is delivered hareby, and 
to reconvey, without warranty, all the estBt" now held by you under this: D",ed of Trust to 
the person Of persons legally entitlad thereto. 
~~I~·C~~."-'~O 
VMP;!: fUr#o:1I. S.,..~hl 
WI;ltutIl."'~Fin:rn:::bt~ Co HXU.Ai)Og: 
---------- ----
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TRACT!: 
LEGAL DESCR1l"l10N 
EXHIBIT 'A' 
R~ nt a pt)lnt tluU is South~ West alDl1lI; file: SectiDn !Inc 131638 ~ fro,r;a ~ 
N(Jrtil 'A ~or~= 10, T~ 1l'\oTlh, ~ 38 East aCtfs Bo~·~ ~ 
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-------State of Idaho-----Space Above This Line For Recording Data-----
REAL ESTATE DEED OF TRUST 
(With Future Advance Clause) 
1. DATE AND PARTIES. The date of this Deed of Trust (Security Instrument) IS 
11·21·2008 . The parties and their addresses are: 
GRANTOR: 
HAMPSHIRE HOLDINGS, LLC, AN IDAHO LIMITED LIABIlITY COMPANY 
3777 HAMPSHIRE CT. 
IDAHO FALLS, ID 83404 
o Refer to the Addendum which is attached and incorporated herein for additional 
Grantors. 
TRUSTEE: 
ALLIANCE TITLE AND ESCROW CORP . 
. 1070 RlVERWALK DR., STE. 100 
IDAHO FALLS, ID 83402 
LENDER: 
THE BANK OF COMMERCE·ADMINISTRA TION 
3113 SOUTH 25TH EAST, P.O. 1B87 
IDAHO FALLS, ID 83403 
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2. CONVEYANCE. For good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which 
is acknowledged, and to secure the Secured Debt (hereafter defined), Grantor irrevocably 
grants, bargains, sells and conveys to Trustee, in trust for the benefit of Lender, with 
power of sale, the following described property: 
LOT l11N BLOCK 3 OF CANTERBURY PARK, DIVISION NO. Z, TO THE CITY OF 10AHO FALLS, IDAHO ACCORDING TO 
THE OFFICIAL PLAT THEREOF, RECOROED OCTOBER 19, 1992 AS INSTRUMENT NO. 837954 FILED IN OFFICIAL 
RECORDS OF BONNEVILLE COUNTY, IDAHO. 
The property is located in ...!B::.::O"'N""N!:.EV'-"IL""Lc=.E ____ ==-:;-_______ at _____ _ 
(County) 
3777 HAMPSHIRE CT. 
(Address) 
-"ID;o:.A.::.;H""O..!.F!.!!AL=L:::..S_-",~ _____ ' Idaho-"8",,34.:.::0:..:.4--,,,;~.....,.., __ _ 
(City) (Zip Codel 
Together with all rights, easements, appurtenances, royalties, mineral rights, oil and gas 
rights, crops, timber, all diversion paymerits or third party payments made to crop 
producers, and all existing and future improvements, structures, fixtures, and 
replacements that may now, or at any time in the future, be part of the real estate 
described above (all referred to as "Property"). The term Property also includes, but is not 
limited to, any and all water wells, water, ditches, reservoirs, reservoir sites and dams 
located on the real estate and all riparian and water rights associated with the Property, 
however established. 
3. MAXIMUM OBLIGATION LIMIT. The total principal amount of the Secured Debt (hereafter 
defined) secured by this Deed of Trust at anyone time shall not exceed 
$ 1,000,000.00 . This limitation of amount does not include interest, loan 
charges, commitment fees, brokerage commissions, attorneys' fees and other charges 
validly made pursuant to this Deed of Trust and does not apply to advances (or interest 
accrued on such advances) made under the terms of this Deed of Trust to protect 
Lender's security and to perform any of the covenants contained in this Deed of Trust. 
Future advances are contemplated and, along with other future obligations, are secured 
by this Deed of Trust even though all or part may not yet be advanced. Nothing in this 
Deed of Trust, however, shall constitute a commitment to make additional or future loans 
or advances in any amount. Any such commitment would need to be agreed to in a 
separate writing. 
4. SECURED DEBT DEFINED. The term "Secured Debt" includes, but is not limited to, the 
following: 
A. The promissory note(s), contract(s), guaranty(ies) or other evidence of debt 
described below and all extensions, renewals, modifications or substitutions 
(Evidence of Debt) (e.g., borrower's name, note amount, interest rate, maturity 
date); 
NOTE DATED 1112112008 FOR DUANE YOST IN THE AMOUNT OF $1,000,000.00. LOAN WILL MATURE ON 
11121(2009. 
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B. All future advances from Lender to Grantor or other future obligations of Grantor to 
Lender under any promissory note, contract, guaranty, or other evidence of debt 
existing now or executed after this Deed of Trust whether or not thiS Deed of Trust 
is specifically referred to in the evidence' of ?ebt.. . 
C. All obligations Grantor owes to Lender, which no:-", .exlst or .ma.y: !ater anse, to the 
extent not prohibited by law, including, but not limIted to, liabilities for overdrafts 
relating to any deposit account agreement betwe~n Grantor and Lender. . . 
D. All additional sums advanced and expenses Incurred by Lender for InSUring, 
preserving or otherwise protecting the Property and its value and any other sums 
advanced and expenses incurred by Lender under the terms of this Deed of Trust, 
plus interest at the highest rate in effect, from time to time, as provided in the 
Evidence of Debt. 
E. Grantor's performance under the terms of any instrument evidencing a debt by 
Grantor to Lender and any Deed of Trust securing, guarantying, or otherwise 
relating to the debt. 
If more than one person signs this Deed of Trust as Grantor, each Grantor agrees that 
this Deed of Trust will secure all future advances and future obligations described above 
that are given to or incurred by anyone or more Grantor, or anyone or more Grantor and 
others. This Deed of Trust will not secure any other debt if Lender fails, with respect to 
such other debt, to make any required disclosure about this Deed of Trust or if Lender 
fails to give any required notice of the right of rescission. 
5. PAYMENTS. Grantor agrees to make all payments on the Secured Debt when due and in 
accordance with the terms of the Evidence of Debt or this Deed of Trust. If any note 
evidencing the Secured Debt contains a variable rate feature, Grantor acknowledges that 
the interest rate, payment terms, or balance due on the loan may be indexed, adjusted, 
renewed or renegotiated. 
6. WARRANTY OF TITLE. Grantor covenants that Grantor is lawfully seized of the estate 
conveyed by this Deed of Trust and has the right to irrevocably grant, convey and sell to 
Trustee, in trust, with power of sale, the Property and warrants that the Property is 
unencumbered, except for encumbrances of record. 
7. CLAIMS AGAINST TITLE. Grantor will pay all taxes, assessments, liens, encumbrances, 
lease payments, ground rents, utilities, and other charges relating to the Property when 
due. Lender may require Grantor to provide to Lender copies of all notices that such 
amounts are due and the receipts evidencing Grantor's payment. Grantor will defend title 
to the Property against any claims that would impair the lien of this Deed of Trust. 
Grantor agrees to assign to Lender, as requested by Lender, any rights, claims or 
defenses which Grantor may have against parties who supply labor or materials to 
improve or maintain the Property. 
8. PRIOR SECURITY INTERESTS. With regard to any other mortgage, deed of trust, security 
agreement or other lien document that created a prior security interest or encumbrance on 
the Property and that may hav€ priority over this Deed of Trust, Grantor agrees: 
A. To make all payments when due and to perform or comply with all covenants. 
B. To promptly deliver to Lender any notices that Grantor receives from the holder. 
C. Not to make or permit any modification or extension of, and not to request or 
accept any future advances under any note or agreement secured by, the other 
mortgage, deed of trust or security agreement unless Lender consents in writing. 
9. DUE ON SALE OR ENCUMBRANCE. Lender may, at its option, declare the entire balance 
of the Secured Debt to be immediately due and payable upon the creation of any lien, 
encumbrance, transfer, or sale, or contract for any of these on the Property. However, if 
the Property includes Grantor's residence, this section shall be subject to the restrictions 
imposed by federal law (12 C.F.R. 591), as applicable. For the purposes of this section, 
the term "Property" also includes any interest to all or any part of the Property. This 
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covenant shall run with the Property and shall remain in effect until the Secured Debt is 
paid in full and this Deed of Trust is released. 
10. TRANSFER OF AN INTEREST IN THE GRANTOR. Lender may demand immediate payment 
of the debt(s) if Grantor is not a natural person and fails to obtain Lender's prior written 
consent before organizing, merging into, or consolidating with an entity; acquiring all or 
substantially all of the assets pf another; materially changing the legal structure, 
management, ownership or financial condition; or effecting or entering into a 
domestication, conversion or interest exchange. 
11. ENTITY WARRANTIES AND REPRESENT A TIONS. If Grantor is an entity other than a 
natural person (such as a corporation or other organization), Grantor makes to Lender the 
following warranties and representations which shall be continuing' as long as the Secured 
Debt remains outstanding: . 
A. Grantor is an entity which is duly organized and validly existing in the Grantor's 
state of incorporation (or organization). Grantor is in good standing in all states in 
which Grantor transacts business. Grantor has the power and authority to own the 
Property and to carryon its business as now being conducted and, as applicable, is 
qualified to do so in each state in which Grantor operates. 
B. The execution, delivery and performance of this Deed of Trust by Grantor and the 
obligation evidenced by the Evidence of Debt are within the power of Grantor, have 
been duly authorized, have received all necessary governmental approval, and will 
not violate any provision of law, or order of court or governmental agency. 
C. Other than disclosed in writing Grantor has not changed its name within the last 
ten years and has not used any other trade or fictitious name. Without Lender's 
prior written consent, Grantor does not and will not use any other name and will 
preserve its existif)g name, trade names and franchises until the Secured Debt is 
satisfied. 
12. PROPERTY CONDITION, ALTERATIONS AND INSPECTION. Grantor will keep the 
Property in good condition and make all repairs that are reasonably necessary. Grantor 
will give Lender prompt notice of any loss or damage to the Property. Grantor will keep 
the Property free of noxious weeds and grasses. Grantor will not initiate, join in or 
consent to any change in any private restrictive covenant, zoning ordinance or other 
public or private restriction limiting or defining the uses which may be made of the 
Property or any part of the Property, without Lender's prior written consent. Grantor will 
notify Lender of all demands, proceedings, claims, and actions against Grantor or any 
other owner made under law or regulation regarding use, ownership and occupancy of 
the Property. Grantor will comply with all legal requirements and restrictions, whether 
public or priVate, with respect to the use of the Property. Grantor also agrees that the 
nature of the occupancy and use will not change without Lender's prior written consent. 
No portion of the Property will be removed, demolished or materially altered without 
Lender's prior written consent except that Grantor has the right to remove items of 
personal property comprising a part of the Property that become worn or obsolete, 
provided that such personal property is replaced with other personal property at least 
equal in value to the replaced personal property, free from any title retention device, 
security agreement or other encumbrance. Such replacement of personal property will be 
deemed subject to the security interest created by this Deed of Trust. Grantor shall not 
partition or subdivide the Property without Lender's prior written consent. Lender or 
Lender's agents may, at Lender's option, enter the Property at any reasonable time for 
the purpose of inspecting the Property. Any inspection of the Property shall be entirely for 
Lender's benefit and Grantor will in no way rely on ~ender's inspection. 
13. AUTHORITY TO PERFORM. If Grantor fails to perform any of Grantor's duties under this 
Deed of Trust, or any other mortgage, deed of trust, security agreement or other lien 
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document that has priority over this Deed of Trust, Lender may, without notice,. perform 
the duties or cause them to be performed. Grantor appoints Lender as attorney In fact to 
sign Grantor's name or pay any amount necessary for performance. If any construction 
on the Property is discontinued or not carried on in a reasonable manner, Lender !!lay do 
whatever is necessary to protect Lender's security interest in the Property. ThIS may 
include completing the construction. 
Lender's right to perform for Grantor shall not create an obligation to perform, and 
Lender's failure to perform will not preclude Lehder from exercising any of Lender's other 
rights under the law or this Deed of Trust. Any amounts paid by Lender for insuring, 
preserving or otherwise protecting the Property and Lender's security interest will be due 
on demand and will bear interest from the date of the payment until paid in full at the 
interest rate in effect from time to time according to the terms of the Evidence of Debt. 
14. ASSIGNMENT OF LEASES AND RENTS. Grantor absolutely, unconditionally, irrevocably 
and immediately assigns, grants, bargains and conveys to Lender all the right, title and 
interest in the following (Property). 
A. Existing or future leases, subleases, licenses, guaranties and any other written or 
verbal agreements for the use and occupancy of the Property, including but not 
limited to, any extensions, renewals, modifications or replacements (Leases). 
B. Rents, issues and profits, including but not limited to, security deposits, minimum 
rents, percentage rents, additional rents, common area maintenance charges; 
parking charges, real estate taxes, other applicable taxes, insurance premium 
contributions, liquidated damages following default, cancellation premiums, "loss of 
rents" insurance, guest receipts, revenues, royalties, proceeds, bonuses, accounts, 
contract rights, general intangibles, and all rights and claims which Grantor may 
have that in any way pertain to or are on account of the use or occupancy of the 
whole or any part of the Property (Rents). 
In the event any item listed as Leases or Rents is determined to be personal property, this 
Assignment will also be regarded as a security agreement. . 
Grantor will promptly provide Lender with copies of the Leases and will certify these 
Leases are true and correct copies. The existing Leases will be provided on execution of 
the Assignment, and all future Leases and any other information with respect to these 
Leases will be provided immediately after they are executed. Lender grants Grantor a 
revocable license to collect, receive, enjoy and use the Rents as long as Grantor is not in 
default. Grantor's default automatically atld immediately revokes this license. Grantor will 
not collect in advance any Rents due in future lease periods, unless Grantor first obtains 
Lender's written consent. Amounts collected will be applied at Lender's discretion to the 
Secured Debts, the costs of managing, protecting and preserving the Property, and other 
necessary expenses. Upon default, Grantor will receive any Rents in trust for Lender and 
Grantor will not commingle the Rents with any other funds. When Lender so directs, 
Grantor will endorse and deliver any payments of Rents from the Property to Lender. 
Grantor agrees that Lender will not be considered to be a mortgagee-in-possession by 
executing this Security Instrument or by collecting or receiving payments on the Secured 
Debts, but only may become a mortgagee-in-possession after Grantor's license to collect, 
receive, enjoy and use the Rents is revoked by Lender or automatically revoked on 
Grantor's default, and Lender takes actual possession of the Property. Consequently, until 
Lender takes actual possession of the Property, Lender is not obligated to perform or 
discharge any obligation of Grantor under the Leases, appear in or defend any action or 
proceeding relating to the Rents, the Leases or the Property, or be liable in any way for 
any injury or damage to any person or property sustained in or about the Property. 
Grantor agrees that this Security Instrument is immediately effective between Grantor and 
Lender and effective as to third parties on the recording of this Assignment. 
As long as this Assignment is in effect, Grantor warrants and represents that no default 
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exists under the Leases, and the parties subject to the Leases have not violated any 
applicable law on leases, licenses and landlords and tenants. Grantor, at its sole cost and 
expense, will keep, observe and perform, and require all other parties to the Leases to 
comply with the Leases and any applicable law. If Grantor or any party to the Lease 
defaults or fails to observe any applicable law, Grantor will promptly notify Lender. If 
Grantor neglects or refuses to enforce compliance with the terms of the Leases, then 
Lender may, at Lender's option, enforce compliance. 
Grantor will not sublet, modify, extend, cancel, or otherwise alter the Leases, or accept 
the surrender of the Property covered by the Leases (unless the Leases so requirel 
without Lender's consent. Grantor will not assign, compromise, subordinate or encumber 
the Leases and Rents without Lender's prior written consent. Lender does not assume or 
become liable for the Property's maintenance, depreciation, or other losses or damages 
when Lender acts to manage, protect or preserve the Property, except for losses and 
damages due to Lender's gross negligence or intentional torts. Otherwise, Grantor will 
indemnify Lender and hold Lender harmless for all liability, loss or damage that Lender 
may incur when Lender opts to exercise any of its remedies against any party obligated 
under the Leases. 
15. CONDOMINIUMS; PLANNED UNIT DEVELOPMENTS. If the Property includes a unit in a 
condominium or a planned unit development, Grantor will perform all of Grantor's duties 
under the covenants, by·laws, or regulations of the condominium or planned unit 
development. 
16. DEFAULT. Grantor will be in default if any of the following occur: 
A. Any party obligated on the Secured Debt fails to make payment when due; 
B. A breach of any term or covenant in this Deed of Trust, any prior mortgage or any 
construction loan agreement, security agreement or any other document 
evidencing, guarantying, securing or otherwise relating to the Secured Debt; 
C. The making or furnishing of any verbal or written representation, statement or 
warranty to Lender that is false or incorrect in any material respect by Grantor or 
any person or entity obligated on the Secured Debt; 
D. The death, dissolution, or insolvency of, appointment of a receiver for, or 
application of any debtor relief law to, Grantor or any person or entity obligated on 
the Secured Debt; 
E. A good faith belief by Lender at any time that Lender is insecure with respect to 
any person or entity obligated on the Secured Debt or that the prospect of any 
payment is impaired or the value of the Property is impaired; 
F. A material adverse change in Grantor's business including ownership, management, 
and financial conditions, which Lender in its opinion believes impairs the value of 
the Property or repayment of the Secured Debt; or 
G. Any loan proceeds are used for a purpose that will contribute to excessive erosion 
of highly erodible land. or to the conversion of wetlands to produce an agricultural 
commodity, as further explained in 7 C.F.R. Part 1940, Subpart G, Exhibit M. 
17. REMEDIES ON DEFAULT. In some instances, federal and state law will require Lender to 
provide Grantor with notice of the right to cure, mediation notices or other' notices and 
may establish time schedules for foreclosure actions. Subject to these limitations, if any, 
Lender may accelerate the Secured Debt and foreclose this Deed of Trust in a manner 
provided by law if this Grantor is in default. 
At the option of Lender, all or any part of the agreed fees and charges, accrued interest 
and principal shall become immediately due and payable, after giving notice if required by 
law, upon the occurrence of a default or anytime thereafter. In addition, Lender shall be 
entitled to all the remedies provided by law, the Evidence of Debt, other evidences of 
debt, this Deed of Trust and any related documents, including without limitation, the 
power to sell the Property. 
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If there is a default, Trustee shall, in addition to any other permitted remedy, at the 
request of Lender, advertise and sell the Property as a whole or. In separate parcels at 
public auction to the highest bidder for cash and convey absolute tItle fre~ and clear of all 
right, title and interest of Grantor at such time and place as Trustee deslgn~tes .. Trustee 
shall give notice of sale including the time, terms and place of sale and a aescnptlon of 
the property to be sold as required by the applicable law in effect at the tIme of the 
proposed sale. 
Upon sale of the Property and to the extent not prohibited by law, Trustee shall make and 
deliver a deed to the Property sold whIch conveys absolute tItle to the purchaser, and 
after first paying all fees, charges and costs, shall pay to. Lender all moneys advan.ced for 
repairs, taxes, insurance, liens, assessments and pnor enc.umbrances and. Interest 
thereon, and the principal and interest on the Secured Debt, paYing the surplus, If any, to 
Grantor. Lender may purchase the Property. The recitals in any deed of conveyance shall 
be prima facie evidence of the facts set forth therein. 
All remedies are distinct, cumulative and not exclusive, and Lender is entitled to all 
remedies provided at law or equity, whether expressly set forth or not. The acceptance 
by Lender of any sum in payment or partial payment on the Secured Debt after the 
balance is due or is accelerated or after foreclosure proceedings are filed shall not 
constitute a waiver of Lender's right to require full and complete cure of any existing 
default. By not exercising any remedy on Grantor's default, Lender does not waive 
Lender's right to later consider the event a default if it continues or happens again. 
18. EXPENSES; ADVANCES ON COVENANTS; ATTORNEYS' FEES; COLLECTION COSTS. 
Except when prohibited by law, Grantor agrees to pay all of Lender's expenses if Grantor 
breaches any covenant in this Deed of Trust. Grantor will also pay on demand all of 
Lender's expenses incurred in collecting, insuring, preserving or protecting the Property or 
in any inventories, audits, inspections or other examination by Lender in respect to the 
Property. Grantor agrees to pay all costs and expenses incurred by Lender in enforcing or 
protecting Lender's rights and remedies under this Deed of Trust, including, but not 
limited to, attorneys' fees, court costs, and other legal expenses. Once the Secured Debt 
is fully and finally paid, Lender agrees to release this Deed of Trust and Grantor agrees to 
pay for' any recordation costs. All such amounts are due on demand and will bear interest 
from the time of the advance at the highest rate in effect, from time to time, as provided 
in the Evidence of Debt and as permitted by law. 
19.ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS AND HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES. As used in this section, (1) 
"Environmental Law" means, without limitation, the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. 9601 et seq.), all other 
federal, state and local laws, regulations, ordinances, court orders, attorney general 
opinions or interpretive letters concerning the public health, safety, welfare, environment 
or a hazardous substance; and (2) "Hazardous Substance" means any toxic, radioactive 
or hazardous material, waste, pollutant or contaminant which has characteristics which 
render the substance dangerous or potentially dangerous to the public health, safety, 
welfare or environment. The term includes, without limitation, any substances defined as 
"hazardous material," "toxic substances," "hazardous waste" or "hazardous substance" 
under any Environmental Law. Grantor represents, warrants and agrees that, except as 
previously disclosed and acknowledged in writing: 
A. No Hazardous Substance has been, is, or will be located, transported, 
manufactured, treated, refined, or handled by any person on, under or about the 
Property, except in the ordinary course of business and in strict compliance with all 
applicable Environmental Law. 
B. Grantor has not and will not cause, contribute to, or permit the release of any 
Hazardous Substance on the Property. 
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C. Grantor will immediately notify Lender if (1) a release or threatened release of 
Hazardous Substance occurs on, under or about the Property or migrates or 
threatens to migrate from nearby property; or (2) there is a violation of any 
Environmental Law concerlling the Property. In such an event, Grantor will take all 
necessary remedial action in accordance with Environmental Law. 
D. Grantor has no knowledge of or reason to believe there is any pending or 
threatened investigation, claim, or proceeding of any kind relating to (1) any 
Hazardous Substance located on, under or about the Property; or (2) any violation 
by Grantor or any tenant of any Environmental Law. Grantor will immediately notify 
Lender in writing as soon as Grantor has reason to believe there is any such 
pending or threatened investigation, claim, or proceeding. In such an event, Lender 
has the right, but not the obligation, to participate in any such proceeding including 
the right to receive copies of any documents relating to such proceedings. 
E. Grantor and every tenant have been, are and shall remain in full compliance with 
any applicable Environmental Law. . 
F. There are no underground storage tanks, private dumps or open wells located on or 
under the Property and no such tank, dump or well will be added unless Lendei' 
first consents in writing. 
G. Grantor will regularly inspect the Property, monitor the activities and operations on 
the Property, and confirm that all permits, licenses or approvals required by any 
applicable Environmental Law are obtained and complied with. 
H. Grantor will permit, or cause any tenant to permit, Lender or Lender's agent to 
enter and inspect the Property and review all records at any reasonable time to 
determine (1) the existence, location and nature of any Hazardous Substance on, 
under or about the Property; (2) the existence, location, nature, and magnitude of 
any Hazardous Substance that has been released on, under or about the Property; 
or (3) whether or not Grantor and any tenant are in compliance with applicable 
Environmental Law. 
I. Upon Lender's request and at any time, Grantor agrees, at Grantor's expense, to 
engage a qualified environmental engineer to prepare an environmental audit of the 
Property and to submit the results of such audit to Lender. The choice of the 
environmental engineer who will perform such audit is subject to Lender's approval. 
J. Lender has the right, but not the obligation, to perform any of Grantor's obligations 
under this section at Grantor's expense. 
K. As a consequence of any breach of any representation, warranty or promise made 
in this section, (1) Grantor will indemnify and hold Lender and Lender's successors 
or assigns harmless from and against all losses, claims, demands, liabilities, 
damages, cleanup, response and remediation costs, penalties and expenses, 
including without limitation all costs of litigation and attorneys' fees, which Lender 
and Lender's successors or assigns may sustain; and (2) at Lender's discretion, 
Lender may release this Deed of Trust and in return Grantor will provide Lender 
with collateral of at least equal value to the Property secured by this Deed of Trust 
without prejudice to any of Lender's rights under this Deed of Trust. 
L. Notwithstanding any of the language contained in this Deed of Trust to the 
contrary, the terms of this section shall survive any foreclosure or satisfaction of 
this Deed of Trust regardless of any passage of title to Lender or any disposition by 
Lender of any or all of the Property. Any claims and defenses to the pontrary are 
hereby waived. 
20. CONDEMNATION. Grantor will give Lender prompt notice of any action, real or 
threatened, by private or public entities to purchase or take any or all of the Property, 
inclUding any easements, through condemnation, eminent domain, or any other means. 
Grantor further agrees to notify Lender of any proceedings instituted for the establishment 
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of any sewer, water, conservation, ditch, drainage, or other district relating to or bindi~g 
upon the Property or any part of it. Grantor authorizes Lender to Intervene ~n Grantor s 
name in any of the above described actions or claims and to collect and receive all sums 
resulting from the action or claim .. Grantor assigns to Lender the proceeds of any award 
or claim for damages connected with a condemnation or other takmg of all or any pa:t of· 
the Property. Such proceeds shall be considered payments and will be applied as provld~d 
in this Deed of Trust. This assignment of proceeds IS subject to the terms of any prior 
mortgage, deed of trust, security agreement or other lien document. 
21.INSURANCE. Grantor agrees to maintain insurance as follows: 
A. Grantor shall keep the Property insured against loss by fire, theft and other hazards 
and risks reasonably associated with the Property due to its type and location. 
Other hazards and risks may include, for example, coverage against loss due to 
floods or flooding. This insurance shall be maintained in the amounts and for the 
periods that Lender requires. What Lender requires pursuant to the preceding three 
sentences can ·change during the term of the Secured Debt. The insurance carrier 
providing the insurance shall be chosen by Grantor subject to Lender's approval, 
which shall not be unreasonably withheld. If Grantor fails to maintain the coverage 
described above, Lender may, at Lender's option, obtain coverage to protect 
Lender's rights in the Property according to the terms of this Deed of Trust. 
All insurance policies and renewals shall be acceptable to Lender and shall include a 
standard "mortgage clause" and, where applicable, "lender loss payee clause." 
Grantor shall immediately notify Lender of cancellation or termination of the 
insurance. Lender shall have the right to hold the policies and renewals. If Lender 
requires, Grantor shall immediately give to Lender all receipts of paid premiums and 
renewal notices. Upon loss, Grantor shall give immediate notice to the insurance 
carrier and Lender. Lender may make proof of loss if not made immediately by 
Grantor. 
Unless Lender and Grantor otherwise agree in writing, insurance proceeds shall be 
applied to restoration or repair of the Property damaged if the restoration or repair 
is economically feasible and Lender's security is not lessened. If the restoration or 
repair is not economically feasible or Lender's security would be lessened, the 
insurance proceeds shall be applied to the Secured Debt, whether or not then due, 
with any excess paid to Grantor. If Grantor abandons the Property, or does not 
answer within 30 days a notice from Lender that the insurance carrier has offered 
to settle a claim, then Lender may collect the insurance proceeds. Lender may use 
the proceeds to repair Of restore the Property or to pay the Secured Debt whether 
or not then due. The 30-day period will begin when the notice is given. 
Unless Lender and Grantor otherwise agree in writing, any application of proceed 
to principal shall not extend or postpone the due date of scheduled payments or 
change the amount of the payments. If the Property is acquired by Lender, 
Grantor's right to any insurance policies and proceeds resulting from damage to the 
Property before the acquisition shall pass to Lender to the extent of the Secured 
Debt immediately before the acquisition. 
B. Grantor agrees to maintain comprehensive general liability insurance naming Lender 
as an additional insured in an amount acceptable to Lender, insuring against claims 
arising from any accident or occurrence in or on the Property. 
c. Grantor agrees to maintain rental loss or business interruption insurance, as 
required by Lender, in an amount equal to at least coverage of one year's debt 
service, and required escrow account deposits (if agreed to separately in writing), 
under a form of policy acceptable to Lender. 
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22. NO ESCROW FOR TAXES AND INSURANCE. Unless otherwise provided in a separate 
agreement, Grantor will not be required to pay to Lender funds for taxes and insurance in 
escrow. 
23. FINANCIAL REPORTS AND ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS. Grantor will provide to Lender 
upon request, any financial statement or information Lender may deem necessary. 
Grantor warrants that all financial statements and information Grantor provides to Lender 
are, or will be, accurate, correct, and complete. Grantor agrees to sign, deliver, and file as 
Lender may reasonably request any additional documents or certifications that Lender 
may consider necessary to perfect, continue, and preserve Grantor's obligations under 
this Deed of Trust and Lender's lien status on the Property. If Grantor fails to do so, 
Lender may sign, deliver, and file such documents or certificates in Grantor's name and 
Grantor hereby irrevocably appoints Lender or Lender's agent as attorney in fact to do the 
things necessary to comply with this section. 
24.JOINT AND INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY; CO-SIGNERS; SUCCESSORS AND ASSIGNS 
BOUND. All duties under this Deed of Trust are joint and individual. If Grantor signs this 
Deed of Trust but does not sign the Evidence of Debt, Grantor does so only to mortgage 
Grantor's interest in the Property to secure payment of the Secured Debt and Grantor 
does not agree to be personally liable on the Secured Debt. Grantor agrees that Lender 
and any party to this Deed of Trust may extend, modify or make any change in the terms 
of this Deed of Trust or the Evidence of Debt without Grantor's consent. Such a change 
will not release Grantor from the terms of this Deed of Trust. The duties and benefits of 
this Deed of Trust shall bind and benefit the successors and assigns of Grantor and 
Lender. 
If this Deed of Trust secures a guaranty between Lender and Grantor and does not 
directly secure the obligation which is guarantied, Grantor agrees to waive any rights that 
may prevent Lender from bringing any action or claim against Grantor or any party 
indebted under the obligation including, but not limited to, anti-deficiency or one-action 
laws. 
25. APPLICABLE LAW; SEVERABILITY; INTERPRETATION. This Deed of Trust is governed by 
the laws of the jurisdiction in which Lender is located, except to the extent otherwise 
required by the laws of the jurisdiction where the Property is located. This Deed of Trust 
is complete and fully integrated. This Deed of Trust may not be amended or modified by 
oral agreement. Any section or clause in this Deed of Trust, attachments, or any 
agreement related to the Secured Debt that conflicts with applicable law will not be 
effective, unless that law expressly or impliedly permits the variations by written 
agreement. If any section or clause of this Deed of Trust cannot be enforced according to 
its terms, that section or clause will be severed and will not affect the enforceability of 
the remainder of this Deed of Trust. Whenever used, the singular shall include the plural 
and the plural the singular. The captions and headings of the sections of this Deed of 
Trust are for convenience only and are not to be used to interpret or define the terms of 
this Deed of Trust. Time is of the essence in this Deed of Trust. 
26. SUCCESSOR TRUSTEE. Lender, at Lender's option, may from time to time remove 
Trustee and appoint a successor trustee by an instrument recorded in the county in which 
this Deed of Trust is recorded. The successor trustee, without conveyance of the 
Property, shall succeed to all the title, power and duties conferred upon the Trustee by 
this Deed of Trust and applicable law. . 
27. NOTICE. Unless otherwise required by law, any notice shall be given by delivering it or by 
mailing it by first class mail to the appropriate party's address on page 1 of this Deed of 
Trust, or to any other address designated in writing. Notice to one grantor will be deemed 
to be notice to all grantors. 
28. WAIVERS. Except to the extent prohibited by law, Grantor waives all rights to homestead 
exemption, appraisement or the marshalling of liens and assets relating to the Property. 
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29. DECLARATION. Grantor declares that the Property is either located within an incorporated 
city or village or that the Property is not more than fo'!y (40) acres in a.rea regardless of 
its use or location, or not more than eighty (80) acres In area and not prinCipally used for 
the agricultural production of crops, livestock, dairy or aquatic goods. 
30. U.C.C. PROVISIONS. If checked, the following are applicable to, but do not limit, this 
Deed of Trust: 
o Construction Loan. This Deed of Trust secures an obligation incurred for the 
construction of an improvement on the Property. 
[Xl Fixture Filing. Grantor grants to Lender a security interest in all goods that Grantor 
owns now or in the .future and that are or will become fixtures related to the 
Property. 
[Xl Crops; Timber; Minerals; Rents, Issues and Profits. Grantor grants to Lender a 
security interest in all crops, timber and minerals located on the Property as well as 
all rents, issues and profits of them including, but not limited to, all Conservation 
Reserve Program (CRP) and Payment in Kind (PIK) payments and similar 
governmental programs (all of which shall also be included in the term "Property"). 
[Xl Personal Property. Grantor grants to Lender a security interest in all p·ersonal 
property located on or connected with the Property. This security interest includes 
all farm products, inventory, equipment, accounts, documents, instruments, chattel 
paper, general intangibles, and all other items of personal property Grantor owns 
now or in the future and that are used or useful in the construction, ownership, 
operation, management, or maintenance of the Property. The term .. personal 
property" specifically excludes that property described as "household goods" 
secured in connection with a "consumer" loan as those terms are defined in 
applicable federal regulations governing unfair and deceptive credit practices. 
IX! Filing As Financing Statement. Grantor agrees and acknowledges that this Deed of 
Trust also suffices as a financing statement and as such, may be filed of record as 
a financing statement for purposes of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code. A 
carbon, photographic, image or other reproduction of this Deed of Trust is 
sufficient as a financing statement. 
31. OTHER TERMS. If checked, the following are applicable to this Deed ·of Trust: 
o Line of Credit. The Secured Debt includes a revolving line of credit provision. 
Although the Secured Debt may be reduced to a zero balance, this Deed of Trust 
will remain in effect until released. 
o Separate Assignment. The Grantor has executed or will execute a separate 
assignment of leases and rents. If the separate assignment of leases and rents is 
properly executed and recorded, then the separate assignment will supersede this 
Security Instrument's "Assignment of Leases and Rents" section. 
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o Additional Terms. 
SIGNATURES: By signing below, Grantor agrees to the terms and covenants contained in this 
Deed Trust attachments. Grantor also acknowledges receipt of a copy of this Deed of 
Trust on the date stated above on Page 1. 
o Actual authority was granted to the parties signing below by resolution signed and 
dated __________________ __ 
Entity Name: HAMPSHIRE HOLDINGS, tlC 
DUANE YOST, INDIVIDUAllY 
o Refer to the Addendum which is attached and incorporated herein for additional 
Grantors, signatures and acknowledgments. 
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ACKNOWLEDGMENT: . .J .. {l. 
STATE OF I tltl tl 0 COUNTY OF V)()n ne vi I L\, } 55. 
On this 2,\ 51: day of A101,tL'\(I.1hC( ,;2i2C~~.., before me, 
d "", M..r lhii- .t. 1 II,£:I ~IDJ)± /lnd'vidual) a Notary Public, personally appeare -1.M!!.!.A.l:l.\:_.--l4Ji.._.l: _L_ --":~---J_.J.LlL.L_':+"-!.:':':--:-__ 
.j , known or identified to me 
-(-o-r-p-r-o-ve-d--t-o-m--e-o-n--th-e--o-at-h--o-f~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~= ______ ~~ ________ ),to 
be the person(s) whose name is subscribed to the within instrument, and 
acknowle~g~d to m~ that she/he/they e~futed the same., n . " 
My ~£.mC)1ISSI0n eX~lre\ \".) ( .il nr ( .f J\ \ \ ALI l' ~ ( h-c 
() IIt.AL{ 1 v- )t)1 C INotOfY PUblici '" 
STATE OF IDAHO 
COUNTY OF BO~VILLE 
On tills 'Z I day of_..L..Jlll..\,w....u.;~~ ____ -:-r / .I i< before me, a Notary Public in 
and for said State, personally appeared known to me to be the 
Managing Member respectively, of the L.L.C. that execute the within instrument or the person(s) who 
executed the instrument in behalf of said L.L.C., and acknowledge to me that such Corporation executed 
the same. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my han~d affixed my official seal th ay and year in 
this certificated frrst above,~~~IIIIIIIIJ// L ' /1"'").,......-
"" ..... p.. Rl;JI. ~ / L ,}l}. J I (, L--~~ ~::-.... · .. ·· ..... :V&% 1'. ~_ _ ~ ::f .. ' T'" h •..•. ~~% Notary Public t' ~ 
- <:0' 0 '"'>rff p,.' :.. IJ ~ :' ",), \ ~ Residing at---l4/~J....e.,!..L!d..I~f-L...k:f~-T-.L--_ 
- : ®>Il<lll) '::: 
- \. hUi8\...\V./ ff % ~"'" . . ..... ~.p$ ~~~]:E·Of·\\)~~~ 
1/1111111111111\\\\\ 
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TO TRUSTEE: 
REQUEST FOR RECONVEYANCE 
(Not to be completed until paid in full) 
The undersigned is the holder of the note or notes secured by this Deed of Trust. Said note 
or notes, together with all other indebtedness secured by this Deed of Trust, have been paid 
in full. You are hereby directed to cancel this Deed of Trust, which is delivered hereby, and 
to reconvey, without warranty, all the estate now held by you under this Deed of Trust to 
the person or persons legally entitled thereto. 
(Authorized Bank Signature I 
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TRACT I: 
LEGAL DESCRIPTION 
EXHIBIT 'A' 
Beginning at a point that is South 89°55'28" West along the Section line 1326.98 feet from the 
North Y.I Corner of Section 10, Township 1 North, Range 38 East of the Boise Meridian; running 
thence South 89°55'28" West along said Section line 1236.12 feet to the South Right-of-Way line of 
65th South; thence along said South Right-of-Way line of 65tb South and the East Right-of-Way line 
of 25 th East the following three (3) courses; South 00°12'54" East 28.10 feet to a point of curve with 
a radius of 69.34 feet and a chord bearing South 44°18'28" West 98.29 feet; thence to the left along 
said curve 109.24 feet through a central angle of 90°16'00"; thence South 89°10'28" West 28.71 feet 
to the West line of said Section 10; thence Sonth 00°19'04" East 1213.86 feet to the South line of the 
North 'li of the Northwest Y.I of said Section 10, thence North 89°54'09" East along said South line 
1327.87 feet; thence North 00°03'13" West 1312.06 feet to the POlNT OF BEGINNING. 
That portion thereof conveyed to the State of Idaho by that deed recorded on March 8, 1950 in 
Book 70 of Deeds at Page 287 of Official Records of Bonneville County, Idaho. 
TRACT II: 
Lot 11 in Block 3 of Canterbury Park, Division No.2, to the City of Idaho Falls, Idaho according to 
the official plat thereof, recorded October 19, 1992 as Instrument No. 837954 filed in Official 
Records of Bonneville County, Idaho. 
Exhibit "F" 
GUARANTY 
iCltr~ 
NOVEMBER 21 7008 • 
For good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of w.hich are hereby acknowledged, and to in-
duce THE BANK DE COMMEBCE·ADMINISTRATlON 
(herein, with its participants, successors and assigns, called "Lender"), at its option, at any time or from time to 
time to make loans or extend other accommodations to or for the account of LtO"'IJA"'NijJE"-yJJOL,CS"-T'-___________ _ 
(herein called "Borrower") or to engage in any other transactions with Borrower. the Undersigned hereby absolutely 
and unconditionally guarantees to Lender the full and prompt payment when due, whether at maturity or earlier by 
reason of acceleration or otherwise, of the debts, liabilities and obligations described as follows: 
A. If this 0 is checked, the Undersigned guarantees to Lender the payment and performance of the debt, lia-
bility or obligation of Borrower to Lender evidenced by or arising out of the following: 
_______________ ,..-______________________ and any extensions, 
renewals or replacements thereof (hereinafter referred to as the "Indebtedness"). 
B. If this [XI is checked, the Undersigned guarantees to Lender the payment and performance of each and 
every debt, liability and obligation of every type and description which Borrower may now or at any time 
hereafter owe to Lender (whether such debt, liability or obligation now exists or is hereafter created or 
incurreq, and whether it is or may be direct or indirect, due or to become due, absolute or contingent, 
primary or secondary, liquidated or unliquidated, or joint, several, or joint and several; all such debts, 
liabilities and obligations being hereinafter collectively referred to as the "Indebtedness"). Without limitation, 
this guaranty includes the following described debt(s): NOTE DATED 1112112008 FOB DUANE YOST IN THE AMOUNT OF 
$1.000,000.00 
The Undersigned further acknowledges and agrees with Lender that: 
1. No act or thing need occur to establish the liability of the Undersigned hereunder, and no act or thing, except 
full payment and discharge of all indebtedness, shall in any way exonerate the Undersigned or modify, reduce, limit 
or release the liability of the Undersigned hereunder. 
2. This is an absolute, unconditional and continuinQ guaranty of payment of the Indebtedness and shall continue 
to be in force and be binding upon the Undersigned, whether or not all Indebtedness is paid in full, until this 
guaranty is revoked by written notice actually received by the Lender, and such revocation shall not be effective as 
to Indebtedness existing or committed for at the time of actual receipt of such notice by the Lender, or as to any 
renewals, extensions and refinancings thereof. If there be more than one Undersigned, such revocation shall be 
effective only as to the one so revoking. The death or incompetence of the Undersigned shall not revoke this 
guaranty, except upon actual receipt of written notice thereof by Lender and then only as to the decedent or the 
incompetent and only prospectively, as to future transactions, as herein set forth. 
3. If the Undersigned shall be dissolved, shall die, or shall be or become insolvent (however defined) or revoke 
this guaranty, then the Lender shall have the right to declare immediately due and payaqle, and the Undersigned 
will forthwith pay to the Lender, the full amount of all Indebtedness, whether due and payable or unmatured. If the 
Undersigned voluntarily commences or there is commenced involuntarily against the Undersigned a case under the 
United States Bankruptcy Code, the full amount of all Indebtedness, whether due and payable or unmatured, shall 
be immediately due and payable without demand or notice thereof. . 
4. The liability of the Undersigned hereunder shall be limited to a principal amount of $ -'1"'.0"'0"'0"',0"'0"'0"'.0"'0'-_____ _ 
(if unlimited or if no amount is stated, the Undersigned shall be liable for all Indebtedness, without any limitation as 
to amount), plus accrued interest thereon and all other costs, fees, and expenses agreed to be paid under all 
agreements evidencing the Indebtedness and securing the payment of the Indebtedness, and all attorneys' fees, 
collection costs and enforcement expenses referable thereto. Indebtedness may be created and continued in any 
amount, whether· or not in excess of such principal amount, without affecting or impairing the liability of the 
Undersigned hereunder. The Lender may apply any sums received by or available to Lender on account of the 
Indebtedness from Borrower or any other person (except the Undersigned), from their properties, out of any 
collateral security or from any other source to payment of the excess. Such application of receipts shall not reduce, 
affect or impair the liability of the Undersigned hereunder. If the liability of the Undersigned is limited to a stated 
amount pursuant to this paragraph 4, any payment made by the Undersigned under this guaranty shall be effective 
to reduce or discharge such liability only if accompanied by a written transmittal document, received by the Lender, 
advising the Lender that such payment is made under this guaranty for such purpose. 
5. The Undersigned will payor reimburse Lender for all costs and expenses (including reasonable attorneys' fees 
and legal expenses) incurred by Lender in connection with the protection, defense or enforcement of this guaranty 
in any litigation or bankruptcy or insolvency proceedings. 
This guaranty includes the additional provisions on page Z, all of which are made a part hereof. 
This guaranty is fXI unsecured; 0 secured by a mortgage or security agreement dated __________ _ 
o secured by 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this guaranty has 
written. 
been duly executed by the Undersigned the day and year first above 
,~sr~~ 
"Unclatsigrl9d- shall ratar to all persons who Gign this guaranty, severally and jointly. 
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ADDITIONAL PROW"'\IS 
6. or not any existing relationship between the ,gned and Borrower has been changed or ended 
and or not this guaranty has been revoked. ay! but shall not be obligated to, enter into 
transactions resulting in the creation or continuance of Indebtedness, without any consent or approval by the 
Undersigned and without any notice to the Undersigned. The liability of the Undersigned shall not be affected or 
impaired by any of the following acts or things (which Lender is expressly authorized to do, omit or suffer from 
time to time, both before and after revocation of this guaranty, without notice to or approval by the Undersigned): 
0) any acceptance of collateral security, guarantors, accommodation parties Of sureties for any or all Indebtedness; 
(ii) anyone or more extensions or renewals of Indebtedness (whether or not for longer than the original period) or 
any modification of the interest rates, maturities or other contractual terms applicable to any Indebtedness; (iii) any 
waiver, adjustment, forbearance, compromise or indulgence granted to Borrower, any delay or lack of diligence in 
the enforcement of Indebtedness, or any failure to institute proceedings, file a claim, give any required notices or 
otherwise f3rotect any Indebtedness; (iv) any full or partial release of, settlement with, or agreement not to sue, 
Borrower or any other guarantor or other person liable in respect of any Indebtedness; (v) any discharge of any 
evidence of Indebtedness or the acceptance of any instrument in renewal thereof or substitution therefor; (vi) any 
failure to obtain collateral security (including rights of setoff) for Indebtedness, or to see to the proper or sufficient 
creation and perfection thereof, or to establish the priority thereof, or to protect, insure, or enforce any collateral 
security; or any release, modification, substitution, discharge, impairment, deterioration, waste, or loss of any 
collateral security; (vii) any foreclosure or enforcement of any collateral security; (viii) any transfer of any 
Indebtedness or any evidence thereof; fix) any order of application of any payments or credits upon Indebtedness; 
(x) any election by the Lender under § 1111 (b)(2) of the United States Bankruptcy Code. 
7. The Undersigned waives any and all defenses, claims and discharges of Borrower, or any other obligor, 
pertaining to Indebtedness, except the defense of discharge by payment in full. Without limiting the generality of 
the foregoing, the Undersigned will not assert, plead or enforce against Lender any defense of waiver, release, 
statute of limitations, res judicata, statute of frauds, fraud, incapacity, minority, usury, illegality or unenforceability 
which 'may be available to Borrower or any other person liable in respect of any Indebtedness, or any setoff 
available against Lender to Borrower or any such other person, whether or not on account of a related transaction. 
The Undersigned expressly agrees that the Undersigned shall be and remain liable, to the fullest extent permitted by 
applicable law, for any deficiency remaining after foreclosure of any mortgage or security interest securing 
Indebtedness, whether or not the liability of Borrower or any other obligor for such deficiency is discharged 
pursuant to statute or judicial decision. The Undersigned shall remain obligated, to the fullest extent permitted by 
law, to pay such amounts as though the Borrower's obligations had not been discharged. 
8. The Undersigned further agrees that the Undersigned shall be and remain obligated to pay Indebtedness even 
though any other person obligated to. pay Indebtedness, including Borrower, has such obligation discharged in 
bankruptcy or otherwise discharged by law. "Indebtedness" shall include post-bankruptcy petition interest and 
attorneys' fees and any other amounts which Borrower is discharged from paying or which do not otherwise accrue 
to Indebtedness due to Borrower's discharge, and the Undersigned shall remain obligated to pay such amounts as 
though Borrower's obligations had not been discharged. 
9. If any payment applied by Lender to Indebtedness is thereafter set aside, recovered, rescinded or required to 
be returned for any reason (including, without limitation, the bankruptcy, insolvency or reorganization of Borrower 
or any other obligor), the Indebtedness to which such payment was applied shall for the purposes of this guaranty 
be deemed to have continued in existence, notwithstanding such application, and this guaranty shall be enforceable 
as to such .Indebtedness as fully as if such application had never been made. 
10. Until the obligations of the Borrower to Lender have been paid in full, the Undersigned waives any claim, 
remedy or other right which the Undersigned may now have or hereafter acquire against Borrower or any other 
person obligated to pay Indebtedness arising out of the creation or performance of the Undersigned's obligation 
under this guaranty, including, without limitation, any right of subrogation, contribution, reimbursement, 
indemnification, exoneration, and any right to participate in any claim or remedy the Undersigned may have against 
the Borrower, collateral, or other party obligated for Borrower's debts, whether or not such claim, remedy or right 
arises in equity, or under contract, statute or common law. 
11. The Undersigned waives presentment, demand for payment, notice of dishonor or nonpayment, and protest 
of any instrument evidencing Indebtedness. Lender shall not be required first to resort for payment of the 
Indebtedness to Borrower or other persons or their properties, or first to enforce, realize upon or exhaust any 
collateral security for Indebtedness, before enforcing this guaranty. 
12. The liability of the Undersigned under this guaranty is in addition to and shall be cumulative with all other 
liabilities of the Undersigned to Lender as guarantor or otherwise, without any limitation as to amount, unless the 
instrument or agreement evidencing or creating such other liability specifically provides to the contrary. 
13. This guaranty shall be enforceable against each person signing this guaranty, even if only one person signs 
and regardless of any failure of other persons to sign this guaranty. If there be more than one signer, all 
agreements and promises herein shall be construed to be, and are hereby declared to be, joint and several in each 
of every particular and shall be fully binding upon and enforceable against either, any or all the Undersigned. This 
guaranty shall be effective upon delivery to Lender, without further act, condition or acceptance by Lender, shall be 
binding upon the Undersigned and the heirs, representatives, successors and assigns of the Undersigned and shall 
inure to the benefit of Lender and its participants, successors and assigns. Any invalidity or unenforceability of any 
provision or application of this guaranty shall not affect other lawful provisions and application hereof, and to this 
end the provisions of this guaranty are declared to be severable. Except as authorized by the terms herein, this 
guaranty may not be waived, modified, amended, terminated, released or otherwise changed except by a writing 
signed by the Undersigned and Lender. This guaranty shall be governed by the laws of the State in which it is 
executed. The Undersigned waives notice of Lender's acceptance hereof. 
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GUARANTOR NAME AND ADDRESS 
HAMPSHIRE HOLDINGS, LLC 
I.H'DER NAME AND ADDRESS 
ANK OF COMMERCE·ADMINISTRATION 
.3 SOUTH 25TH EAST, P.O. 1887 
Number ------~~w~ 
3777 HAMPSHIRE CT. Amount 
IDAHO FAILS. 10 83404 FALLS, 10 83403 
Date NOVEMBER 21, 2008 
GUARANTY 
DATE. The date of this Guaranty is j1LJlj·2~1!..:.£20~0!!8<-_____________________ -:-_-:----:---:_---:-_-:----:----:--:-:-. 
For good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged, and to induce Lender (with its 
participants, successors and assigns). at its option, at any time or from time to time to make loans or extend other accommodations to 
or for the accountofJnlll~IA~N~ELYYDO~SlT ___________________________________ -:-_______ -:-______ ~--------~-
(Borrower) or to engage in any other transactions 
with Borrower, the Guarantor hereby absDlutely and unconditionally guarantees to the Lender the full and prompt payment when due, 
whether at maturity or earlier by reaSDn Df acceleratiDn or otherwise, Df the debts, liabilities and obligations described as follows: 
INDEBTEDNESS. 
o Specific Debts, The Guarantor guarantees to Lender the payment and performance of the debt, liability or obligation of 
Borrower tD Lender evidenced by or arising out of the following: __________________________________________ _ 
_________________ and any extensions, renewals or replacements thereDf (Indebtedness). 
[Xj All Debts. Except as this Guaranty may otherwise provide, the Guarantor guarantees to Lender the payment and 
performance of each and every debt, liability and obligation of every type and description which Borrower may now or at any 
time hereafter owe to Lender (whether such debt, liability or obligation now exists Of is hereafter created or incurred, and 
whether it is or may be direct or indirect, due or to become due, absolute or contingent. primary or secondary, liquidated or 
unliquidated, or joint, several, or joint and several; all such debts, liabilities and obligations {Indebtedness)). Without limitation, 
this Guaranty includes the fDllowing described debtlsl: 
NOTE DATED 11121/2008 FOR DUANE YOST IN THE AMOUNT OF $1 ,000,000.00 
Exclusions. 
o Guarantor will be liable for $ of the principal amount of the Indebtedness outstanding at 
default and for all of the accrued interest, and the expenses of collection, enforcement or protection of Lender's fights and 
remedies under this Guaranty, including reasonable attorneys' fees. 
o Guarantor's liability will not exceed % of the Indebtedness outstanding at default and all of the accrued 
interest, and the expenses of collection, enforcement or protection of Lender's rights and remedies under this Guaranty, 
including reasonable attDrneys' fees. 
o Indebtedness Excludes: 
SECURITY, 
[Xl the Guaranty is unsecured. 
o secured by 
!L only 0 CONFESSION OF JUDGMENT. If Guarantor defaults, it authDrizes any attorney to appear in a court of record and confess 
judgment against it in favor of Lender. The confession of judgment may be without process and for any amount due on this Guaranty 
including collection costs and reasonable attorneys' fees. 
PA only 0 WARRANT OF AUTHORITY TO CONFESS JUDGMENT. Upon d"fault, in addition to all other remedies and rights available 
to Lender. by signing below Guarantor irrevocably authorizes the prothonotary, clerk. or any attorney to appear in any court of record 
having jurisdiction over this matter and to confess judgment against Guarantor at any time without stay of execution. Guarantor 
waives notice, service of process and process. Guarantor agrees and understands that judgment may be confessed against Guarantor 
for any unpaid principal. accrued interest and accrued charges due on this Note, plus collection costs and reasonable attorneys' fees up 
to 15 percent of the jUdgment. The exercise of the power to confess judgment will not exhaust this warrant of authority to confess 
judgment and may be done as often as Lender elects. Guarantor further understands that Guarantor's property may be seized without 
prior notice to satisfy the debt owed. Guarantor knowingly. intentionally. and voluntarily waives any and all constitutional rights 
Guarantor has to pre-deprivation notice and hearing under federal and state laws and fully understands the consequences of t"i5 
waiver .. 
By signing immediately below, Guarantor agrees to the terms of the WARRANT OF AUTHORITY TO CONFESS JUDGMENT section. 
SIGNATURES, By signing under seal, Guarantor agrees to the terms contained in this Guaranty !including those on page 21. Guarantor 
also acknowledges receipt of a copy of this Guaranty. 
GUARANTOR: 
HAMPSHIRE HOLDINGS, LLC 
Entity Name IS.al) 
" ~ /!4V.-f...-- /( ~ (Seal) 
Name, Title (Sea!) 
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funher acknowledges and agrees with Lender 
thing need occur to establish the liability of the 
, and no act or thing, except full payment and 
discharge Indebtedness, shaii in any way exonerate the 
Guarantor or modify, reduce, limit or release the liability of the 
Guarantor hereunder. 
2. This is an absolute, unconditional and continuing Guaranty of 
payment of the Indebtedness and will continue to be enforceable 
against the Guarantor, whether or not all Indebtedness is paid in 
full, until this Guaranty is revoked by written notice actually 
received by the Lender. Any revocation shall not be effective as to 
any Indebtedness existing or committed to at the time of actual 
receipt of notice by the Lender, or as to any renewals, extensions 
and refinancings thereof. 
The Guarantor represents and warrants to the Lender that the 
Guarantor has a direct and substantial economic interest in 
Borrower and expects to derive substantial benefits therefrom and 
from any loans and financial accommodations resulting from the 
creation of Indebtedness.guaranteed hereby, and that this 
Guaranty is gi~en for a business purpose. The Guarantor agrees to 
rely exclusively on its right to revoke this Guaranty prospectively 
as to future transactions by written notice actually received by 
Lender if at any time the benefits then being received by· the 
Guarantor in connection with this Guaranty are not sufficient to 
warrant its continuance as a Guarantor as to future Indebtedness. 
Accordingly, the Lender may rely conclusively on a continuing 
warranty, hereby made, that the Guarantor continues to be 
benefited by this Guaranty and that the Lender has no duty to 
inquire into or confirm the receipt of any benefits, and that this 
Guaranty will be enforceable without regard to the receipt, nature 
or value of any such benefits. 
3. If the Guarantor is dissolved or becomes insolvent, however 
defined, or revokes this Guaranty, then the Lender has the right to 
declare the full amount of all Indebtedness immediately due and 
payable, and the Guarantor will fonhwith pay the Lender. If the 
Guarantor voluntarily commences or there is commenced 
involuntarily against the Guarantor a case under the United States 
Bankruptcy Code, the full amount of all Indebtedness, whether 
due and payable or unmatured. will become immediately due and 
payable without demand or notice thereof. 
4. The Guarantor will be liable for all Indebtedness, without any 
limitation as to amount .. plus accrued interest thereon and all other 
costs, fees, and expenses agreed to be paid under all agreements 
evidencing the Indebtedness and securing the payment of the 
Indebtedness, and all attorneys' fees, collection costs and 
enforcement expenses referable thereto. Indebtedness may be 
created and continued in any amount, whether or not in excess of 
such principal amount, without affecting or impairing the liability of 
the GUarantor hereunder. The Lender may apply any sums 
received by or available to the Lender on account of the 
Indebtedness from Borrower or any other person (except the 
Guarantor), from their properties, out of any collateral security or 
from any other source to payment of the excess. Such application 
of receipts will not reduce, affect or impair the liability of the 
Guarantor hereunder. If the liability of the Guarantor is limited 
pursuant to this paragraph 4, any payment made by the Guarantor 
under this Guaranty will be effective to reduce or discharge its 
liability only if accompanied by a written transmittal document, 
received by the Lender, advising that such payment is made under 
this Guaranty for that purpose. 
S. The Guarantor will payor reimburse the Lender for all costs 
and expenses (including reasonable attorneys' fees and legal 
expenses) incurred by the Lender in connection with the 
protection, defense or enforcement of this GUaranty in any 
litigation or bankruptcy or insolvency proceedings. 
6. Whether or not any existing relationship between the 
Guarantor and Borrower has been changed or ended and whether 
or not this Guaranty has been revoked. the Lender may, but shall 
not be obligated to, enter into transactions resulting in the creation 
or continuance of Indebtedness, without any consent or approval 
by the Guarantor and without any notice to the Guarantor. The 
liability of the Guarantor will not be affected or impaired by any of 
the following acts or things (which the Lender is expressly 
authorized to do, omit or suffer from time to time, both before and 
after revocation of this Guaranty, without notice to or approval by 
the Guarantor): (i) any acceptance of collateral security, 
Guarantors, accommodation parties or sureties for any or all 
Indebtedness; (ii) anyone or more extensions or renewals of 
Indebtedness (whether or not for longer than the original period) or 
any modification of the interest rates, maturities or other 
contractual terms applicable to any Indebtedness; (iii) any waiver, 
adjustment, forbearance, compromise or indulgence granted to 
Borrower, any delay or lack of diligence in the enforcement of 
Indebtedness, or any failure to institute proceedings, file a claim, 
give any reqUired notices or otherwise protect any Indebtedness; 
(iv) any full or partial release of, settlement with, or agreement not 
to sue, Borrower or any other Guarantor or other person liable in 
respect of any Indebtedness; (v) any discharge of any evidence of 
Indebtedness or the acceptance of any instrument in renewal 
thereof or substitution therefor; (vi) any failure to obtain collateral 
security (including rights of setoff) for Indebtedness, or to see to 
the proper or sufficient creation and perfection thereof, or to 
establish the priority thereof, or to protect, insure, or enforce any 
collateral security; or any release, modification, substitution, 
discharge, impairment, deterioration, waste, or loss of any 
collateral security; (vii) any foreclosure or enforcement of any 
collateral security; (viii) any transfer of any Indebtedness or any 
evidence thereof; (ix) any order of application of any payments or 
credits upon Indebtedness; (x) any election by the Lender under 
§ 1111 (b)(2) of the United States Bankruptcy Code. 
7. The Guarantor waives any and all defenses, claims and 
discharges of Borrower, or any other obligor, penaining to 
Indebtedness, except the defense of discharge by payment in full. 
Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, the Guarantor will 
not assert, plead or enforce against the Lender any defense of 
waiver, release, estoppel, statute of limita'~~s, res judicata, 
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·~auds, fraud, forgery, incapac:ity, minority. usury, 
un enforceability which may be available to Borrower or 
liable in respect of any Indebtedness, or any 
against the Lender to Borrower or any such other 
er or no! on account of 8' reia1ed transactiooo The 
GUIBfianltor expressly agrees that the Guarantor will be liable, to the 
fullest extent permitted by applicable law, for any deficiency 
remaining after foreclosure of any mortgage or security interest 
securing Indebtedness, whether or not the liability of Borrower or 
any other obligor for such deficiency is discharged pursuant to 
statute or judicial decision. The Guarantor shall remain obligated, 
to the fullest extent permitted by law, to pay such amounts as 
though Borrower's obligations had not been discharged. 
8. The Guarantor funher agree(s) that Guarantor will be 
obligated to pay Indebtedness even though any other person 
obligated to pay Indebtedness, including Borrower, has such 
obligation discharged in bankruptcy or otherwise discharged by 
law. "Indebtedness" shall include post-bankruptcy petition interest 
and attorneys' fees and any other amounts which Borrower is 
discharged from paying or which do not accrue to Indebtedness 
due to Borrower's discharge, and Guarantor will be obligated to 
pay such amounts as fully as if Borrower's obligations had not 
been discharged. 
9. If any payment applied by the Lender to Indebtedness is 
thereafter set aside, recovered, rescinded or required to be 
returned for any reason (including, without limitation, the 
bankruptcy, insolvency or reorganization of Borrower or any other 
obligor), the Indebtedness to which such payment was applied will 
for the purposes of this Guaranty be deemed to have continued in 
existence, notwithstanding such application, and this Guaranty will 
be enforceable as to such Indebtedness as fully as if such 
application had never been made. 
10. Until the obligations of the Borrower to Lender have been 
paid in full, the Guarantor waive(s) any claim, remedy or other 
right which the Guarantor may now have or hereafter acquire 
against Borrower or any other person obligated to pay 
Indebtedness arising out of the creation or performance of the 
Guarantor's obligation under this Guaranty, including, without 
limitation, any right of subrogation, contribution, reimbursement, 
indemnification, exoneration or any right to participate in any claim 
or remedy the Guarantor may have against the Borrower, 
collateral, or other party obligated for Borrower's debt, whether or 
not such claim .. remedy, or right arises in equity, or under 
contract, statute or common law. 
11. The Guarantor waives presentment, demand for payment, 
notice of dishonor or nonpayment .. and protest of any instrument 
evidencing Indebtedness. The Lender will not be required first to 
resort for payment of the Indebtedness to Borrower or other 
persons or their propenies. or first to enforce, realize upon or 
exhaust any collateral security for Indebtedness, before enforcing 
this Guaranty. 
12. The liability of the Guarantor under this Guaranty is in 
addition to and is cumulative with all other liabilities of the 
Guarantor to the Lender as Guarantor or otherwise, without any 
limitation as to amount, unless the instrument or agreement 
evidencing or creating such other liability specifically provides to 
the contrary. 
13. To induce Lender to enter into the Loan, Guarantor makes 
these representations and warranties for as long as Guaranty is in 
effect. Guarantor is duly organized, validly existing and in good 
standing under the laws in the jurisdiction where Guarantor was 
organized and is duly qualified, validly existing and in good 
standing in all jurisdictions in which Guarantor operates or 
Guarantor owns or leases property. Guarantor has the power and 
authority to enter into this transaction and to carry on Guarantor's 
business or activity as now conducted. The execution, delivery 
and performance of this Guaranty and the obligation evidenced by 
this Guaranty are within Guarantor's duly authorized powers; have 
received all necessary governmental approval; will not violate any 
provision of law or order of court or governmental agency; and will 
not violate any agreement to which Guarantor is a party or to 
which Guarantor is or any of Guarantor's propeny is subject. 
Other than previously disclosed in writing to Lender, Guarantor has 
not changed Guarantor's name or principal place of business 
within the last ten years and has not us"d any other trade or 
fictitious name. Without Lender's prior written consent, Guarantor 
does not and wm not use any other name and will preserve 
Guarantor's existing name, trade names and franchises. Guarantor 
owns or leases all property that Guarantor needs to conduct 
Guarantor's business and activities. All of Guarantor's propeny is 
free and clear of all liens, security interests, encumbrances and 
other adverse claims and interests, except those Lender previously 
agreed to in writing. Guarantor is not violating any laws, 
regulations, rules, orders, judgments or decrees applicable to 
Guarantor or Guarantor's propeny, except for those that Guarantor 
is challenging in good faith through proper proceedings after 
providing adequate reserves to fully pay the claim and its 
challenge should Guarantor lose. 
14. This Guaranty is effective upon delivery to the Lender, 
without funher act, condition or acceptance by the Lender. It will 
be binding upon the Guarantor and the suCCessors and assigns of 
the Guarantor and will inure to the benefit of the Lender and its 
participants, successors and assigns. If there be more than one 
Guarantor, all agreements and promises herein shall be construed 
to be, and are hereby declared to be, joint and several in each and 
every particular and shall be fully binding upon and enforceable 
against either, any or all the Guarantors. Any invalidity or 
un enforceability of any provision or application of this Guaranty 
will not affect other lawful proviSions and application hereof, and 
to this end the provisions of this Guaranty are declared to be 
severable. Except as allowed by the terms herein, this Guaranty 
may not be waived, modified, amended, terminated, released or 
otherwise changed except by a writing signed by the Guarantor 
and the Lender. This Guaranty shall be governed by the laws of 
the State in which it is executed. The Guarantor waives notice of 
the Lender's acceptance hereof. 
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Douglas R. Nelson - ISB# 1580 
Brian T. Tucker - ISB# 5236 
Wiley R. Dennert - ISB# 6216 
NELSON HALL PARRY TUCKER, P.A. 
490 Memorial Drive 
P.O. Box 51630 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-1630 
Telephone:(208) 522-3001 
Facsimile: (208) 523-7254 
Attorneys for The Bank of Commerce 
':'~ _,_ 1 
; 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
DARRYL HARRIS and CHRISTINE 
HARRIS, husband and wife, 
PlaintiiTs, 
v. 
DUANE L YOST and LORI YOST, husband 
and wife, DUANE L YOST as Trustee of the 
DUANE L YOST TRUST, THE BANK OF 
COMMERCE, an Idaho Corporation and 
JOHN DOES I-X, 
Defendants . 
Case No. CV -09-3488 
JUDGMENT ON HARRISES' AND 
THE BANK OF COMMERCE'S 
MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT, DECREE OF 
FORECLOSURE, AND ORDER OF 
SALE 
. JUDGMENT ON HARRISES' AND THE BANK OF COMMERCE'S MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT, DECREE OF FORECLOSURE, AND ORDER OF SALE - 1 
THE BANK OF COMMERCE, an Idaho 
corporation, 
v. 
Counterclaimant/Cross-
claimant/Third-Party Claimant, 
DARRYL HARRIS and CHRISTINE 
HARRIS, husband and wife, 
Counterdefendants, 
and 
DUANE L. YOST and LORI YOST, husband 
and wife, DUANE L. YOST as Trustee of the 
DUANE L. YOST TRUST, JOI-IN DOES I-X, 
Crossdefendants, 
and 
HAMPSHIRE HOLDINGS, LLC, 
Third-Party Defendant. 
This matter came on before the Court on Harrises' and The Bank of Commerce's Motion for 
Summary Judgment and based on the Court's Order on Motions for Summary Judgment dated March 
31, 2011, and for good cause appearing therefore; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. That The Bank of Commerce have an in rem judgment against Duane L. Yost and 
Lori Yost, husband and wife, ("Yosts" herein) in the sum of $1 ,50 1 ,399.44; detailed as follows: 
a. On the Promissory Note dated April 16,2008, judgment in the principal and interest 
amount of $802,976.06 as of September 16, 2010, plus a per diem interest accrual 
from September 16,2010 to April 28, 2011 at the per diem rate of$1 01.13794. (224 
JUDGMENT ON HARRISES' AND THE BANK OF COMMERCE'S MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT, DECREE OF FORECLOSURE, AND ORDER OF SALE - 2 
days X $101.13794 = $22,654.90). Thus the total amount of the Judgment relating 
to the April 16, 2008 note is $825,630.96. 
b. On the Promissory Note dated November 21, 2008, judgment in the principal and 
interest amount of$638,007 .50 as of March 31,2010, plus a per diem interest accrual 
from March 31,2010 to April 28, 2011 at the per diem rate of$96.083929. (393 days 
X $96.083929 = $37,760.98). Thus the total amount of the Judgment relating to the 
March 31, 2010 note is $675,768.48. 
2. That Y osts' Deed of Trust to the Bank of Commerce dated November 21, 2008. and 
recorded November 21,2008 and re-recorded on December 17,2008, in the records of Bonneville 
County, State of Idaho as Instrument Nos. 1317355 and 1319093, is adjudged a first and prior lien 
upon the mortgaged property superior to any right, title, claim or interest on the part of the Yosts or 
Darryl and Christine Harris ("Harris" herein) or any persons claiming by, through, or under said 
Y osts or Harris, or any other third-party. 
3. That Yosts' Deed of Trust to the Bank of Commerce dated December 24, 2008, and 
recorded December 30,2008 in the records of Bonneville County, State ofIdaho as Instrument No. 
1319937, is adjudged a first and prior lien upon the mortgaged property superior to any right, title, 
claim or interest on the part of the named Y osts or Harris or any persons claiming by, through, or 
under said Y osts or Harris. 
4. Said Deeds of Trust cover the following described real property situated in Bonneville 
County, Idaho: 
TRACT I 
Beginning at a point that is South 89°55'28" West along the Section line 1326.98 feet 
from the North 1;4 Corner of Section 10, Township 1 North, Range 38 East of the 
Boise Meridian; running thence South 89°55'28" West along said Section line 
1236.12 feet to the South Right-of-Way line of 65 th South; thence along said South 
Right-of-Way line of 65 th South and the East Right-of-Way line of 25 th East the 
following three (3) courses; South 00°12'54" East 28.10 feet to a point of curve with 
a radius of69.34 feet and a chord bearing South 44°18'28" West 98.29 feet; thence 
to the left along said curve 109.24 feet through a central angle of 90° 16'00"; thence 
South 89°10'28" West 28.71 feet to the West line of said Section 10; thence South 
00°19'04" East 1216.86 feet to the South line of the North 12 of the Northwest v.; of 
JUDGMENT ON HARRISES' AND THE BANK OF COMMERCE'S MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT, DECREE OF FORECLOSURE, AND ORDER OF SALE - 3 
said Section 10, thence North 89°54'09" East along said South line l327.87 feet; 
thence North 00°03'13" West l312.06 feet to the POINT OF BEGINNING. 
Excepting 
That portion thereof conveyed to the State of Idaho by that deed recorded on May 8, 
1950 in Book 70 of Deeds at Page 287 of Official Records of Bonneville County, 
Idaho. 
("Real Property Collateral" herein) 
5. That the Court, hereby retains jurisdiction and reserves the final determination of a 
deficiency judgment against the above named Yosts, the issue ofthe value of the Mortgaged Property 
and hereby orders that following the sale of the Mortgaged Property, The Bank of Commerce may 
establish the reasonable value of the Mortgaged Property herein described according to proof and 
determine the amount of any deficiency. 
6. That the Bank of Commerce's Deeds of Trust described herein are foreclosed and said 
real property, together with water rights, however evidenced, be sold in one (I) parcel in accordance 
with and in the manner provided by law; that the Bank of Commerce is permitted to be a purchaser 
at sale; that the net proceeds of said sale shall be applied first toward the payment of the costs of said 
sale and then toward the payment of the Bank of Commerce's Judgement; that the Bank of 
Commerce has and shall retain a right to apply for a Deficiency Judgement against Y osts, and each 
of them, jointly and severally, in the event that bid at sale or fair market value of the foreclosed real 
property is less than the sum of the Bank of Commerce's entire Judgement, plus costs of sale. 
7. That after the sale of said Mortgaged Property, all right, title, claim, lien, or interest 
in the above-named Yosts and Harris, and of every person claiming by, through, or under said Yosts 
or Harris, in or to said property, including the right of possession thereof from and after said sale, 
shall be forever barred and foreclosed and that the purchaser at said sale shall be entitled to 
immediate possession of the premises as allowed by law subject only to such statutory right of 
redemption as said Yosts may have by law. 
8. That in the event the Bank of Commerce is the purchaser at sale and possession of 
said premises is not surrendered to the Bank of Commerce, a Writ of Assistance shall be issued 
JUDGMENT ON HARRISES' AND THE BANK OF COMMERCE'S MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT, DECREE OF FORECLOSURE, AND ORDER OF SALE - 4 
directing the sheriff of Bonneville County, Idaho, to deliver possession of said premises to the Bank 
of Commerce. 
DATED this ~ day of June, 2011. ( ....... ~. '" 
\ \ J~~\~~ 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
1 I hereby certify that I served a true copy of the foregoing document upon the following this __ day of June, 2010, by hand delivery, mailing with the necessary postage affixed thereto, 
facsimile, or overnight mail. 
Brian T. Tucker 
NELSON HALL PARRY TUCKER 
P.O. Box 51630 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-1630 
Kipp L. Manwaring 
MANWARING LA W OFFICE 
381 Shoup Avenue, Suite 210 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
Duane Yost 
3777 Hampshire Court 
Idaho Falls, ID 83401 
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)Z('Mailing 
D Fax 
D Hand Delivery 
D Overnight Mail 
~Mailing 
DFax 
Hand Delivery 
Overnight Mail 
~ Mailing 
D Fax 
D Hand Delivery 
D Overnight Mail 
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STATE OF IDAHO 
(Process Servez:) 
AFFlnAVIT OF SE...1U1JCB ON 
') 
,'':' 
CaseNo • .?&~rt 
, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that the testimony 
I shall give in the matter at • shall be the troth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. 
(Check on;yone of tho fonowing): 
X personally. 
said address being t1:te usual dwelling orplace of abOde of said part:y;. The person who 
received such process then was over the ago of 18 and then.resided: at such address: 
_ who is agent authorized by law or by appointment torecei.ve service ofpmcess for said party. 
. . 
(SEAL) 
r; tj "; 
..J lJ t-.. 
STATE OF IDAHO 
County ofBonnevi11e 
/';7 
AFFIDAVIT OF SER\<1CB ON 
) 
)88. 
) i ' 
1, ~z-£c:t': L 
~ (l'rocess Senr~ 
t do solemnly swear (or affirm) that the testimony 
I shall give in.1he matter at . '"' shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nqthittg but the truth. 
(Check only one oltho fonowing): 
\ . . 
LpersonallY. . 
_ said address being the usual dwelling OJ' p1aco of abOde of said party. Tho person who 
received such process ihen was over the.age of 18 and ~ resided-at such address: 
_ who is agent aufhorlzed by law or by appointment to receive service ofprocess for said party. 
. -
3. Fee charged for this service: $. ____ _ 
DATED: ~ ~/ S~ {/ 
,",. 
(SEA¥)·· 
Residing at: 't 
Commission EX:PiIl=S: ==~ 
rt1\ 
J~j 
MANWARING LAW OFFICE, P.A. 
Kipp L. Manwaring ~ ISB 3817 
381 Shoup Avenue, Suite 210 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
2DlI 
? I h L" I..) 
i Telephone: (208) 782-2300 
Facsimile: (208) 523 -91 09 . 'i ;il~' !?:~'IS'ION :'.:L : (;:!NTY 
Attorney for the Plaintiffs 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO, COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
DARRYL HARRIS and CHRISTINE 
HARRIS, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DUANE L. YOST and LORI YOST, 
husband and wife, DUANE L. YOST 
as Trustee of the DUANE L. YOST 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
TRUST, THE BANK OF COMMERCE, ) 
an Idaho Corporation and JOHN DOES I-X,) 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
Case No. CV-09-3488 
MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND 
In accordance with LR. C.P. 59( e) and 60(b), the Harrises move the court for its 
order altering or amending its judgment entered June 7, 2011. This motion is based upon 
the pleadings of record. 
Judgment was entered in favor of the Bank of Commerce for a certain monetary 
amount with authorization for judgment of foreclosure of the Bank's deeds of trust. 
Judgment was improperly entered prior to the court making its final determination on the 
partial summary judgment issue of whether the Bank was a bona fide encumbrancer. 
If the court finds there are genuine issues of material fact preventing partial 
summary judgment on the issue of whether the Bank was a bona fide encumbrancer, then 
the judgment must be set aside pending trial. 
Motion To Alter or Amend 
Harris v. Yost/Bank a/Commerce 
Case No. CV -09-3488 
If the court determines there are no genuine Issues of material fact prevent partial 
summary judgment, the court must further determine the Hanises' claim for vendor's lien 
and equitable mortgage and establish a priority for purposes of foreclosure and 
redemption. The current judgment fails to identify the Harrises' remaining claims for 
vendor's lien and equitable mortgage. Judgment has been entered in favor of the Hanises 
and against the Y osts for a monetary amount. The Harrises are entitled to satisfy that 
judgment against any lien they have on the subject real property as a junior lien holder. 
The Harrises are also entitled to rights as redemptioners. 
Furthermore, the Bank did not provide a verified affidavit setting forth the 
amounts in support of its judgment. In its Amended Answer and Counterclaim, the Bank 
alleges two notes in the total amount of $3,000,000 plus interest seeured by two deeds of 
trust. However, the judgment is for a lesser amount. There is no way of determining 
whether the Bank has conectly applied payments the Y osts have made to come up with 
the balance. The Bank must supply such information. In his deposition, Tom Romrell 
identified payments applicable to the notes, including sales of other collateral. The 
Hanises believe the Bank must engage in marshalling of the Y osts assets forming any 
part of its collateral in order to detennine the amount for judgment of foreclosure against 
the subject property. 
Oral argument is requested. 
Dated this 16th day of June 2011. 
Motion To Alter or Amend 
Harris v. Yost/Bank a/Commerce 
Case No. CV-09-3488 
~~ 
Kipp L Manwaring ~ 
Attorney for the Plaintiffs 
2 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 16th day of June 2011, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing document was served upon the person or persons named below, in the 
manner indicated. 
DOCUMENT SERVED: 
PARTIES SERVED: 
Motion To Alter or Amend 
Harris v. Yost/Bank a/Commerce 
Case No. CV-09-3488 
MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND 
Douglas R. Nelson 
Nelson Hall Parry Tucker 
PO Box 51630 
3 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-1630 
MAILED f\\\t\~ U1vY\~; 
Alicia Lambert 
Legal Assistant 
Douglas R. Nelson - ISB# 1580 
Brian 1'. Tucker - JSB# 5236 
Wiley R. Dennert - rSB# 6216 
NELSON HALL PARRY TUCKER, P.A. 
490 Memorial Drive 
P.O. Box 51630 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-1630 
Te1ephone:(208) 522-3001 
Facsimile: (208) 523-7254 
Attomeys for The Bank of Commerce 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
DARRYL HARRIS and CHRISTINE 
HARRIS, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
DUANE L. YOST and LORI YOST, husband 
and wife, DUANE L. YOST as Trustee of the 
DUANE L. YOST TRUST, THE BANK OF 
COMMERCE, an Idaho Corporation and 
JOHN DOES I-X, 
Defendants. 
OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND - I 
Case No. CV-09-3488 
OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO 
ALTER OR AMEND 
r· ti ~) :' "-.1: 
THE BANK OF COMMERCE, an Idaho 
corporation, 
v. 
Counterclaimant/Cross-
claimant/Third-Party 
Claimant, 
DARRYL HARRIS and CHRISTINE 
HARRIS, husband and wi fe, 
Countcrdefcndants, 
and 
DUANE L. YOST and LORI YOST, husband 
and wife, DUANE L. YOST as Trustee of the 
DUANE L. YOST TRUST, JOHN DOES I-X, I 
Crossdefendants, 
and 
HAMPSHIRE HOLDINGS, LLC, 
Third-Party Defendant. 
COMES NOW DefendantiCounterclaimant/Cross-claimantiThird-Party Claimant The Bank 
of Commerce (the "Bank"), through counsel of record, and objects to and opposes the Motion to 
Alter or Amend filed by Darryl HalTis and Christine HalTis (collectively the "Harrises"), as follows: 
1. The Court did make its final detem1ination on the summary judgment issue regarding 
the Bank's status as a bona fide encumbrancer and determined there were no genuine issues of 
material fact on this issue. Thus the Court properly granted the Bank a full summary judgment. 
I 
2. The Han-ises chose to obtain a default money judgment against the Y osts. Therefore, 
OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND - 2 
;', t -; 
J/J 
they have elected their remedy and are not entitled to now obtain a judieial lien against the subject 
real property using the theories of a vendor's lien or an equitable mortgage. Ifthere is a surplus after 
the property is sold and the proceeds are applied to the Yosts' loans with the Ba11k, then the Harrises 
can use their judgment to execute on those proceeds.' 
3. The Bank did provide an affidavit setting forth the amounits in support of its 
judgment. Specifically, the Bank filed the Affidavit of Michael MOlTison on September 16, 2010. 
Mr. Morrison's affidavit declares that all collateral, other than the subject Real Property Collateral, 
has been liquidated and applied to the loans. Thereafter, Mr. Morrison's affidavit states the 
remaining principal and interest that is due on the loans plus the per diem rate of interest due 
thereafter. As all ofthe Yosts' other collateral has been liquidated and applied to the loans, there are 
no other assets to marshall. 
The Court should deny the Harrises' Motion to Alter or Amend. 
DATED this ;)1 day ofJune, 2011. : 
~-Z? ~ 
, However, it is very unlikely that there will be any surplus following the sale of the property and application 
ofthe proceeds to the Bank's loans, because the Yosts owe well over $1 ,440,983.56 ($802,976.06 + $638,007.50), which 
is the amount of combined principal and interest set forth in the Affidavit of Michael Morrison, plus a substantial amount 
of accrued per diem interest. See Affidavit of Michael Morrison, '1'15-6. The accrued per diem interest is approximately 
$72,643.64 as of June 29,2011. As such, the amount the Yosts owe the Bank is at least $1,513,627.20. Darryl Harris 
agreed to sell the subject 40 acres to Duane Yost for $800,000, which was $20,000 per acre. See Darryl Harris Aff., p. 
33, II. 18-23. Darryl Harris testified that the property was later appraised for either $15,000 per acre or $17,000 per acre. 
ld. at 54, II. 4-8. Therefore, the 40 acres was later w0l1h between $600,000 and $680,000 which is well below the 
amount the Y ost5 owe the Bank. 
OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND - 3 (-, t "i 
.; ;"~) 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certifY that I served a true copy of the foregoing document upon the following 
this ~ day of June, 2011, by hand delivery, mailing with the necessary postage affixed 
thereto, facsimile, or overnight mail. 
Kipp L. Manwaring 
MANWARING LAW OFFICE 
381 Shoup Avenue, Suite 210 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
PCI Mailing 
[ ] Hand Delivery M Fax: 523-9109 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
Brian T. Tucker 
L:\ORN\0260.491\Opposi(ion (0 Motion (0 Alter or Amend,wpd 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL'DIS"l'RICT 
STATE OF IDAHO, BONNEVILLE COUNTX it'! 
If 19 
DARRYL HARRIS and CHRISTINE ) 
HARRIS, husband and wife, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
DUANE L. YOST and LORI YOST, husband ) 
and wife, DUANE L. YOST as Trustee of the ) 
DUANE L. YOST TRUST, THE BANK OF ) 
COMMERCE, an Idaho corporation, and ) 
JOHN DOES I-X, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
Case No. CV-09-3488 
AMENDED JUDGMENT AND 
DECREE OF FORECLOSURE 
On July 6,2011 this action came before the court for hearing the Harrises' motion to alter 
or amend. After considering the arguments of counsel, the court determined it would amend its 
judgment entered June 6, 2011. Therefore; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Harrises' motion to alter or amend is granted and 
amended judgment of foreclosure is entered as follows. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Harrises' motion for reconsideration is denied. 
I 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that: 
1. The Bank of Commerce have judgment of foreclosure against the Defendants, 
Duane L. Yost and Lori Yost, and the Duane L. Yost Trust (the Yosts) and all interest the Yosts 
i 
may have in the real property described below is foreclosed as decreed in this judgment. 
2. Subject to the senior priority of the Bank of Commerce, the Harrises have 
judgment of foreclosure against the Y osts and all interest the Y osts may have in the real property 
described below is foreclosed as decreed in this judgment. 
3. This judgment of foreclosure applies to the following real property: see Exhibit A 
attached and incorporated here by reference. 
4. In accordance with the Second Affidavit of Thomas J. Romrell filed with the 
court, the Bank of Commerce is entitled to judgment of foreclosure of its deed of trust as 
follows: 
a. Principal amount of$I,501,399.44; 
Amended Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure - Page I 
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b. On the Promissory Note dated April 16, 2008, judgment in the principal 
and interest amount of $802,976.06 as of September 16, 2010, plus a per diem interest accrual 
from September 16, 2010 to April 28, 2011 at the per diem rate of $101,13794. (224 days X 
$101.13794 = $22,654.90). Thus the total amount of the Judgment relating to the April 16,2008 
note is $825,630.96. 
c. On the Promissory Note dated November 21, 2008, judgment in the 
principal and interest amount of $638,007.50 as of March 31, 2010, plus a per diem interest 
accrual from March 31, 2010 to April 28, 2011 at the per diem rate of $96,083929. (393 days X 
$96.083929 = $37,760.98). Thus the total amount of the Judgment relating to the March 31, 
2010 note is $675,768,48. 
d. Post judgment interest at the rate of 5.250% per annum beginning at the 
date this judgment is entered until this judgment is satisfied; 
e. Post judgment interest accrues at the per diem rate of$215.95. 
5. In accordance with the default judgment and summary judgment previously 
entered, the Harrises' legal and equitable interests are junior to the Bank of Commerce's deeds of 
trust interest. The Harrises are entitled to judgment of foreclosure as follows: 
a. Default judgment amount of$987,61O.40; 
b. Post judgment interest at the rate of 5.625% per annum beginning at 15 
October 2009 until judgment is satisfied; 
c. Post judgment interest accrues at the per diem rate of $,152.20. 
6. The real property described in paragraph 3 above be sold at public auction by the 
Sheriff of Bonneville County, Idaho, in the manner prescribed by the law and according to the 
rules and practice of this Court, and the Sheriff, after the time allowed by law for redemption has 
expired, shall execute the deed to the purchaser or purchasers of the real property at said sale, 
and the parties to this action may become purchasers at said sale. 
7. From the proceeds of that sale the Sheriff of Bonneville County shall retain his 
fees and expenses incurred on said sale and shall then payout the proceeds in accordance with 
the provisions of this judgment. 
8. The Defendant, the Y osts, and their known and unknown heirs or devisees, and 
the unknown owners, claimants, and parties in interest claiming all or ~y part of the real 
property described above, and each of them, and all persons claiming or to claim from and under 
them or any of them, and all persons having liens subject to the deeds of trust held by the Bank 
Amended Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure Page 2 
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of Commerce, by judgment or decree or otherwise upon the subject real property, or any part or 
parcel thereof, and their heirs, personal representatives, and all persons claiming to have acquired 
any estate or interest in or to said lands or premises, BE AND HEREBY ARE FOREVER 
BARRED AND FORECLOSED of and from all right, title, claim and interest in and to said real 
property and in and to every part or parcel thereof, except for such rights of redemption as they 
may have to the extent that such rights of redemption have not otherwise been duly waived, and 
that said persons, and each of them, be and they hereby are enjoined and restrained from 
removing or destroying any of the buildings, the improvements or appurtenances on such subject 
real property or otherwise damaging the lands or premises prior to redemption from such sale. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the purchaser or 
purchasers of the real property at the foreclosure sale be let into immediate possession, and that 
any of the parties to this action who may be in possession of said premises or any part thereof or 
any appurtenant water or similar rights, or any person who, since the commencement of this 
action, has come into possession of the subject property or any portion thereof or any 
appurtenant water or similar rights, shall immediately deliver possession to such purchaser or 
I 
purchasers upon the production of a Sheriffs Certificate of Sale or Deed for such real property 
or any part thereof. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that jurisdiction of this action IS hereby expressly 
reserved and retained for the purpose of making such further orders as may be necessary in order 
I 
to carry this Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure into effect and to correct any mathematical 
error, to grant any accrued credits, or for the purpose of making such further orders as may be 
necessary or desirable. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that an Order for Sheriff's Sale may,issue in accordance 
with this Amended Judgment. 
DATED this ~ day of August 20 1 ~'" 
~~ \,\t:1 
.. :~~~:~f~%'?t~·~ 
Amended Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure - Page 3 
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~ Watkins, District Judge 
r" C' ~ 
:; (,j .j 
RULE S4(b) CERTIFICATE 
With respect to the issues determined by the above judgment it is hereby CERTIFIED, in 
accordance with Rule 54(b), LR.C.P., that the court has determined that there is no just reason 
for delay of the entry of a final judgment and that the court has and does h~reby direct that the 
above judgment shall be a final judgment upon which execution may issue and an appeal may be 
taken as provided by the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
DATED this ~ day of August 2011. 
atkins, DISTrTr-.u""ge 
NOTICE OF ENTRY 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am a Clerk~ the above entitled Court and that I mailed a 
true copy of the foregoing documents on the J.L day of August 2011, to the following of 
record and! or parties: 
DOCUMENT SERVED: 
PARTIES SERVED: 
AMENDED JUDGMENT AND 
DECREE OF FORECLOSURE, 
Manwaring Law Office, P.A. 
Kipp L. Manwaring 
381 Shoup Avenue, Suite 210 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
MAILED 
Douglas R. Nelson 
Nelson Hall Parry Tucker 
PO Box 51630 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-1630 
MAILED 
RONALD LONGMORE 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
BY,~Il!1L171 riJO 
DeptitYlerk ' 
Amended Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure Page 4 
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EXHIBIT" A" 
TRACT I 
Beginning at a point that is South 89°55'28" West along the Section line 1326.98 
feet from the North 'i4 Comer of Section 10, Township 1 North, Range 38 East of 
the Boise Meridian; running thence South 89°55'28" West along said Section line 
1236.12 feet to the South Right-of-Way line of 65th South; thence along said 
South Right-of-Way line of 65th South and the East Right-of-Way line of 25th East 
the following three (3) courses; South 00°12'54" East 28.10 feet to a point of 
curve with a radius of69.34 feet and a chord bearing South 44°18'28" West 98.29 
feet; thence to the left along said curve 109.24 feet through a central angle of 
90°16'00"; thence South 89°10'28" West 28.71 feet to the West line of said 
Section 10; thence South 00°19'04" East 1216.86 feet to the South line of the 
North 12 of the Northwest 'i4 of said Section 10, thence North 89°54'09" East 
along said South line 1327.87 feet; thence North 00°03'13" West 1312.06 feet to 
the POINT OF BEGINNING. 
Excepting 
That portion thereof conveyed to the State of Idaho by that deed recorded on May 
8, 1950 in Book 70 of Deeds at Page 287 of Official Records of Bonneville 
County, Idaho. 
MANWARING LAW OFFICE, P.A. 
Kipp L. Manwaring ~ ISB 3817 
381 Shoup Avenue, Suite 2lO 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
Telephone: (208) 782-2300 
Facsimile: (208) 523-9109 
Attorney for the Plaintiffs 
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i' 
,; ',11 
:. ; r 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO, COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
DARRYL HARRIS and CHRISTINE 
HARRIS, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DUANE L. YOST and LORI YOST, 
husband and wife, DUANE L. YOST 
as Trustee of the DUANE L. YOST 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV -09-3488 
NOTICE OF NO OBJECTION 
TRUST, THE BANK OF COMMERCE, ) 
an Idaho Corporation and JOHN DOES I-X,) 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
The Harrises hereby give notice to court and counsel that they have no objection 
to the Bank of Commerce's motion and memorandum for costs and fees where such costs 
and fees are sought entirely against the Y osts and not the Harrises. 
The Harrises do not intend to appear at any hearing or otherwise file any further 
pleadings concerning the Bank's motion for costs and fees. 
Dated this 29th day of August 2011. 
Notice Of No Objection 
Harris v, Yost/Bank of Commerce 
Case No, CV-09-3488 
Kipp L. Manwaring 
Attorney for the Plaintiffs 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 29th day of August 2011, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document was served upon the person or persons named below, in 
the manner indicated. 
DOCUMENT SERVED: 
PARTIES SERVED: 
Notice Of No Objection 
Harris v. Yost/Bank a/Commerce 
Case No. CV -09-3488 
2 
NOTICE OF NO OBJECTION 
Douglas R. Nelson 
Nelson Hall Parry Tucker 
PO Box 51630 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-1630 
MAILED 
Alicia Lambert 
Legal Assistant 
rc 
,J (J J: 
Douglas R. Nelson - ISB# 1580 
Brian T. Tucker - ISB# 5236 
Wiley R. Dennert - ISB# 6216 
NELSON HALL PARRY TUCKER, P.A. 
490 Memorial Drive 
P.O. Box 51630 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405- 1630 
Telephone:(208) 522-3001 
Facsimile: (208) 523-7254 
Attorneys for The Bank of Commerce 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
DARRYL HARRIS and CHRISTINE 
HARRIS, husband and wife, 
PlaintitTs, 
v. 
DUANE L. YOST and LORI YOST, husband 
and wife, DUANE L. YOST as Trustee of the 
DUANE L. YOST TRUST, THE BANK OF 
COMMERCE. an Idaho Corporation and 
JOHN DOES I-X, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV -09-3488 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT FOR 
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS - ] 
THE BANK OF COMMERCE, an Idaho 
corporation, 
v. 
Counterclaimant/Cross-
claimantiThird-Party Claimant, 
DARRYL HARRIS and CHRISTINE 
HARRIS. husband and wife, 
Counterdefendants, 
and 
DUANE L. YOST and LORI YOST, husband 
and wife, DUANE L. YOST as Trustee of the 
DUANE L. YOST TRUST, JOHN DOES I-X, 
Crossdefendants, 
and 
HAMPSHIRE HOLDINGS, LLC, 
Third-Party Defendant. 
The Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs was filed on August 26,20 II along with the Atlidavit 
of Brian T. Tucker in support of Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs and the Memorandum of 
, 
Attorney's Fees and Costs. The Defendants having not liled an objection and it appearing from the 
Motion, Affidavit. and Memorandum that the requested fees and costs are reasonable and necessarily 
expended. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Plaintiff be awarded attorney's fees and costs in the 
amount 01'$75,335.56 and that Plaintiff have ajudgment for its attorney's fees and costs in the alllount 
of $75.335.56. C' Y 
r "~\Lf)u 
DATED this _\ __ day of~20 I . 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS - 2 
r, C' 
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
. . I hereby c,f;l'!itXJ!.1at I served a true ~opy ofth~ .foreg?ing document upon the t()~~owil1g 
thIS JJL day of ~ 2011, by hand deilvery, madll1g wIth the necessary postage afhxed 
thereto, facsimile, or overnight mail. 
Brian T. Tucker 
NELSON HALL PARRY TUCKER 
P.O. Box 51630 
Idaho Falls, TD 83405-1630 
Kipp L. Manwaring 
MANWARING LA W OFFICE 
381 Shoup Avenue, Suite 210 
Idaho Falls. ID 83402 
Duane & Lori Yost 
3777 Hampshire Court 
Idaho Falls, 10 83401 
LIDRNI0260.4911attorneys Iccs ' ordCLJudglllcnL wpd 
/ca/Mailing 
o Fax 
Hand Deli very 
o Overnight Mail 
)?,Mailing 
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o I-land Delivery 
o Overnight Mail 
Jai.1ailing 
o Fax 
o I-land Delivery 
o Overnight Mail 
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MANWARING LAW OFFICE, P.A. 
Kipp L. Manwaring ~ ISB 3817 
381 Shoup Avenue, Suite 210 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
Telephone: (208) 782-2300 
Facsimile: (208) 523-9109 
Attorney for the Appellants 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO, COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
DARRYL HARRIS and CHRISTINE ) 
HARRIS, husband and wife, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
DUANE L. YOST and LORI YOST, ) 
husband and wife, DUANE L. YOST ) 
as Trustee of the DUANE L. YOST ) 
TRUST, THE BANK OF COMMERCE, ) 
an Idaho Corporation and JOHN DOES I-X,) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
Case No. CV-09-3488 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Fee Category: T 
Fee: $101.00 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT, BANK OF COMMERCE, AND ITS 
ATTORNEY OF RECORD, DOUGLAS NELSON: 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above named appellants, Dan-yl Han-is and Christine Han-is, appeal 
i 
against the above named respondent, Bank of Commerce, to the Idaho Supreme Court 
from the Amended Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure entered in the above action on 
! 
August 12,2011, and the prior summary judgments, decisions, and orders entered June 7, 
2011 and April 1, 2011, Honorable Dane H. Watkins, Jr., District Judge, presiding. 
I 
2. The Appellants have a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court and the 
judgment described in paragraph 1 above is an appealable order under and pursuant to 
Rule 11 (a)(1), LA.R. 
Notice of Appeal 
Harris v. Bank of Commerce 
3. The preliminary issues on appeal are: 
Did the district court err as a matter of law in granting summary judgment 
on the Appellants' claim that a quitclaim deed was invalid for lack of 
consideration? 
Did the district court err as a matter of law in granting summary judgment 
finding the Appellants delivered the quitclaim deed? 
Did the district court err as a matter of law in granting summary judgment 
determining the Appellant, Christine Harris, was estopped from using the 
protections of I.C. § 32-912? 
Did the district court err as a matter of law in granting summary judgment 
finding no genuine issues of material fact exist pertaining to the Respondent's 
claim of being a bona fide encumbrancer for value? 
4. No order has issued sealing all or any portion of the record. 
5. A reporter's transcript is requested and the estimated fee of $455.00 has 
been paid. 
6. The Appellants request the following documents to be included in the 
clerk's record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, tA.R. 
I 
a. The Appellants' Complaint and Reply to Counterclaim. 
b. The Appellants' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment 
c. The Appellants' Memorandum in Response in Opposition to Motion 
for Summary Judgment. 
d. The Appellants' Affidavit of Wayne Klein. 
e. The Appellants' Affidavit of Counsel, Kipp Manwaring. 
f. The Appellants' Augmented Affidavit of Counsel, Kipp Manwaring 
g. Deposition of Duane Yost. 
h. Deposition of Thomas Romrell. 
1. Deposition of Darryl Harris. 
J. Deposition of Christine Harris. 
k. Deposition of Robert Crandall. 
1. Deposition of Stephen Crandall. 
Notice of Appeal 2 ,', C"> 
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Harris v. Bank of Commerce 
7. I certify that: 
a. A copy of this notice of appeal has been served on the reporter. 
b. The clerk of the district court has been paid the estimated fee of 
$455.00 for preparation of the clerk's record. 
c. The filing fee has been paid. 
d. Service has been made upon all parties required to be served. 
Dated this 14th day of September 2011. 
~~ Kipp L. Manwaring 
Attorney for the Appellants 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 14th day of September 2011, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document was served upon the person or persons named below, in 
the manner indicated. 
DOCUMENT SERVED: 
PARTIES SERVED: 
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NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Douglas R. Nelson 
Nelson Hall Parry Tucker 
PO Box 51630 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-1630 
MAILED 
Alicia Lambert 
Legal Assistant 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
DARRYL HARRIS and CHRISTINE ) 
HARRIS, husband and wife, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
THE BANK OF COMMERCE, an Idaho ) 
corporation, ) 
) 
DefendantlRespondent ) 
) 
and, ) 
) 
DUANE L. YOST and LORI YOST, ) 
husband and wife; DUANE L. YOST as ) 
Trustee of the DUANE L. YOST TRUST, and ) 
JOHN DOES I-X, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
Case No. CV-2009-3488 ' 
Docket No. 3q~tJi/ 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
OF APPEAL 
-,-,. 
Appeal from: Seventh Judicial District, Bonneville County 
Honorable Dane H. Watkins, Jr., District Judge, presiding. 
Case number from Court: CV-2009-3488 
Order or Judgment appealed from: Amended Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure, entered August 12, 
2011, and the prior summary judgments, decision, and orders entered June 7, 2011 and April I, 2011. 
Attorney for Appellant: 
Attorney for Respondent: 
Appealed by: 
Appealed against: 
Notice of Appeal Filed: 
Appellate Fee Paid: 
Was District Court Reporter's Transcript requested? 
CLERK'S CERTIFICA TE OF APPEAL - 1 
Kipp Manwaring, 381 Shoup Ave., Ste. 210 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
Douglas Nelson, PO Box 51630 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-1630 
Darryl Harris and Christine Harris 
The Bank of Commerce 
September 16, 20 II 
Yes 
Yes, but no specific request .ma{J.i~!".I""I:n:::--"Xi~~lii'i'i-' 
r,c' 
'.j ,).1 I SEP 2 2 2011 
If so, name of reporter: 
Dated: September 19, 2011 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL - 2 
Karen Konvalinka 
r. f' 
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Douglas R. Nelson -ISB# 1580 
Brian T. Tucker - ISB# 5236 
Wiley R. Dennert - rSB# 6216 
NELSON HALL PARRY TUCKER, P.A. 
490 Memorial Drive 
P.O. Box 51630 
IdahoFalls, ID 83405-1630 
Telepbone:(208) 522-3001 
Facsimile: (208) 523-7254 
Attorneys for The Bank of Commerce 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TIlE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
DARR YL HARRIS and CHRISTINE 
HARRIS, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
DUANE L. YOST and LORI YOST, husband 
and wife, DUANE L. YOST as Trustee of the 
DUANE L. YOST TRUST, THE BANK OF 
COMMERCE, an Idaho Corporation and 
JOHN DOES I-X, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV -09-3488 
AMENDED ORDER AND 
JUDGMENT FOR ATTORNEY'S 
FEES AND COSTS 
AMENDED ORDER AND JUDGMENT FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS I 
THE BANK OF COMMERCE, an Idaho 
corporation, 
v. 
Counterclaimant/Cross-
claimant/Third-Party Claimant, 
DARRYL HARRIS and CHRISTINE 
HARRIS, husband and wife, 
Counterdefendants, 
and 
DUANE L. YOST and LORI YOST, husband 
and wife. DUANE L. YOST as Trustee of the 
DUANE L. YOST TRUST, JOHN DOES I-X, 
Crossdefendants, 
and 
HAMPSHIRE HOLDINGS, LLC, 
Third- Party Defendant. 
The Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs was filed by the Bank of Commerce on August 26, 
20 ll, along with the Affidavit of Brian T. Tucker in support of Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs 
and the Memorandum of Attorney's Fees and Costs. There was no objection filed by any of the other 
parties and it appearing from the Motion, Affidavit, and Memorandum that the requested fees and costs 
are reasonable and necessarily expended, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Bank of Commerce be 
awarded attorney's fees and costs in the amount of$75,335.56 and that such judgment be a supplement 
and addition to the amount due found in the Amended ./udgment and Decree or Foreclosure and Order 
of Sale previously entered by the Court on August 12, 20 I I. 
DATED this ~ day of September 
\ 
AMENDED ORDER AND JUDGMENT FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS 
SEP. 12.2011 3:08PM 
APPROVED AS TO FORM & CONTENT: 
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this J? day of September. 2011, by hand delivery) mailing w~ the necessarypostllge affixed 
thereto. facsimile, or ovemjght mail. i: 
Briau T. Tucker 
NELSON HALL PARRY TUCKER 
P.O. Box 51630 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-1630 
Kipp L. Manwaring 
MANWARING LAW OFFICE 
381 Shoup Avenue, Suite 210 
IdahO Falls, ID ~3402 
Duane & Lori Yost 
3777 Hampshire Court 
Idaho Falls, ID 83401 
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Douglas R. Nelson - ISB# 1580 
Brian T. Tucker - ISB# 5236 
Wiley R. Dennert -ISB# 6216 
NELSON HALL PARRY TUCKER, P.A. 
490 Memorial Drive 
P.O. Box 51630 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-1630 
Telephone:(208) 522-3001 
Facsimile: (208) 523-7254 
Attorneys for The Bank of Commerce 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
DARRYL HARRIS and CHRISTINE 
HARRIS, husband and wife, 
Plainti ffs, 
Y. 
DUANE L. YOST and LORI YOST, husband 
and wife, DUANE L. YOST as Trustee of the 
DUANE L. YOST TRUST, THE BANK OF 
COMMERCE, an Idaho Corporation and 
JOHN DOES I-X, 
Defendants. 
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONS TO CLERK'S RECORD - 1 
Case No. CV-09-3488 
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONS TO 
CLERK'S RECORD 
THE BANK OF COMMERCE, an Idaho 
corporation, 
v. 
Counterclaimant/Cross-
claimant/Third-Party 
Claimant, 
DARRYL HARRIS and CHRISTINE 
HARRIS, husband and wife, 
Co unterdefendants, 
and 
DUANE L. YOST and LORI YOST, husband 
and wife, DUANE L. YOST as Trustee of the 
DUANE L. YOST TRUST, JOHN DOES I-X, 
CrossdeCendants, 
and 
HAMPSHIRE HOLDINGS, LLC, 
Third-Party Defendant. 
COMES NOW Respondent The Bank of Commerce (the "Bank"), through counsel of 
record, and requests that the following documents be added to the Clerk's record for purposes 
of the appeal: 
1. Affidavit of Counsel signed by Kipp Manwaring, filed on October 9,2009; 
2. Judgment by Det~1ult, dated October 16, 2009; 
3. Stipulation Waiving Service, Consenting to Entry of Judgment of Foreclosure, 
and Waiver of Redemption Rights by Duane L. Yost and Lori Yost, Husband and 
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONS TO CLERK'S RECORD - 2 
('. P '! 
'~) <.J : 
Wife, and Duane L. Yost as Trustee of the Duane L. Yost Trust and Hampshire 
Holdings, LLC, filed on April 27, 2010; 
4. Affidavit of Thomas J. Romrell, filed on September 16,2010; 
5. Affidavit of Trent L. Summers, filed on September 16,2010; 
6. At11davit of Duane L. Yost, filed on September 16, 2010; 
7. Affidavit of Michael Morrison, filed on September 16,2010; 
8. Fourth Affidavit of Wiley R. Dennert, filed on September 16,2010; 
9. Second Motion for Summary Judgment, filed on Janumy 27, 2011; 
10. Memorandum in Support of Second Motion for Summary Judgment, filed on 
January 27, 2011; 
11. Second Affidavit of Thomas J. Romrell, filed on January 27, 2011; 
12. Affidavit of Douglas R. Nelson, filed on January 27, 2011; 
13. Motion to Amend Counterclaim, Cross Claim and Third-party Claim and to 
Include Clai m for Punitive Damages, filed on January 27, 2011 ; 
14. Memorandum in Support of Motion to Amend Counterclaim Claim to Include 
Claim for Punitive Damages, filed on January 27,2011; 
15. Opposition to the Harrises' Motion for Summary Judgment, filed on February 10, 
2011; 
16. Second Affidavit of Duane L. Yost, filed on FebrualY 10,2011; 
17. Reply in Support of the Bank's Second Motion for Summary Judgment, filed on 
February 17,2011; 
18. Opposition to Motion for Reconsideration, filed May 26, 2011; 
19. Affidavit of Service on Family Asset Protection Legal Services, PLLC, filed on 
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONS TO CLERK'S RECORD - 3 
r: (' 
d ,_10 
June 16,2011; 
20. Affidavit of Service on Robert Crandall, filed on June 16, 2011; 
21. Opposition to Motion to Alter or Amend, filed on June 29, 2011; and 
22. Notice of No Objection, filed on August 30, 2011. 
DATED this __ 7_ day of September, 2011. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certifY that I served a true copy of the foregoing document upon the following 
this ::2 7 day of September, 2011, by hand delivery, mailing with the necessary postage affixed 
thereto, facsimile, or overnight mail. 
Kipp L. Manwaring 
MANWARING LA W OFFICE 
381 Shoup Avenue, Suite 210 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
L:\DRN\0260A9l \Appcal\Rcqucst for Additional Clerk's Rccord.wpd 
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONS TO CLERK'S RECORD - 4 
[ ] Mailing 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
-M Fax: 523-9109 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
MANWARING LAW OFFICE, P.A. 
Kipp L. Manwaring ~ fSB 3817 
381 Shoup Avenue, Suite 210 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
Telephone: (208) 782-2300 
Facsimile: (208) 523-9109 
Attorney for the Appellants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
I 
STATE OF IDAHO, COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
DARRYL HARRIS and CHRISTINE ) 
HARRIS, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DUANE L. YOST and LORI YOST, 
husband and wife, DUANE L. YOST 
as Trustee of the DUANE L. YOST 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
TRUST, THE BANK OF COMMERCE, ) 
an Idaho Corporation and JOHN DOES I-X,) 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
Case No. CV -09-3488 
AMENDED 
I 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT, BANK OF COMMERCE, AND ITS 
ATTORNEY OF RECORD, DOUGLAS NELSON: 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above named appellants, Darryl Harris and Christine Harris, appeal 
I 
against the above named respondent, Bank of Commerce, to the Idaho Supreme Court 
from the Amended Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure entered in the above action on 
August 12, 2011, and the prior summary judgments, decisions, and orders entered June 7, 
2011 and April 1,2011, Honorable Dane H. Watkins, Jr., District Judge, presiding. 
2. The Appellants have a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court and the 
judgment described in paragraph 1 above is an appealable order under' and pursuant to 
Rule 11(a)(l), I.A.R. 
3. The preliminary issues on appeal are: 
Amended Notice of Appeal 
Harris v. Bank of Commerce 
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Did the district court err as a matter of law in granting summary judgment 
on the Appellants' claim that a quitclaim deed was invalid for lack of 
consideration? 
Did the district court err as a matter of law in granting summary judgment 
finding the Appellants delivered the quitclaim deed? 
Did the district court err as a matter of law in granting summary judgment 
determining the Appellant, Christine Harris, was estopped from using the 
protections ofI.C. § 32-912? 
Did the district court err as a matter of law in granting summary judgment 
finding no genuine issues of material fact exist pertaining to the Respondent's 
claim of being a bona fide encumbrancer for value? 
4. No order has issued sealing all or any portion of the record. 
5. A standard reporter's transcript in both hard copy and electronic format is 
requested of the following hearings: 
a. Hearing held February 24, 2011 on cross motions for summary 
judgment; Karen Konvalinka reporting. 
b. Hearing held June 2, 2011 on the Plaintiffs' motion to reconsider; 
I 
Karen Konvalinka reporting. 
6. The Appellants request the following documents to be included in the 
clerk's record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R. 
c. The Appellants' Complaint and Reply to Counterclaim: 
d. The Appellants' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment 
e. The Appellants' Memorandum in Response in Opposition to Motion 
for Summary Judgment. 
f. The Appellants' Affidavit of Wayne Klein. 
g. The Appellants' Affidavit of Counsel, Kipp Manwaring. 
h. The Appellants' Augmented Affidavit of Counsel, Kipp Manwaring 
1. Deposition of Duane Yost. 
J. Deposition of Thomas Romrell. 
k. Deposition of Darryl Harris. 
Amended Notice of Appeal 
Harris v. Bank of Commerce 
2 7 
1. Deposition of Christine Harris. 
m. Deposition of Robert Crandall. 
n. Deposition of Stephen Crandall. 
7. I certify that: 
a. A copy of this notice of appeal has been served on the reporter, Karen 
Konvalinka. 
b. The clerk of the district court has been paid the estimated fee for 
preparation of the clerk's record. 
c. The filing fee has been paid. 
d. Service has been made upon all parties required to be served. 
Dated this ~ day of October 2011. 
Amended Notice of Appeal 
Harris v. Bank of Commerce 
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~YY?~~ Kipp L. Manwaring 
Attorney for the Appellants 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the Y~day of October 2011, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document was served upon the person or persons named below, in 
the manner indicated. 
DOCUMENT SERVED: 
PARTIES SERVED: 
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AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Douglas R. Nelson 
Nelson Hall Parry Tucker 
PO Box 51630 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-1630 
MAILED 
Karen Konvalinka 
Court Reporter 
Bonneville County Courthouse 
605 North Capital Avenue 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
MAILED 
~i r' •.. 
e t J 
MANWARING LAW OFFICE, P.A. 
Kipp L. Manwaring ~ ISB 3817 
381 Shoup Avenue, Suite 210 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
Telephone: (208) 782-2300 
Facsimile: (208) 523-9109 
Attorney for the Appellants 
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IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO, COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
DARRYL HARRIS and CHRISTINE 
HARRIS, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DUANE L. YOST and LORI YOST, 
husband and wife, DUANE L. YOST 
as Trustee of the DUANE L. YOST 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
TRUST, THE BANK OF COMMERCE, ) 
an Idaho Corporation and JOHN DOES I-X,) 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
Case No. CV-09-3488 
MOTION TO STAY 
EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT 
In accordance with I.R.C.P. 62(a) and I.A.R. 13(b)(10), (14), the Harrises move 
the court for its order staying execution of the Amended Judgment of Foreclosure 
pending the Harrises' appeal. This motion is based upon the pleadings of record. 
The district court has discretion to determine whether stay of execution should be 
granted, including the amount of security, if any, required for the stay. 
As the comi is aware, this action involves competing claims of title and title 
interest to property currently held by the Y osts. The Amended Judgment of Foreclosure is 
not merely a money judgment. Rather, it is a judgment affecting respective rights of the 
Harrises and the Bank of Commerce to the same parcel of property. 
One of the main issues on appeal is whether the quitclaim deed to the Y osts was 
valid. If the appellate court rules in favor of the Harrises, the actipn will either be 
remanded for judgment quieting title in the Harrises' name or trial on issues of fact. The 
Motion To Stay Execution Of Judgment 
Harris v. Bank of Commerce 
land was the Harrises' real property that was part of a planned venture for development. 
Both the Harrises and the Bank are the resulting victims of Darren Palmer's fraud as now 
confirmed through his federal criminal conviction. 
Furthermore, any purchaser at the sheriffs sale which purchaser likely will be 
the Bank receives only possession of the property subject to rights of redemption. 
Moreover, title to the property will retain through the appeal process and any subsequent 
proceedings cloud of interest preventing the Bank or purchaser other than the Harrises 
from conveying clear title. See Radermacher v. Eckert, 63 Idaho 531, 540, 123 P .2d 426 
(1942), quoting, Kremer v. Schutz, 82 Kan. 175, 107 P. 780. 
Due to the nature of the title issues together with the claims of the Hanises, the 
Harrises believe no bond or security should be required. 
Oral argument is requested. 
Dated this 24th day of October 2011. 
Motion To Stay Execution Of Judgment 
Harris v. Bank of Commerce 
~~~ Kipp L. Manwaring 
Attorney for the Appellants 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 24th day of October 2011, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document was served upon the person or persons named below, in 
the manner indicated. 
DOCUMENT SERVED: 
PARTIES SERVED: 
Motion To Stay Execution Of Judgment 
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MOTION TO STAY EXECUTION 
OF JUDGMENT 
Douglas R. Nelson 
Nelson Hall Parry Tucker 
PO Box 51630 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-1630 
MAILED 
Karen Konvalinka 
Court Reporter 
Bonneville County Courthouse 
605 North Capital Avenue 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
MAILED 
1"1 ..... 
.' v ,~! 
MANWARING LAW OFFICE, P.A. 
Kipp L. Manwaring ~ ISB 3817 - 2 9: 2 ! 
381 Shoup Avenue, Suite 210 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
Telephone: (208) 782-2300 
Facsimile: (208) 523-9109 
Attorney for the Appellants 
IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRlCT 
STATE OF IDAHO, COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
DARRYL HARRlS and CHRlSTINE 
HARRlS, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DUANE L. YOST and LORl YOST, 
husband and wife, DUANE L. YOST 
as Trustee of the DUANE L. YOST 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
TRUST, THE BANK OF COMMERCE, ) 
an Idaho Corporation and JOHN DOES I-X,) 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
Case No. CV-09-3488 
NOTICE OF POSTING 
SECURlTY 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN to court and counsel that on this date the Plaintiffs 
have posted with the clerk of the district court cash bond and security in the amount of 
$30,000.00. 
Said bond and security is posted in accordance with the court's order granting 
stay of execution of the amended judgment of foreclosure during the period of the 
pending appeal. 
Dated this 2nd day of December 2011. 
Notice of Posting Security 
Harris v. Bank of Commerce 
~w~ 
Attorney for the Appellants 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 2nd day of December 2011, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document was served upon the person or persons named below, in 
the manner indicated. 
DOCUMENT SERVED: 
PARTIES SERVED: 
Notice of Posting Security 
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NOTICE OF POSTING SECURITY 
Douglas R. Nelson 
Nelson Hall Parry Tucker 
PO Box 51630 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-1630 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO, COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE '. r-
DARRYL HARRIS and CHRISTINE 
HARRIS, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DUANE L. YOST and LORI YOST, 
husband and wife, DUANE L. YOST 
as Trustee of the DUANE L. YOST 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
TRUST, THE BANK OF COMMERCE, ) 
an Idaho Corporation and JOHN DOES I-X,) 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
::J 
Case No. CV-09-3488 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION 
TO STAY EXECUTION 
r 
JeT 
y ID 
On November 21, 2011 this action came before the court for hearing the 
Plaintiffs' motion to stay execution of the amended jUdgment of foreclosure pending 
appeal. A sheriff s sale was scheduled for December 6, 2011. After considering the 
arguments of counsel, the court in its discretion determined stay of execution of the 
judgment should be granted conditioned upon the posting of bond. Therefore; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that execution of the amended judgment of 
foreclosure entered 8th day of August 2011, is stayed pending the outcome of the appeal 
filed by the Plaintiffs. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that stay of execution is conditioned upon the 
Plaintiffs filing with the clerk of the court bond in the amount of $30,000.00 on or before 
December 5, 2011. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties may file motions with the court to 
reconsider the amount of bond subsequent t -the filing of bond. 
Dated this ~ day of December 2 11. 
/., r, 
i' v:J 
Order 
Harris v. Yost/Bank of Commerce 
Case No. CV -09-3488 
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NOV 30 2011 U 
NOTICE OF ENTRY 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am a Clerk in the above entitled Court and that I 
----
mailed a true copy of the foregoing documents on the (/'I day of :December 2011, to 
the following of record and/or parties: '"' 
DOCUMENT SERVED: 
PARTIES SERVED: 
Order 
Harris v, Yost/Bank a/Commerce 
Case No. CV-09-3488 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO STAY 
EXECUTION 
Manwaring Law Office, P.A. 
Kipp L. Manwaring 
381 Shoup Avenue, Suite 210 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
MAILED 
Douglas R. Nelson 
Nelson Hall Parry Tucker 
PO Box 51630 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-1630 
MAILED 
RONALD LONGMORE 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
'~ "-= . 1 !. 'jA:J BY: I /' A / l/l/r ) i 011 
Deputy Clef ~ '-/ v 
L, 
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~,... Douglas R. Nelson - ISB# 1580 
Brian T. Tucker - ISB# 5236 
Wiley R. Dennert - ISB# 6216 
NELSON HALL PARRY TUCKER, P.A. 
490 Memorial Drive 
P.O. Box 51630 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-1630 
Telephone:(208) 522-3001 
Facsimile: (208) 523-725~4 
Attorneys for The Bank of Commerce 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
DARRYL HARRIS and CHRISTINE 
HARRIS, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
DUANE L. YOST and LORI YOST, husband 
and wife, DUANE L. YOST as Trustee of the 
DUANE L. YOST TRUST, THE BANK OF 
COMMERCE, an Idaho Corporation and 
JOHN DOES I-X, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-09-3488 
OBJECTION TO INCLUSION OF 
EXHIBIT BOOK FOR 
DEPOSITIONS IN CLERK'S 
RECORD 
OBJECTION TO INCLUSION OF EXHIBIT BOOK FOR DEPOSITIONS IN CLERK'S RECORD - 1 
I"'} . "2 
I .... _ 
THE BANK OF COMMERCE, an Idaho 
corporation, 
v. 
CounterclaimantlCross-
claimantlThird-Party 
Claimant, 
DARRYL HARRIS and CHRISTINE 
HARRIS, husband and wife, 
Counterdefendants, 
and 
DUANE L. YOST and LORI YOST, husband 
and wife, DUANE L. YOST as Trustee of the 
DUANE L. YOST TRUST, JOHN DOES I-X, 
Crossdefendants, 
and 
HAMPSHIRE HOLDINGS, LLC, 
Third-Party Defendant. 
COMES NOW Respondent The Bank of Commerce (the "Bank"), through counsel of 
record, and objects, in part, to the Appellants' Motion to Correct with Additions to Record and 
specifically to the inclusion of the following to the Clerk's record for purposes of the appeal: 
1. The Exhibit Book for Depositions. 
The basis for this Objection is similar to the Bank's previous Objection to Inclusion of 
Deposition Transcripts in Clerk's Record, filed on September 27,2011. The exhibits in the 
Exhibit Book for Depositions, by themselves, were not filed with the trial court, published 
OBJECTION TO INCLUSION OF EXHIBIT BOOK FOR DEPOSITIONS IN CLERK'S RECORD - 2 
i' 
I .... 
during any hearing before the trial court, submitted as exhibits in any hearing nor made part of 
the trial court's record. Therefore, the Exhibit Book for Depositions should not be included in 
the clerk's record for appeal, except to the extent that portions of some of these deposition 
exhibits were attached to affidavits and filed with the trial court prior to the filing of the Notice 
of Appeal.! 
DATED this 
/) ~·b. 
0' day of Jantlftry, 2012. 
Brian T. Tucker 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby cert~ that I served a true copy of the foregoing document upon the following 
this ,:;2 day of~, 2012, by hand delivery, mailing with the necessary postage affixed 
thereto, facsimile, or overnight mail. 
Kipp L. Manwaring 
MANWARlNG LAW OFFICE 
381 Shoup Avenue, Suite 210 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
[ ] Mailing 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ 0ax: 523-9109 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
Brian T. Tucker 
L\DRN\0260.491 \AppeaJ\Objection to Inclusion of Exhibit Book for Depositions.wpd 
! For example, the Affidavit of Douglas R. Nelson dated January 27,2011, provides: 
7. Attached hereto as Exhibit "B" is a true and correct copy of selected portions of the 
transcript of the Deposition of Darryl Harris taken in this case, with non-relevant and inadmissible 
portions removed or redacted. Also included as Exhibit "B" are true and correct, relevant portions 
of selected exhibits to the Deposition of Darryl Harris. 
(Emphasis added.) Only selected portions of the deposition transcripts and selected portions of the exhibits were 
presented to the trial court for its consideration. Therefore, only what was available to the trial court should be added 
to the clerk's record for consideration on appeal by the Supreme Court. 
OBJECTION TO INCLUSION OF EXHIBIT BOOK FOR DEPOSITIONS IN CLERK'S RECORD - 3 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
DARRYL HARRIS and CHRISTINE HARRIS, ) 
husband and wife, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
DUANE L. YOST and LORI YOST, husband and ) 
wife, DUANE L. YOST as Trustee of the DUANE ) 
L. YOST TRUST, THE BANK OF COMMERCE, ) 
an Idaho Corporation and JOHN DOES I-X, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
THE BANK OF COMMERCE, an Idaho 
Corporation, 
vs. 
CounterclaimantiCross-claimanti 
Third-Party Claimant, 
DARRYL HARRIS and CHRISTINE HARRIS, 
husband and wife, 
Counterdefendants, 
and 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
DUANE L. YOST and LORI YOST, husband and ) 
wife, DUANE L. YOST as Trustee of the DUANE ) 
L. YOST TRUST, JOHN DOES I-X, ) 
Counterdefendants, 
and 
HAMPSHIRE HOLDINGS, LLC, 
Third-Party Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
-------------------------------) 
MINUTE ENTRY - I 
Case No. CV-2009-3488 
AMENDED MINUTE ENTRY 
February 9, 2012, at 8:30 A.M., an objection to the appellate record came on for hearing 
before the Honorable Dane H. Watkins, Jr., District Judge, sitting in open court at Idaho Falls, 
Idaho. 
Ms. Karen Konvalinka, Court Reporter, and Ms. Lettie Messick, Deputy Court Clerk, 
were present. 
Mr. Kipp Manwaring appeared on behalf of the plaintiffs. Mr. Brian Tucker appeared 
on behalf of the defendants. 
Mr. Manwaring presented argument supporting the objection to the record. Mr. 
Manwaring requested an exhibit book be provided. 
The Court noted the Court did not receive a deposition exhibit book. 
Mr. Manwaring requested the Affidavit of Doug Nelson be included in the record. 
The Court will include the pleadings requested and the Affidavit of Doug Nelson. 
Court was thus adjourned. 
c: Kipp Manwaring 
Douglas Nelson 
MINUTE ENTRY 2 
~~ .. ~ 
DANE H. WATKINS, JR. 
District Judge 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTlUCT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
DARRYL HARRIS and CHRISTINE ) 
HARRIS, husband and wife, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
THE BANK OF COMMERCE, an Idaho ) 
corporation, ) 
) 
Defendant/Respondent ) 
) 
an~ ) 
) 
DUANE L. YOST and LORI YOST, ) 
husband and wife; DUANE L. YOST as ) 
Trustee ofthe DUANE L. YOST TRUST, and ) 
JOHN DOES I-X, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) 
County of Bonneville ) 
Case No. CV-2009-3488 
Docket No. 39204-2011 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATION 
OF EXHIBITS 
I, Ronald Longmore, Clerk ofthe District Court of the Seventh Judicial District ofthe State of 
I 
Idaho, in and for the County of Bonneville, do hereby certifY that the foregoing Exhibits were marked for 
identification and offered in evidence, admitted, and used and considered by the Court! in its determination: 
please see attached sheets (0 pages). 
NO EXHIBITS 
And I further certifY that all of said Exhibits are on file in my office and are part of this record on 
Appeal in this cause, and are hereby transmitted to the Supreme Court. 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATION OF EXHIBITS-l 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the District Court 
this 23 rd day of December, 2011. 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATION OF EXHIBITS - 2 
RONALD LONGMORE 
Clerk of the District Court 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
DARRYL HARRIS and CHRlSTINE ) 
HARRIS, husband and wife, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs! Appellants, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
THE BANK OF COMMERCE, an Idaho ) 
corporation, ) 
) 
DefendantlRespondent ) 
) 
~~ ) 
) 
DUANE L. YOST and LORI YOST, ) 
husb~d and wife; DUANE L. YOST as ) 
Trustee of the DUANE L. YOST TRUST, and ) 
JOHN DOES I-X, ) 
) 
Defend~t. ) 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) 
County of Bonneville ) 
Case No. CV-2009-3488 
Docket No. 39204-2011 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
I, Ronald Longmore, Clerk of the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, of the State of 
Idaho, in and for the County of Bonneville, do hereby certifY that the above and foregoing Record in the 
above-entitled cause was compiled and bound under my direction and is a true, correct ~d complete 
Record of the pleadings ~d documents as are automatically required under Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate 
Rules. 
I do further certifY that no exhibits were either offered or admitted in the above-entitled cause, that 
the Clerk's Record will be duly lodged with the Clerk of the Supreme Court, as required by Rule 31 of the 
CLERK'S CERTIFICA TE - 1 
f' . '· 8 
~ ..... ' 
Idaho Appellate Rules. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal 6fthe District Court 
at Idaho Falls, Idaho, this 23 rd day of December, 2011. 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE - 2 
RONALD LONGMORE 
Clerk of the District Court 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
I 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
DARRYL HARRIS and CHRISTINE ) 
HARRIS, husband and wife, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs! Appellants, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
THE BANK OF COMMERCE, an Idaho ) 
corporation, ) 
) 
DefendantlRespondent ) 
) 
and, ) 
) 
DUANE L. YOST and LORI YOST, ) 
husband and wife; DUANE L. YOST as ) 
Trustee of the DUANE L. YOST TRUST, and ) 
JOHN DOES I-X, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
Case No. CV-2009-3488 
Docket No. 39204-2011 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 
CL~'l UCLV-)(- . 
day ofd.Lt;;!;;talJ..lJ(;F,,-:t;trH, IJserved a copy of the Reporter's 
Transcript (if requested) and the Clerk's Record in the Appeal to the Supreme Court in the above entitled 
cause upon the following attorneys: 
Kipp Manwaring 
MANWARING LAW OFFICE 
381 Shoup Ave., Ste. 210 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
I 
Brian Tucker 
NELSON HALL PARRY TUCKER 
PO Box 51630 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-1630 
by depositing a copy of each thereof in the United States mail, postage prepaid, in an envelope addressed 
CERTIFICA TE OF SERVICE - I 
~".""- ,n 
1,,_ 0 
to said attorneys at the foregoing address, which is the last address of said attorneys known to me. 
CERTIFICA TE OF SERVICE - 2 
RONALD LONGMORE 
Clerk ofthe District Court 
By: ~~~ ________________ __ 
Deputy Clerk 
